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I. INTRODUcnON 
The survival of individual wild animals, as well as species of 
wildlife, is dependent upon habitat, which provides wildlife with 
food, shelter, protection (from human and animal predators), breed-
ing sites, and sites for rearing and nesting their young. In order for a 
particular area or ecosystem to provide a suitable habitat for a 
particular species of wildlife, the area may have to contain certain 
types of geological features (e.g., caves, mountains, etc.), particular 
types of waterbodies, particular types of trees or plants, or other spe-
cies of wildlife.1 The destruction or alteration of wildlife habitat may 
deprive members of that wildlife species of food, shelter, protection, 
reproduction sites, or nesting sites, and cause the death of individual 
wild animals and, eventually, the extinction of an entire species of 
wildlife.2 Habitat modification of a wildlife species may result in the 
eventual extinction of the species when members of the species are 
unable to adapt to changes in their habitat because they have 
"become intimately tied" to the conditions of their existing habitat 
"through evolution."3 
Representative Sullivan, the floor manager of the House version 
of the Endangered Species Act of 1973,4 stated during a legislative 
process that: 
For the most part, the principal threat to animals stems from the 
destruction of their habitat. The destruction may be intentional, as 
would be the case in clearing of fields and forests for development 
or resource extraction, or it may be unintentional, as in the case of 
the spread of pesticides beyond their target area. Whether it is in-
tentional or not, however, the result is unfortunate for the species of 
animals that depend on that habitat, most of whom are already liv-
ing on the edge of survivaLs 
1. For example, some types of bird species may forage on insects, fruits, and seeds found 
only in particular types of trees in particular locations, see Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land &: 
Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 998-90 (D. Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981); 
Sierra Oub v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, 1265 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part and vacated in part sub. 
nom. Sierra Oub v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991), and also may be dependent upon the 
same types of trees for shelter, "reproduction requirements," and nesting sites. See Sierra Club 
v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. at 1265; Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land &: Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 
at 989. '" 
2. See PaUla v. Hawaii Dep't of Land &: Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (D. 
Haw. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9thCir. 1988); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. at 1271-72. 
3. Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 989 n.7. See Sierra Oub v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. at 1269 ("[T)he 
actions of man have taken an increasing toll on the survivability of various species, particular-
ly those which. due to their particular habits and lifestyles, are unable to adapt to a changing 
environment. A). 
4. 16 U.S.c. §§ 1531-44 (1988). 
5. 119 CONGo REC. H3Q,162 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1973). 
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The United States Supreme Court has noted that lIin shaping the 
[Endangered Species] Act, Congress started from the finding that 
'[t]he two major causes of extinction are hunting and destruction of 
natural habitat.' ... Of these twin threats, Congress was informed 
that the greatest was destruction of natural habitat.1I6 The drafters of 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973: 
realized that the degradation of habitats posed one of the gravest 
threats to the continued existence of endangered and threatened 
species .... Indeed, the first stated purpose of the ESA is "to provide 
a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered and 
threatened species depend may be conserved .... "7 
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 contains several provisions 
that seek to protect and preserve the habitat of endangered species8 
and threatened species.9 Section 510 of the Endangered Species Act 
grants the Secretaries of the Interior, Commerce and Agriculture 
authority to acquire land to preserve the habitat of protected species 
as part of conservation programs for endangered and threatened 
6. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978) (citation omitted). 
7. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1,8 (D.C Cir. 1993) (Mikva, C J., concurring) 
(quoting 16 U.S.C § 1531(b) (1988», modified on other grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C Cir. 1994), 
reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). 
8. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 defines "endangered species" to mean "any species 
which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than a 
species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection 
under the provisions of this chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to 
man" 16 U.S.C § 1532(6) (1988). The term "species" is defined by the Act to include "any sub-
species of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of 
vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature." 16 U.S.C § 1532(16) (1988). Par-
ticular species of wildlife are designated as an endangered species pursuant to the procedures 
of section 4 of the Act. 16 U.S.C § 1533 (1988). Species of wildlife that have been listed as en-
dangered are set forth at 50 CF.R. § 17.11 (1993). 
9. "Threatened species" is defined by the Endangered Species Act to mean "any species 
which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all 
or a significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C § 1532(20) (1988). Particular species of wildlife 
are designated as threatened species pursuant to the procedures of section 4 of the Act. 16 
U.S.C § 1533 (1988). Species of wildlife that have been listed as threatened are set forth at 50 
CF.R. § 17.11 (1993). 
Pursuant to 16 U.s.C §§ 1532(15) &: 1533(a)(2) (1988), the Fish and Wildlife Service (for the 
Secretary of the Interior) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (for the Secretary 
of Commerce) share responsibility for implementing and enforcing the provisiOns of the En-
dangered Species Act with respect to endangered and threatened species of fish and wildlife. 
See 50 CF.R. §§ 17.2(b), 17.11 (1993). Endangered and threatened marine species under the 
jurisdiction of the NMFS are listed at 50 CF.R. §§ 222.23(a), 227.4 (1993). NMFS regulations 
governing takings of protected terrestrial species under its jurisdiction are at 50 CF.R. §§ 
220.50-.53, 222.21-.28, and 227.11-.72 (1993). This article will analyze only Fish and Wildlife 
Service regulations governing the taking of terrestrial endangered and threatened species of 
fish and wildlife; NMFS regulations governing takings of endangered and threatened marine 
species will not be analyzed in this article. 
10. 16 U.S.C § 1534 (1988). 
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species of.fish, wildlife and plants.11 Section 712 of the Endangered 
Species Act protects endangered and threatened species habitat, by 
requiring each federal agency to "insure that any action authorized, 
funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened spe-
cies or result in destruction or adverse modification of habitat of 
such species" which has been determined by the Secretary of the In-
terior or Commerce to be "critical."13 Sections 9(a)(1)(B) and (C)14 of 
the Endangered Species Act also make it illegal for any person to 
"take" any listed endangered species of fish or wildlife within the 
United States or the territorial sea of the United States or upon the 
high seas. This prohibition of takings of endangered species has 
been extended to threatened species of wildlife by Fish and Wildlife 
Service regulations.15 
The Fish and Wildlife Service also adopted a regulation16 speci-
fying that modification or degradation of the habitat of a listed 
endangered or threatened species of wildlife constitutes, in certain 
circumstances, "harm" (and therefore a "take") in violation of the En-
dangered Species Act,17 This regulation, however, leaves a number 
of questions unanswered regarding when habitat modification con-
stitutes "harm" in violation of the Endangered Species Act,18 
A disagreement has recently occurred between United States 
Courts of Appeals as to the validity of this Fish and Wildlife Service 
regulation providing that modification or destruction of wildlife 
habitat, in certain circumstances, can be a "harm" in violation of the 
Endangered Species Act. In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit held that this regulation "serves the overall pur-
pose of the Act" and "is also consistent with the policy of Congress 
evidenced by the legislative history."19 In 1994, however, a divided 
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia invalidated the Fish and Wildlife Service regulation 
11. See Sweet Home Chapter v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279, 283-84 (D.D.C. 1992), aff d sub nom. 
Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.c. Cir. 1993), modified on other grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 
(D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cut. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Gan. 6, 
1995) (No. 94-859). 
12. 16 U.S.c. § 1536 (1988). 
13. Id. at § 1536(a)(2). See Babbitt, 17 F.3d at 1467. See also infra notes 114-27 and accom-
panying text. 
14. 16 U.S.c. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B)-(q (1988). 
15. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1993). See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text. 
16. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993). 
17. See infra notes 149-62 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 162-229 and accompanying text. 
19. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988). 
See infra notes 207-58 and accompanying text. 
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defining "harm" to include habitat modification.2o On January 6, 
1995, the United States Supreme Court granted the federal govern-
ment's petition for certiorari in this case to address the validity on its 
face of the Fish and Wildlife Service's regulation that makes signifi-
cant habitat modification a prohibited taking under the Endangered 
Species Act.21 
The question of whether under the Endangered Species Act a 
prohibited "taking" of an endangered or threatened species of wild-
life can include the modification or destruction of a protected spe-
cies' habitat is significant because the Act's taking prohibition applies 
to any person,22 including an individual, a corporation, and an offi-
cer, employee or agent of federal, state and local govemments,23 and 
is enforced through civil penalties,24 criminal penalties,25 and injunc-
tive relief.26 If the Act's prohibition on the "taking" of listed endan-
gered and threatened species applies to habitat modification in 
certain circumstances, the Act's taking prohibition will in many cases 
prohibit development of private land that serves as habitat for an en-
dangered or threatened species of wildlife, unless the person either 
qualifies for an exemption from the Act's taking prohibition,27 or 
such prohibition constitutes a taking of private property without just 
20. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 
(D.c. Cir. 1994), cut. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 ijan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). See infra notes 322-461 
and accompanying text. In 1993 this panel held, in a preenforcement challenge, that the Fish 
and Wildlife Service's regulation defining "harm" was not facially void for vagueness and was 
not invalid in violation of the Endangered Species Act. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 
1 (D.C. Cir. 1993), modified on other grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 
190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cut. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 ijan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859); see infra notes 261-
320 and accompanying text. However, the panel granted a petition for rehearing and, based 
on Judge Stephen Williams changing his position, invalidated the Fish and Wildlife Service's 
definition of "harm" which included habitat modification. 17 F.3d at 1465, 1472. 
Later in 1994, the divided panel, per curiam, denied the appellees' petition for rehearing, 30 
F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994); the en bane United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia denied the appellees' suggestion for rehearing en banco rd. 
21. Babbitt V. Sweet Home Chapter, 115 S. Ct. 714 ijan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). Oral argu-
ments are scheduled for April 17, 1995. 
22. 16 U.S.c. § 1538(a)(1)(B)-(q (1988). 
23. The Endangered Species Act defines "person" to mean "an individual, corporation, 
partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, 
department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or poli-
tical subdivision of a State; or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 
16 US.C. § 1532(13) (1988). 
24. ld. at § 154O(a). See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. 
25. 16 US.c. § 154O(b) (1988). See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. 
26. 16 US.c. §§ 154O(e)(6), (g) (1988). See infra notes 99-113 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra notes SO-85 and accompanying text. 
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compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.28 
This article will first analyze provisions of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act that make it illegal for any person to "take" any endangered 
species of fish or wildlife, and the Fish and Wildlife Service regula-
tions that make it illegal for any person to "take" any threatened 
species of wildlife. The article then analyzes exemptions under the 
Act and the Fish and Wildlife Service regulations from the general 
prohibitions on taking any endangered or threatened species of wild-
life. Also, this section discusses the Ads enforcement of the taking 
prohibitions through civil penalties, criminal penalties, and injunc-
tive relief. 
After comparing the protection of wildlife habitat provided by 
section 7 of the Endangered Species Act with habitat protection pro-
vided by the Act's taking prohibitions, this article analyzes the Fish 
and Wildlife Service regulations that define when a "take" occurs. 
This section of the article focuses particularly on when modification 
or destruction of a listed endangered or threatened species' habitat 
constitutes a "take." This section of the article identifies situations 
where uncertainty exists in determining when modification or altera-
tion of a wildlife habitat constitutes a "take" in violation of these 
regulations; also, various interpretations of the regulations are 
suggested. These suggested interpretations may be adopted by the 
Fish and Wildlife Service as formal amendments to their regulations. 
This adoption would give more guidance to courts and persons sub-
ject to regulation under the Endangered Species Act and further the 
Act's purposes.29 . 
28. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Nollan v. California 
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1334-35 (9th Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989). See also Patricia A. Hageman, Comment, Fifth. Amendment 
Takings Issues Raised by Section' 9 of the Endangered Species Act, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 375 
(1994); see also Michelle Desiderio, The ESA: Facing Hard Truths and Advocating Responsible 
Refonn, 8 NAT. REsoUkCES & ENV'T, Summer 1993, at 37, 80-81. This article will not analyze the 
issue of when a prohibition on land development or habitat modification, under the 
Endangered Species Act's "takings" provision, constitutes a taking of private property without 
just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
29. An alternative to adopting formal amendments to Fish and Wildlife Service regula-
tions would be pre-land development rulings by the Fish and Wildlife Service as to whether a 
specific use or development of a particular parcel of private or public land would "take" a 
listed endangered or threatened species of wildlife by destroying or modifying wildlife habitat. 
See Steven P. Quarles et aI., The Unsettled Law of ESA Takings, 8 NAT. REsoURCES & ENV'T, 
Summer 1993, at 10, 61. There are "several practicable difficulties with this approach." Id. 
Consequently, formal amendment of the Fish and Wildlife Service regulation defining when a 
"take" occurs under the Endangered Species Act, through notice-and-comment procedures of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.c. § 553 (1988), is a preferable approach for providing 
the public and the courts with guidance as to when modification of wildlife habitat constitutes 
a "take" in violation of the Endangered Species Act. Such guidance might be provided by the 
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Finally, this article analyzes the opinions of the Ninth Circuit and 
District of Columbia Courts of Appeal that have addressed the 
validity of the Fish and Wildlife Service's regulation defining when 
"harm" (and therefore a "take") occur~ under the Endangered Species 
Act. The article concludes that the Fish and W~dlife Service regula-
tion defining "harm" is not facially void for vagueness in violation of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, and the United States Supreme Court should uphold 
the Fish and Wildlife Service regulation as a reasonable agency inter-
pretation of an ambiguous provision of the Endangered Species Act, 
using the standard of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council.3O 
II. PRoHIBmoNS ON TAKINGS OF ENDANGERED AND THREATENED 
SPEOES 
Except as provided in two provisions of the Endangered Species 
Act,31 section 9(a)(1)(B)32 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
makes it unlawful for any person,33 within the United States or the 
territorial sea of the United States, to take endangered species34 of 
fish or wildlife listed pursuant to section 435 of the Act.36 Section 9 
Fish and Wildlife Service stating "informally that it will not prosecute some types of land use 
activities as takings." Quarles et al., supra, at 61. 
30. 467 US. 837 (1984). 
31. 16 U.S.c. §§ 1535(g)(2), 1539 (1988). See infra notes 50-85 and accompanying text. 
32 16 U.S.c. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1988). 
33. "Person" is defined under the Act by 16 US.c. § 1532(13) (1988). See supra note 23. 
American Indians are within the Act's definition of "person." United States v. Billie, 667 F. 
Supp. 1485, 1491 (S.D. Fla. 1987). Enforcement of the Act's taking prohibition against a state, a 
state agency, and a state employee does not violate either the Tenth or Eleventh Amendment 
of the United States Constitution. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land &: Natural Resources, 471 F. 
Supp. 985 (0. Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). 
34. "Endangered species" is defined under the Act by 16 US.c. § 1532(6) (1988). See supra 
note 8. 
35. 16 US.c. § 1533 (1988). 
36. Section 9(1)(q of the Endangered Species Act. 16 US.c. § 1538(a)(1)(q (1988), also 
makes it unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to take upon 
the high seas any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed under section 4 of the Act, id. at § 
1533 (1988), except as provided in 16 US.C. §§ 1535(g)(2) &: 1539. 
The Endangered Species Act. however, does not make it illegal for a person to "take" an 
endangered plant species that has been listed under section 4 of the Act. Section 9(a)(2)(B), 16 
U.S.c. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1988), of the Act, as implemented by Fish and Wildlife Service regula-
tions, 50 C.F.R. § 17.61(c)(1) (1993), however, makes it illegal, except as provided in 16 U.S.c. § 
1535(g)(2) or 16 US.c. § 1539, for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to 
remove and reduce to possession any listed endangered species of plants: 
from areas under Federal jurisdiction; maliciously damage or destroy any such 
species on any such area; or remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy any such 
species on any other area in knowing violation of any law or regulation of any 
State or in the course of any violation of a State criminal trespass law. 
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only prohibits the taking of endangered species of fish and wildlife, 
not the taking of threatened species of fish and wildlife. The Fish 
and Wildlife Service, however, has adopted a regulation37 that pro-
vides, subject to some exceptions, that it is unlawful for any person 
to take any listed threatened species of wildlife. 
The Fish and Wildlife Service adopted this regulation on the 
basis of authority provided by section 4(d) of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, which provides in pertinent part: 
Whenever any species is listed as a threatened species ... , the 
Secretary shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary and 
advisable to provide for the conservation of such species. The 
Secretary may by regulation prohibit with respect to any threatened 
species any act prohibited under section 1S38(a)(1) of this title, in 
the case of fish or wildlife .... 38 
The Fish and Wildlife Service through regulation39 "established a 
regime in which the prohibitions established for endangered species 
are extended automatically to all threatened species by a blanket rule 
and then withdrawn as appropriate by special rule for particular 
species and by permit in particular situations."4O This regulation wa~ 
challenged in Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt41 (Sweet Home 1), on two 7 
grounds: first, that section 4(d) of the Endangered Species Act re-
quires the Fish and Wildlife Service to extend the Act's endangered 
species prohibitions to threatened species only on a species-by-
species basis; and, second, that the Fish and Wildlife Service can 
This provision makes it illegal to remove an endangered plant species from private land only if 
a person knowingly violates state law or violates a state trespass law in doing so. Subject to 
some exceptions, the prohibition on removing and reducing to possession endangered plants 
from an area under Federal jurisdiction, has been extended to threatened plants. 50 C.F.R. § 
17.71(a) (1993). This article will only analyze the Endangered Species Act's prohibitions on the 
taking of endangered and threatened species of fish and wildlife. 
37. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1993). 
38. 16 U.S.c. § 1533(d) (1988). 
39. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1993). 
40. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1,5 (D.c. Cir. 1993), modified on other grounds, 17 
F.3d 1463 (O.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (O.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 
aan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). The Fish and Wildlife Service regulation generally prohibits the 
taking of threatened species of wildlife, "except as provided in subpart A of this part, or in a 
permit issued under ... subpart [0]." 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1993). The Fish and Wildlife Service 
"actually issued special rules for a substantial number of the fish and wildlife species listed as 
threatened." See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.40-48. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d at 7. In addition, 
Fish and Wildlife Service permits under 50 c.F.R. § 17.32 authorizing the taking of threatened 
species of wildlife "are more readily available" than are permits under 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22-.23 
authorizing the taking of endangered species of wildlife. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 
F.3d at 7. This article will not further discuss these special rules, 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.40-.48 (1993), 
which authorize certain takings of specific threatened species. 
41. 1 F.3d 1 (D.c. Cir. 1993), modified on petition for reh'g, 17 F.3d 1463 (O.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g 
denied, 30 F.3d 190 (O.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 aan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). 
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extend the Act's endangered species prohibitions to a threatened spe-
cies of wildlife only after making a specific and formal finding and 
explanation that such an extension was "necessary and· advisable II 
within the meaning of the first sentence of section 4(d) of the Act.42 
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia rejected both of these arguments in Sweet Home I. This 
panel upheld the Fish and Wildlife Service's regulation generally 
prohibiting the taking of all listed threatened species of wildlife lias a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute, II "in light of the substantial 
deference II the court owes the agency under the principles of Chevron 
USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.43 The court stated 
that "[t]he statute does not unambiguously compel the agency to 
expand regulatory protection for threatened species only by promul-
gating regulations that are specific to individual species."44 The 
panel also held that the Fish and Wildlife Service was not required to 
make a "necessary and advisable" finding before promulgating the 
regulation on the grounds that lithe two sentences of § lS33(d) repre-
sent separate grants of authority. The second sentence gives the 
[Fish and Wildlife Service] discretion to apply any or all of the § 
lS38(a)(l) prohibitions to threatened species without obligating it to 
support such actions with findings of necessity."45 
A. Definition of II Take II Under the Endangered Species Act 
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 defines "take" to mean lito 
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or 
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."46 This broad 
42. See Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d at 5-6. 
43. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See infra notes 238-40, 392-96, 453 and accompanying text. 
44. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d at 6. The panel reviewed the singular vs. plural 
issue in 16 U.s.c. § 1533(d) (1988), and legislative history of the Endangered Species Act, and 
concluded that "the possible conflict" between the Senate and House Reports on the Endan-
gered Species Act and "apparent inconsistency within [16 U.S.c. § 1533(d») itself as to singular 
and plural, shows the perils of attempting to use ambiguous legislative history to clarify am-
biguous words within statutes." 1 F.3d at 6. 
45. 1 F.3d at 7-8. The panel stated that "[o)nIy the first sentence of § 1533(d) contains the 
'necessary and advisable' language and mandates formal individualized findings. This sen-
tence requires the [Fish and Wildlife Service) to issue whatever other regulations are 'necessary 
and advisable: including regulations that impose protective measures beyond those contained 
in § 1538(a)(1)." Id. at 8. 
46. 16 U.S.c. § 1532(19) (1988). Fish and Wildlife Service regulations also define "take" in 
this manner. 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1993). A court will engage in de novo judicial review of a claim 
that certain conduct constitutes a "take" in violation of section 9 of the Endangered Species Act 
when the takings claim does not involve an examination of the consultation process between a 
federal agency and the Fish and Wildlife Service under section 7 of the Endangered Species 
Act, 16 U.S.c. § 1536 (1988). See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 438 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(dictum). 
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definition seemingly does not require that an animal be killed. The 
Act's definition of "take" also does not, on its face, require that a per-
son know, or have reason to know, that their conduct will "take" a 
listed endangered or threatened species of wildlife. Although the 
Act does not define any of the terms included within the Act's defini-
tion of "take, II the Fish and Wildlife Service has promulgated regula-
tions47 defining the terms "harass" and "harm" in the Act's definition 
of II take. II These Fish and Wildlife Service regulations define "harm" 
to include "significant habitat modification or. degradation where it 
actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential 
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering."48 
The Service's definitions of "harm" and "harass" are analyzed later in 
this article49 following analysis of exemptions from the Act's takings 
prohibitions, enforcement of the Act's takings prohibitions, and com-
parison of habitat protection under sections 7 and 9 of the Act. 
B. Exemptions from the Act's Takings Prohibitions 
"Congress has drawn several extraordinarily narrow exceptions 
to the Act's prohibitions."50 Although section 9(a)(1)51 contains expli-
cit exceptions to the general prohibitions on taking endangered spe-
cies of fish or wildlife under 16 U.s.c. §§ 1535(g)(2) and 1539, Fish 
and Wildlife Service regulations and other provisions of the Act con-
tain additional exceptions.52 There are several provisions of the Act 
47. 50 CF.R. § 17.3 (1993). 
48. [d. 
49. See infra notes 128-229 and accompanying text. 
50. United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (S.D. Fla. 1987). 
51. 16 U.S.C § 1538(a)(1) (1988). 
52. Fish and Wildlife Service regulations provide that notwithstanding the general pro-
hibitions on the takings of endangered and threatened species, "any person may take endan-
gered [or threatened wildlife] in defense of his own life or the lives of others." 50 CF.R. §§ 
17.21(c)(2), .31(a) (1993). Fish and Wildlife Service regulations also authorize permits for 
takings of endangered and threatened species of wildlife "to prevent undue economic hard-
ship." 50 CF.R. §§ 17.23, .32(a) (1993). These regulations arguably are authorized by 16 U.s.C 
§ 1540(f) (1988), which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior "to promulgate such regulations 
as may be appropriate to enforce" the Endangered Species Act. Similarly, a person who acts 
"on a good faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a member of his or her 
family, or any other individual from bodily harm, from any endangered or threatened species" 
is exempt from civil penalties, 16 U.S.C § 1540(a)(3) (1988), and criminal penalties, id. § 
1540(b)(3), for illegally taking an endangered or threatened species of fish or wildlife. Fish and 
Wildlife Service special rules, 50 CF.R. §§ 17.40-.48 (1993), authorize takings of specific 
threatened species under certain circumstances. See supra note 40. 
In addition, the Secretary of the Interior's authority to "issue such regulations as he deems 
necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of" listed threatened species, 16 U.S.C 
§ 1533(d) (1988), and the Act's definition of "conservation"-which "in the extraordinary case 
where population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved, may 
include regulated taking," id. § 1532(3) - permit the secretary to issue regulations authorizing 
the taking of a threatened species if he has determined that "population pressures within ... 
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which may exempt a person, engaging in land development activi-
ties that modify or destroy wildlife habitat, from the Act's prohibi-
tions on takings. 
First, the Secretary of the Interior may permit a taking of wildlife, 
otherwise prohibited by section 9(a)(1)(B)53 of the Act, "if such taking 
is incidental to, and not [for] the purpose of, the carrying out of an 
otherwise lawful activity."54 To obtain an incidental takings permit, 
a person must submit a habitat conservation plan (HCP) to the Fish 
and Wildlife Service that will minimize and mitigate the impacts of 
[the animal's] ecosystem cannot otherwise be relieved." Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 613 
(8th Cir. 1985) (dictum). See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Turner, No. CIV. A. 91-2201 (MB), 1991 
WL 206232 (D.D.C. Sept. 27,1991); Note, The Taking a/Threatened Species Under the Endangered 
Species Act: Fund for Animals v. Turner, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 109 (1993). 
Under section 10(e), 16 U.S.c. § 1539(e) (1988), of the Endangered Species Act, any Indian, 
Aleut, or Eskimo who is an Alaskan Native residing in Alaska, "and any non-native permanent 
resident of an Alaskan native village," is not subject to the Endangered Species Act's prohibi-
tions on the taking of endangered or threatened species, "if such taking is primarily for subsis-
tence purposes," id. § 1539(e)(1), and is not "accomplished in a wasteful manner." [d. § 
1539(e)(2). This exemption does "not apply to any non-native resident of an Alaskan native 
village found by the Secretary to be not primarily dependent upon the taking of fish and wild-
life for consumption or for the creation and sale of authentic native articles of handicrafts and 
clothing." [d. § 1539(e)(1). The Secretary of the Interior or Commerce may regulate such sub-
sistence takings wherever the Secretary determines "that such taking materially and negatively 
affects the threatened or endangered species." ld. at § 1539(e)(4). See 50 C.F.R. § 17.5 (1993). 
While one court held that the Act's prohibitions on takings are not applicable to other Indians 
who take endangered or threatened species on an Indian reservation for non-commercial pur-
poses pursuant to treaty rights, United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1270 (8th Cir. 1985) (en 
banc), rro'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 734 (1986), another court has held that Indians are 
exempt from the Act's prohibition on takings only to the extent provided in 16 U.S.c. § 1539(e). 
United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987). 
Section 10(a)(1)(A), 16 U.S.c. § 1539(a)(1)(A) (1988), of the Endangered Species Act author-
izes the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce to issue permits authorizing otherwise pro-
hibited takings of endangered or threatened species of wildlife "for scientific purposes or to 
enhance the propagation or survival of the affected species, including, but not limited to, acts 
necessary for the establishment and maintenance of experimental populations pursuant to [16 
U.S.c. § 15390) (1988)]." See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(a), .32(a) (1993). 
Fish and Wildlife Service regulations authorize certain federal and state employees and 
agents, when acting within the scope of their official duties, to take endangered and threatened 
species without a permit, "to aid a sick, injured, or orphaned specimen," to "dispose of a dead 
specimen," to "(s]alvage a dead specimen which may be useful for scientific study," or to 
"remove specimens which pose a demonstrable but nonimmediate threat to human safety." 50 
C.F.R. §§ 17.21(c)(3), .21(c)(4), .31(a) (1993). In addition, qualified employees or agents of a 
state conservation agency that have a "Cooperative Agreement with the Fish and Wildlife 
Service in accordance with section 6(c) [16 U.s.c. § 1535(c) (1988)] of the Act," are authorized to 
take endangered or threatened species under the agreement for conservation purposes. 50 
C.F.R. §§ 17.21(c)(5), .31(b) (1993). These regulations apparently are based upon authority con-
ferred on the Secretary of the Interior under 16 U.S.c. § 1540(f) (1994) to promulgate regula-
tions needed to enforce the Act. 
53. 16 U.S.c. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994). 
54. [d. § 1539(a)(1)(B). Fish and Wildlife Service regulations regarding the permits for 
endangered species of wildlife are at 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b) (1993). The Fish and Wildlife Service 
has adopted regulations authorizing permits for incidental taking of threatened species of 
wildlife. 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b) (1993). 
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such incidental taking to the maximum extent practicable. The Fish 
and Wildlife Service must also find that lithe taking will not appre-
ciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the 
species in the wild.1I55 Although a section 10 incidental takings per-
mit may allow land development to modify or destroy wildlife 
habitat, development of an Hep can be expensive, complicated and 
time-consuming.56 
Notwithstanding the Act's prohibitions against taking endan-
gered and threatened species of wildlife, any taking that complies 
with the specific terms and conditions of a written statement under 
section 7(b)(4)(C)(iv)57 is not lIa prohibited taking.1I58 The Fish and 
Wildlife Service must provide a written statement to a federal agency 
when the Service, after consultation with the agency pursuant to 
section 7(a)(2)59 of the Act: 
concludes that-
(A) the agency action will not violate such subsection, or offers rea-
sonable and prudent alternatives which the Secretary believes 
would not violate such subsection; 
(B) the taking of an endangered species or a threatened species inci-
dental to the agency action would not violate such subsection; and 
55. 16 U.S.c. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (1988). "Section 10(a) provides procedural means by 
which to improve the trade-off between protecting endangered species and permitting normal 
development. Firms whose activities might incidentally 'take' members of an endangered 
species can get advanced protection from legal liability, but only if they convince the Secretary 
that the plan uses the maximum devices possible to mitigate and minimize species loss, and 
that the resulting losses will not unduly harm the species. See § 10(a)(2)(B)(ii) & (iv), 16 U.S.c. 
§ 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii) & (iv)." Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1468 (D.c. Cir. 1994) 
(Sweet Home II), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Uan. 6, 
1995) (No. 94-859). The majority in Sweet Home II concluded that an "incidental taking" for 
which a permit can be issued under section 10(a)(I)(B) of the Act does not include "significant 
habit!1t modification injurious to wildlife." Id. See infra notes 357-63 and accompanying text. 
The dissent in Sweet Home II argued that an "incidental taking" under section 10(a)(I)(8) can 
include habitat modification that constitutes a "take" under 50 c.F.R. § 17.3. 17 F.3d at 1477 
(Mikva, C.]., dissenting). See infra notes 428-31 and accompanying text. 
56. See Robert D. Thornton, The Search for a Conservation Planning Paradigm: Section 10 of 
the ESA, 8 NAT. REsoURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1993, at 21 [hereinafter Thornton, Conservation 
Planning Paradigm]; Robert D. Thornton, Takings Under Endangered Species Act Section 9,4 NAT. 
REsoURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1990, at 7, 9, 50 [hereinafter Thornton, Takings]. 
Habitat conservation plans for section 10(a) incidental take permits can cover "large tracts 
of land. . .. The plan to protect the California gnatcatcher, for example, covers 3.8 million 
acres." Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 
714 Uan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). 
57. 16 U.S.c. § 1536(b)(4)(Q(iv) (1988). 
58. Id. at § 1536(0)(2). 
59. Id. at § 1536(a)(2). See infra notes 114-27, 340-56 and accompanying text. 
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(C) if an endangered or threatened species of a marine mammal is 
involved, the taking is authorized pursuant to [16 U.S.c. § 
1371(a)(5)].6O 
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The statement must specify the terms and conditions that the federal 
agency, applicant, or both, must comply with to implement specified 
reasonably prudent measures, minimizing the incidental taking. The 
statement must also adopt necessary measures to comply with 16 
U.S.c. § 1371(a)(5) regarding marine mammals.61 
This "exemption," however, can only be triggered by a section 7 
consultation. Conversely, a section 7 consultation requires some 
federal agency action. Thus, before a private landowner can take a 
listed species under section 7, there must be a "nexus between the 
proposed taking and a federal agency action."62 This nexus only 
exists if the private landowner's taking results from an "action 
authorized, funded, or carried out" by a federal agency.63 Further-
more, this exemption does not apply to a taking, resulting from an 
existing physical condition, that is the subject of an incidental taking 
statement under section 7(b)(4) of the Act.64 
To qualify for this exemption, a federal "agency must obtain an 
incidental taking statement before it takes the protected species."65 A 
Fish and Wildlife Service statement "does not retroactively excuse 
the takings that occurred before the Secretary [of the Interior] issued 
the statement. 1166 However, if a federal agency can show that it sub-
sequently obtained authorization from the Fish and Wildlife Service 
and complied with the requirements of a section 7(b)(4) incidental 
taking statement, a court should lift an injunction against the agency 
action constituting a taking under the Endangered Species ACt.67 
When federal agency action or private action is authorized or 
funded by a federal agency,68 section 7(0)(1) provides an alternate 
method of exempting land development activities.69 Section 7(0)(1) 
provides that, notwithstanding the Act's prohibitions, any exempt 
60. 16 U.S.c. § 1536(b)(4) (1988). 
61. Id. § 1536(b)(4)(Q. Regulations implementing this exemption are at 50 C.F.R. § 
402.14(i) (1993). 
62. Thornton, Takings, supra note 56, at 8. 
63. 16 U.S.c. § 1536(a)(2) (1988). See Deborah L. Freeman, Reinitiation of ESA § 7 
Consultlltions over Existing Projects, 8 NAT. REsoURCES &: ENV'T, Summer 1993, at 17, 17-18; see 
also infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text. 
64. See Swan View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 937 (D. Mont. 1992). 
65. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1989). 
66.Id. 
67.Id. 
68. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 114-27, 340-56 and 
accompanying text. 
69. 16 U.S.c. § 1536(0)(1) (1988). 
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action under section 7(h)10 of the Act "shall not be considered to be a 
taking of any endangered or threatened species with respect to any 
activity which is necessary to carry out such action."71 The Endan-
gered Species Committee (the so-called "God Squad"72) is required to 
issue exemptions under 7(h) if it makes determinations that: "there 
are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action "; the 
action's benefits "clearly outweigh" the benefits of alternative courses 
of action "consistent with conserving the species or its critical habitat, 
and such action is in the public interest "; and the action is regionally 
or nationally significant.73 An additional finding that the Committee 
must make in order to be required to issue a section 7(h) exemption 
is that the action "establishes such reasonable mitigation and 
enhancement measures ... as are necessary and appropriate to mini-
mize the adverse effects of the agency action upon the endangered 
species, threatened species, or critical habitat concerned."74 The 
Committee, however, has granted only a few exemptions under 
section 7(h).75 
In states that are parties to cooperative agreements under section 
6(c)16 of the Endangered Species Act, land development modifying 
wildlife habitat may be exempted, under sections 4( d) and 
6(g)(2)(A),77 from the Act's takings prohibitions. Where the habitat 
70. Id. § 1536(h). 
71. Id. § 1536(0)(1). 
72. Wm. Robert Irvin, The Endangered Species Act: Keeping Every Cog and Wheel, 8 NAT. 
REsoURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1993, at 36, 39. 
73. Id. § 1536(h)(I)(A). Section 7(p), 16 U.S.c. § 1536(p) (1988), authorizes the President, 
when acting under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.s.c. § 5121, to 
make the determinations required by sections 7(g) and (h), 16 U.S.c. § 1536(g) & (h) (1988), for 
any project repairing or replacing a public facility in a designated major disaster area, "which 
the President determines (1) is necessary to prevent the recurrence of such a natural disaster 
and to reduce the potential loss of human life, and (2) to involve an emergency situation which 
does not allow the ordinary procedures of [section 7] to be followed." The Committee is 
required to accept the President's determinations under section 7(p). 16 U.s.c. § 1536(p) 
(1988). 
74. Id. § 1536(h)(I)(B). Regulations governing issuance of exemptions by the Endangered 
Species Committee are at 50 C.F.R. §§ 450.01-453.06 (1993). 
Section 70), 16 U.S.c. § 15360) (1988), alternatively provides that "[n]otwithstanding any 
other provision of [the Endangered Species Act], the Committee shall grant an exemption for 
any agency action if the Secretary of Defense finds that such exemption is necessary for 
reasons of national security." See 50 C.F.R. § 453.03(d) (1993). 
Section 7(i), 16 U.S.c. § 1536(i) (1988), prohibits the Committee "from considering for 
exemption any application" for proposed agency action if the Secretary of State, after follOWing 
prescribed procedures, certifies in writing to the Committee that the granting of the exemption 
and the implementation of the action would violate an international treaty or commitment of 
the United States. 
75. As of the summer of 1993, the Committee had met only three times during the nearly 
15 years of section 7(h)'s existence. Irvin, supra note 72, at 36, 40. 
76. 16 U.S.c. § lS35(c) (1988). 
77. Id. §§ 1533(d), 1535(g)(2)(A). 
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modification is not an unlawful taking of an endangered or 
threatened species under state law, the exemption may be nullified 
by section 6(f)18 of the Act. Section 6(g)(2)(A) provides that pro-
hibitions against the taking of endangered and threatened species: 
shall not apply with respect to the taking of any resident endan-
gered species or threatened species (other than species listed in 
Appendix I to the Convention [on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, signed on March 3, 1973, 
and the appendices thereto] or otherwise specifically covered by 
any other treaty or Federal law) within any State-
(A) which is then a party to a cooperative agreement with the Secre-
tary [of the Interior] pursuant to subsection (c) of this section 
(except to the extent that the taking of any such species is contrary 
to the law of such State) ... .79 
Section 4( d) of the Act provides that Fish and Wildlife Service 
regulations, regarding the taking of threatened resident species of 
fish or wildlife, apply in any state that is party to a cooperative 
agreement under section 1535(c) only to the extent that such regula-
tions are incorporated into state law.so Such cooperative agreements 
can be entered into by the Fish and Wildlife Service and a state 
"which establishes and maintains an adequate and active program 
for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species. "81 
Section 6(f) of the Act provides, however, that state laws or regu-
lations governing the taking of endangered or threatened species 
may be more restrictive than section 6(f) or the accompanying regu-
lations, but may not be less restrictive.82 Furthermore, Swan View 
Coalition, Inc. v. Turner83 held that section 6(f) of the Act means that 
state takings provisions for a member of a section 6(c) cooperative 
agreement are preempted when the state's definition of take does not 
include "harm" and "significant habitat modification." The court in 
Swan View Coalition consequently held that the Endangered Species 
Act's "take" prohibitions, which include "harm" and "significant habi-
tat modification/, were applicable in a state that is party to a section 
78. [d. § 1535(1). 
79. [d. § 1535(g)(2)(A). 
80. [d. § 1533(d). See Swan View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 938 (0. Mont. 
1992). 
81. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(1) (1988). A state which has entered into such a cooperative 
agreement is eligible for federal assistance covering up to 90% of the estimated program cost 
stated in the agreement. [d. § 1535(d). 
82. [d. § 1535(1). Any less restrictive state law is preempted by section 6(1) of the Act. See 
United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (E.D. Cal. 1992); Swan 
View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 938 (D. Mont. 1992). 
83. 824 F. Supp. at 938. 
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6(c) cooperative agreement but that has a less restrictive state takings 
prohibition.84 
This holding in Swan View Coalition means that section 6(f) of the 
Endangered Species Act nullifies any exemption from the Act's tak-
ings prohibitions provided under section 6(g)(2)(A) or section 4(d), 
because Swan View Coalition's interpretation of section 6(f) requires 
that a state's definition of "take" mirror the definition of "take" under 
the Endangered Species Act and Fish and Wildlife Service regula-
tions. If section 6(f) requires a state's taking law to be the same as 
federal takings prohibitions, under the Endangered Species Act, 
neither section 6(g)(2) nor section 4(d) of the Act can make the feder-
al prohibitions regarding taking endangered or threatened species 
through "significant habitat modification" inapplicable in a coopera-
tive agreement state.85 
C. Enforcement of the Prohibitions on Takings 
The Endangered Species Act enforces its prohibitions on the tak-
ings of endangered and threatened species through civil penalties, 
criminal penalties, and injunctive relief.86 "The Endangered Species 
Act does not expressly condition the enforcement of the prohibition 
on taking a protected species to takings occurring after the agency 
adopts a recovery plan, identifies critical habitat or issues protective 
regulations."87 Furthermore, completion of an environmental impact 
statement, in compliance with section 102(2)(C)88 of the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969, is not a prerequisite to enforcement 
of the Endangered Species Act's prohibitions on takings.89 
Any person who knowingly violates the Endangered Species 
Act's prohibitions regarding the taking of an endangered species, or 
any permits or implementing regulations issued under the Act, is 
subject a civil penalty of up to $25,000 for each violation9o and 
criminal penalties of a fine, imprisonment, or both.91 Any person 
84. Id. 
85. Furthermore, a person's state water law rights do not exempt a person from the Endan-
gered Species Act's prohibition on takings. United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 
F. Supp. at 1134. 
86. See Eileen Sobeck. Enforcement of the Endangered Species Act, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, 
Summer 1993, at 30. 
87. United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. at 1134-35. 
88. 42 U.S.c. § 4332(q (1988). 
89. United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. at 1135. 
90. 16 U.S.c. § 1540(a)(l) (1988). 
91. Id. § 1540(b)(1}. The 1984 Sentencing Reform Act and the 1987 Criminal Fines 
Improvement Act, 18 U.S.c. §§ 3559(a}(6}, 3571(b}, (e) (1988 & Supp. 1993), increased the maxi-
mum criminal penalties for each violation under the Endangered Species Act, to a $100,000 
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who knowingly violates the Fish and Wildlife Service regulations92 
prohibiting the taking of a threatened species of fish or wildlife is 
subject to assessment of a civil penalty by the Secretary of the 
Interior or Commerce of up to $12,000 for each violation93 and 
criminal penalties of a fine or imprisonment.94 An individual could 
escape civil or criminal penalties by demonstrating "a good faith 
belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a member of 
his or her family, or any other individual from bodily harm, from 
any endangered or threatened species."95 
The Endangered Species Act does not specify whether "know-
ingly" violating the prohibitions under the Act and Fish and Wildlife 
Service regulations requires actual knowledge - at the time of the 
taking-that the conduct constituted a prohibited taking under the 
Act. Several courts have held, however, that a person only has to act 
with a "general intent" to "knowingly" violate the Act's prohibitions 
on takings.96 Under this approach, a person "knowingly" takes a 
protected species, for purposes of the Act's criminal penalty pro-
visions, if the person's actions were voluntary and intentional and 
not due to mistake or accident.97 To "knowingly" violate the Act's 
takings prohibitions the person does not have to know the particular 
species or subspecies of the animal taken, know that the species 
taken was listed under the Act as endangered or threatened, or know 
that the Act applied to the lands where the taking occurred.98 
fine, one year imprisonment, or both, for an individual, and to a $200,000 fine for a 
corporation. 
92. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1993). 
93. 16 U.S.C. § 154O(a)(1) (1988). 
94. Id. § 1540(b)(1). See supra note 9l. 
95. Id. §§ 154O(a)(3), (b)(3). 
96. United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (S.D. Fla. 1987); United States v. St. 
Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044, 1045 (D. Mont. 1988). 
97. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1492. 
98. Id. at 1492-94. The court in United States v. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Mont. 
1988), concluded that the interpretation of the Act in United States v. Billie was "supported by 
the legislative history," id. at 1045, and stated that: 
The critical issue is whether the act was done knowingly, not whether the defen-
dant recOgnized what he was shooting. The scienter element applies to the act of 
taking; thus defendant could only claim accident or mistake if he did not intend to 
discharge his firearm, or the weapon malfunctioned, or similar circumstances 
occurred. 
Id. In St. Onge, the court found that the defendant's belief that he was shooting an elk would 
not be a defense to a criminal charge of knowingly taking'a threatened grizzly bear in violation 
of 16 U.s.c. § 154O(b)(1). 676 F. Supp. at 1044. The court also held in St. Onge that the 
government, in order to convict the defendant of the charged crime, only had to prove that the 
defendant knowingly took a grizzly bear and that the defendant had no federal permit to take 
the bear. Id. at 1045. 
Similarly, in United States v. Nguyen, 916 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1990), the defendant was 
charged under the Endangered Species Act of the crime of knowing possession, importation, 
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A person engaged in an activity that constitutes a prohibited tak-
ing under the Act can also be enjoined from taking a protected 
species. Section l1(e)(6}99 of the Endangered Species Act provides 
that "[t]he Attorney General of the United States may seek to enjoin 
any person who is alleged to be in violation of any provision" of the 
Act or any "regulation issued under authority thereof." This pro-
vision authorizes the Attorney General to file a civil suit, seeking 
injunctive relief, against a person engaging in conduct that takes 
endangered or threatened fish or wildlife in violation of the 
Endangered Species Act. 
In addition, "the [Endangered Species Act] provides a private 
right of action to enjoin violations of the Act. "100 This citizen suit 
provisionlOl authorizes any person, with standing, to enforce the Act 
through injunctive relief by filing suit against any person alleged to 
be in violation of any provision of the Act or regulation issued under 
the ACt.l02 "Congress thus encouraged citizens to 'bring civil suits 
... to force compliance with any provision of the Act.'''103 In order 
for a person "to be in violation of" the Endangered Species Act's 
takings prohibitions and subject to a citizen suit, the person must be 
engaged in continuous, ongoing conduct that constitutes a pro-
hibited taking, both at the time the citizen suit is filed and when the 
citizen suit comes to triaP04 
or attempting to possess a listed threatened species. The Fifth Circuit held that the legislative 
history of section 11 of the Act, 16 u.s.c. § 1540 demonstrates Congress' intent to make its 
violation "a general intent crime." Id. at 1018. The Fifth Circuit stated that Congress' purpose 
is reflected in the 1978 amendment of 16 U.S.c. § 154O(b)(1) by substituting "knowingly" for 
"willfully." 916 F.2d at 1018-19 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26; H.R. CONF. 
REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26). "The committee explicitly stated that it did 'not intend 
to make knowledge of the law an element of either civil penalty or criminal violations of the 
Act.''' 916 F.2d at 1019 (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit therefore held in Nguyen that the 
government in a criminal prosecution under section 11 of the Act does not have to prove that 
the defendant knew that his conduct was illegal, knew the species of the animal in question or 
knew that the species was a listed threatened species. Id. at 1018. 
Without supporting analysis or citations, one federal district court has stated in dictum 
that 16 U.S.c. §§ 154O(a) and (b) require that the defendant knew that the conduct for which he 
is assessed civil penalties or criminally prosecuted was unlawful. Sweet Home Chapter v. 
Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279, 286 (D.D.C. 1992), affd sub nom. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 
1 (D.c. Cir. 1993), modified on petition for reh'g, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 
190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Gan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). 
99. 16 U.S.c. § 154O(e)(6) (1988). 
100. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882F.2d 1294, 1299 (8th Cir. 1989). 
101. 16 U.S.c. § 154O(g)(1)(A) (1988). 
102. Id. § 154O(g)(1). 
103. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d at 1300 (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 181 (1978». 
104. Cf Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) 
(holding that § 505(a) of the Oean Water Act requires a good faith allegation of an ongoing 
violation of the act). 
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Courts differ as to the standard a court should follow in deter-
mining whether a permanent injunction should be issued against 
conduct that constitutes a prohibited taking in violation of the En-
dangered Species Act. A number of courts hold that courts should 
not engage in the traditional balancing of equities when an injunc-
tion is sought against conduct that constitutes a prohibited taking of 
an endangered or threatened species. Following this approach, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in a citizen suit seeking an 
injunction against an alleged taking of an endangered species, that 
courts do not have "their traditional equitable discretion in injunc-
tion proceedings of balancing the parties' competing interests," 
because Congress has determined under the Endangered Species Act 
"that the balance of hardships and the public interest tips heavily in 
favor of protected species."105 One court followed this approach in 
an Endangered Species Act citizen suit and issued an injunction 
against a federal agency action, stating that "[w]hen an injunction is 
sought under the ... [Endangered Species Act], the traditional 
balancing of equities is abandoned in favor of an almost absolute 
presumption in favor of the endangered species."l06 
Under this no-balancing-of-equities approach, a court would 
grant an injunction if an action constitutes a prohibited taking of an 
endangered species unless unusual circumstances exist "where the 
ecological harm caused by ... granting ... [the] injunction would be 
greater than if no injunction [was] issued."107 Courts following this 
105. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. RR, 23 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(affirming denial of motion for preliminary injunction, but stating principles apparently 
governing all injunction proceedings under the Endangered Species Act). The Ninth Circuit in 
Burlington Northern Railroad, however, affirmed the district court's denial of a motion for a 
preliminary injunction against the railroad that would have required the railroad's trains to 
reduce speed at locations where com had accidentally spilled, and to obtain an incidental 
taking permit under section 10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.c. § 1539(a)(1)(B), although the railroad's trains 
had struck and killed seven grizzly bears attracted to the spilled corn. Because the district 
court found that the railroad's cleanup efforts had "substantially minimized" "the attrac-
tiveness of the com spill sites as food sources" and because "[tJhe fact that no bears have been 
killed by BN trains in three years supports an inference that the cleanup was effective," the 
Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not "clearly err" in denying the preliminary 
injunction on the grounds that the plaintiff "failed to establish the likelihood of irreparable 
future injury." ld. at 1511. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. 
106. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 688 F. Supp. 1334, 1355 (D. Minn. 1988), affd in part and 
rev'd in part, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989). In this case, the Eighth Circuit held that the district 
court had properly enjOined the EPA from continuing registration of strychnine under the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.c. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. IV 
1986), when such registration constituted a prohibited taking of endangered species of wildlife. 
882 F.2d at 1301. See infra note 167. 
107. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1089 (E.D. Cal. 1985). In this 
case, the court issued a preliminary injunction against the Secretary of the Interior and the 
Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service prohibiting the defendants from authorizing the 
hunting of migratory birds with lead shot in certain areas, in part because this authorization 
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approach take the position that because Congress intended to afford 
endangered species 'lithe highest of priorities,"'l08 the United States is 
entitled to an injunction against a prohibited taking of a threatened 
species of wildlife in violation of the Act if injury to the species is 
"likely and irreparable."l09 Similarly, a court held, in a citizen suit 
seeking to enjoin a prohibited taking of an endangered species, that 
when a taking creates "an actual present negative impact on the 
[species'] population that threatens the continued existence and 
recovery of the species. . . . [T]he Endangered Species Act leaves no 
room for balancing policy considerations," and a court must order 
cessation of the activity that constitutes the prohibited taking.110 
A court following this no-balancing-of-equities approach, how-
ever, "must look at the likelihood of future harm before deciding 
whether to grant an injunction under the [Endangered Species 
Act]."l11 To obtain an injunction against a person who allegedly will 
continue to take a protected species in violation of the Act, the plain-
tiff "must prove that there is a reasonable likelihood of future viola-
tions of the [Endangered Species Act]."112 
Several courts, however, following the more traditional 
balancing-of-equities approach, have held that in order for plaintiffs 
to obtain a permanent injunction against a prohibited taking, lithe 
[p]laintiffs must establish four facts: (1) actual success on the merits, 
(2) a substantial threat of irreparable harm absent an injunction, (3) 
that the irreparable harm threatened is greater than that caused by 
constituted a prohibited taking of endangered bald eagles that were wounded or killed by lead 
shot. See infra note 167. 
108. United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1132 (E.D. Cal. 1992) 
(quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978». The court in Glenn-Colusa 
enjoined an irrigation district from pumping water from the Sacramento River at a particular 
facility during the threatened winter-run chinook salmon's peak downstream migration sea-
son. because that conduct constituted a prohibited taking of the salmon by killing salmon. 788 
F. Supp. at 1135. 
109. United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. at 1132. 
110. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1082 (D. Haw. 
1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit in Palila upheld the district court's 
issuance of an injunction requiring the State of Hawaii to remove all mouflon sheep from the 
critical habitat of the endangered palila bird species, because the presence of the mouflon 
sheep in that habitat constituted "harm" and a "take" of the palila in violation of the Endan-
gered Species Act. 852 F.2d at 1110; see infra notes 207-58 and accompanying text. 
111. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1506, 1511 (9th Cir. 1994). See 
supra note 105. 
112. Id. Future harm of a protected species does not have to "be shown with certainty 
before an injunction may issue: but "[t]he plaintiff must make a showing that a violation of the 
[Endangered Species Act] is at least likely in the future." 1d. Although "a threat of extinction to 
the species" is not required before an injunction may be issued under the Act, there must be "a 
definitive threat of future harm to protected species, not mere speculation." 1d. at 1511 n.8. 
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the injunction, and (4) the public interest would be served by the 
injunction."113 
III. PROTECIlON OF WILDLIFE HABITAT UNDER SECIlON 7 OF THE 
ENDANGERED SPEOES Acr 
In analyzing the issue of whether modification of wildlife habitat 
is regulated under the Endangered Species Act's takings prohibi-
tions, the regulation of habitat modification under section 7114 of the 
Act should be considered. Section 7 of the Act can prohibit federal 
agency action that will destroy or modify the habitat of endangered 
or threatened species of fish or wildlife.1l5 Section 7(a)(2)1l6 of the 
Endangered Species Act provides: 
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the 
assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior or Commerce], insure that 
any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is 
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered 
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse 
modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the 
Secretary ... to be critical, unless such agency has been granted an 
exemption for such action by the [Endangered Species] Committee 
pursuant to subsection (h) of this section .... 117 
113. Sierra Qub v. Lyng. 694 F. Supp. 1260, 1277 (E.O. Tex. 1988), affd in part and vacated in 
part on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Qub v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Sierra 
Qub v. Lujan. 36 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1533, 1554 (W.O. Tex. 1993) (quoting Lyng's four 
facts). In Lyng, the court issued a pennanent injunction against certain national forest 
management practices of the United States Forest Service, which were found to be a taking in 
violation of the Endangered Species Act as well as in violation of section 7, 16 U.S.c. § 1536, of 
the Act. See infra notes 183-206 and accompanying text. The Lyng court issued the penn anent 
injunction on the grounds that otherwise irreparable hann would result to an endangered 
species of woodpecker that was on the "verge of extinction" because of a "steadily declining 
population,." that "the harm to the woodpecker through extinction would outweigh any harm 
caused by [the] injunction,." and "that the public interest ... [would) be served by the attempt 
to preserve [the) species." 694 F. Supp. at 1277. The court in Lujan ordered the Texas Water 
Commission to prepare a plan to assure that withdrawals of water from groundwater would 
not cause spring flow levels in two springs to drop below levels that result in endangered and 
threatened species being taken in violation of the Endangered Species Act. 36 Env't. Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) at 1558. 
114. 16 U.S.c. § 1536 (1988). 
115. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978); Sierra Qub v. Marsh, 816 
F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987). 
116. 16 U.s.c. § 1536(a)(2) (1988). 
117. Section 7 of "[t)he Act prescribes a three-step process to ensure compliance" by 
federal agencies with section 7(a)(2)'s "substantive provisions," with each of the first two steps 
serving "a screening function to determine if the successive steps are required." Thomas v. 
Peterson,. 753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985). These three procedural "steps" are: 
I) A federal agency shall inquire of the Fish and Wildlife Service whether any threatened or 
endangered species "may be present" in the area of the agency's proposed action. 16 U.S.c. § 
1536(c)(I) (1988). 
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Section 7(a)(2) only applies to action authorized, funded or 
carried out by a federal agency;118 it consequently does not apply to 
private action or state or local government actions that are not 
authorized, funded, or carried out by a federal agency.119 The En-
dangered Species Act's prohibitions regarding taking endangered 
and threatened species of fish and wildlife, however, apply to any 
person, including private individuals, corporations, states, munici-
palities, state political subdivisions, and employees and agents of the 
federal government, a state, a municipality, or a political subdivision 
of a state.120 Although federal agency action that destroys or 
adversely modifies a protected species' habitat may violate section 
7(a)(2)'s prohibition of actions that "jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of any endangered species or threatened species,"l21 this pro-
hibition only applies to actions that may kill all members of the 
endangered or threatened sp~cies (resulting in the species becoming 
extinct).122 The Act's general prohibition of taking endangered or 
2) Preparation by the agency of a biological assessment if the Secretary finds that a 
threatened or endangered species may be present. The biological assessment, which may be 
part of an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment under the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.c. § 4332(2)(C) (1988), is to be conducted "for the 
purpose of identifying any endangered species or threatened species which is likely to be 
affected by such action." 16 U.S.c. § 1S36(c)(1) (1988). 
3) Formal consultation by the agency with the Fish and Wildlife Service if the biological 
assessment determines that a threatened or endangered species "is likely to be affected" by the 
agency action. [d. § 1536(a)(2). Following this formal consultation, the Fish and Wildlife 
Service is required to issue a "biological" "opinion ... detailing how the agency action affects 
the species or its critical habitat." 16 U.S.c. § 1536(b)(3)(A). If the biological opinion concludes 
that the proposed agency action would jeopardize a listed species or adversely modify its 
critical habitat, then'the agency action would violate 16 U.S.c. § 1536(a)(2) and cannot be 
undertaken unless the Fish and Wildlife Service, pursuant to its duty under 16 U.S.c. § 
1536(b)(3)(A) (1988), has suggested a reasonable and prudent alternative which it believes the 
agency or applicant can take without violating section 7(a)(2) of the Act. Thomas v. Peterson, 
753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985). If the biological opinion concludes that the agency action will 
not violate section 7(a)(2), the Fish and Wildlife Service may under 16 U.S.c. § 1536(b)(4)(ii)-
(iii) require reasonable and prudent measures to minimize takings of endangered or 
threatened species incidental to the agency action. Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d at 763. The 
National Marine Fisheries Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service have adopted jOint 
regulations that interpret and implement sections 7(a)-(d), 16 U.s.c. § 1536(a)-(d) (1988), of the 
Endangered Species Act. 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.01-.16 (1993). See Freeman, supra note 63, at 17; 
William H. Satterfield et aI., JNho's Afraid of the Big Bad Beach Mouse, 8 NAT. RESOURCFS & 
ENV'T, Summer 1993, at 13. 
118. See Proffitt v. Dep't of Interior ex reI. Lujan, 825 F. Supp. 159, 164 (W.O. Ky. 1993). 
119. See Freeman, supra note 63, at 37-38. 
120. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
121. See Sierra Oub v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1385 (9th Cir. 1987). 
122. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 156, 171-72, 174 (1978) (finding that 
section 7 will be violated by a federal agency project that extinguishes the existence of an entire 
species). Joint regulations of the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Fish and Wildlife 
Service~ which interpret and implement section 7(a)(2), define "Uleopardize the continued 
existence of' to mean "to engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or 
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threatened species of fish or wildlife is violated, however, when only 
one animal within the species is killed or otherwise taken,l23 even if 
the species' continued existence is not jeopardized by the killing of 
one or a few members of the endangered or threatened species.124 
Section 7(a)(2)'s alternative prohibition of federal agency action 
that may result in the destruction or modification of critical habitatl25 
of an endangered species only applies when the habitat has been 
determined critical by the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce.126 
indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed 
species in the wild by reducing the reproduction. numbers, or distribution of that species." 50 
CF.R § 402.02 (1993). 
123. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981) (codified 
at 50 CF.R § 17.3) (redefining "harm" within the meaning of "take" under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act) (stating that "section 9's threshold does focus on individual members of a protected 
species"). 
124. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1077 (D. 
Haw. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the population of an endangered 
species does not have "to dip closer to extinction before the [takings] prohibitions of section 9 
come into force"). 
125. "Critical habitat" for a threatened or endangered species is defined to mean: 
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species, at the 
time it is listed in accordance with the provisions of section [4 of the Act, 16 U.S.C 
§ 1533 (1988)] ... , on which are found those physical or biological features (I) 
essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may require special 
management considerations or protection; and (ii) specific areas outside the geo-
graphical area occupied by the species at the time it is listed ... , upon a deter-
mination by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation of the 
species. 
16 U.S.C § 1532(5)(A) (1988). Judge Stephen Williams, in a statement joined by Judge Sentelle 
in support of denial of appellees' petition for rehearing of Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 
F.3d 1463 (D.C Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 
Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859), see infra notes 345-56 and accompanying text, stated that section 
7(a}(2)'s prohibition of the federal government's "destruction or adverse modification of habitat 
... which is determined ... to be critical," "seems to be simply another way of referring to 
habitat modifications so Significant to the species that they might lead to death (or at least 
some very serious injury) for members of the species." Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 
190,192 (D.C Cir. 1994) (statement of Williams, J.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) 
(No. 94-859). 
126. Procedures for designation of critical habitat for endangered and threatened species 
are set forth in 16 U.S.C §§ 1533(a}(3), (b)(2), (b)(6}(c) (1988) and in SO CF.R. §§ 424.01-.21 
(1993). Areas that have been listed as critical habitat are set forth at 50 CF.R § 17.95 (fish and 
wildlife) and § 17.96 (plants) (1993). The areas listed in § 17.95 (fish and wildlife) and § 17.96 
(plants) and referred to in the lists at §§ 17.11 and 17.12 have been determined by the Director 
to be "Critical Habitats". Id. at § 17.94 (a). Fish and Wildlife Service regulations specify that 
"[al11 Federal agencies must insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by them 
is not likely to result in the destruction or adverse modification of the constituent elements 
essential to the conservation of the listed species within these defined Critical Habitats." rd. 
Judge Stephen Williams, in a statement joined in by Judge Sentelle in support of denial of 
appellees' petition for rehearing of Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C Cir. 
1994), see infra notes 345-56 and accompanying text, concluded that "[iln looking at the 
Department's regulations [SO CF.R. § 17.94 (1993)] discussing modifications of 'critical' habitat 
under § 7, and habitat modifications that are forbidden under the Department's view of § 9, we 
are unable to discern any substantive, operational difference, and the government has not 
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Consequently, if section 9's takings prohibitions can be violated by 
habitat modification, its takings prohibitions can extend to habitat 
modifications by private individuals, corporations and state and 
local governments that are not authorized or funded by a federal 
agency, and to habitat modification that only kills or injures a single 
or a few animals within a protected species-habitat modifications 
that can not be prohibited under section 7(a)(2).127 
IV. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE'S 1975 REGULATION DEFINING 
"HARM" AND "HARASS" 
A. History of the Regulation 
In 1975, the Fish and Wildlife Service adopted a regulation, 
which is still in effect, that defines "harass" (in the Endanger:ed 
Species Act's definition of "take") to mean: 
[A]n intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the 
likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to 
identified any . . . . . If there are 'essential' habitat elements whose removal or destruction 
causes no injury, the government cites no example and it is hard to imagine one. II Sweet Home 
Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d at 192 (statement of Williams, J.) (citations omitted). 
127. See Comment, What Does It TR1ce to TR1ce and What Does It Take to Jeopardize? A 
Comparative Analysis of the Standards Embodied in Sections 7 and 9 of the Endangered Species Act, 7 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 197 (1993). The Endangered Species Act's only remedy for a violation of 
section 7's substantive provisions, or a substantial violation of section 7's procedural require-
ments, is issuance by a court, without the traditional balancing of equities, of an injunction 
against the action. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Thomas v. Peterson, 
753 F.2d 754 (9th Or. 1985); Sierra Oub v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1383 n.10 (9th Cir. 1987). The 
Endangered Species Act does not impose civil penalties or criminal punishment upon persons 
violating section 7 of the Act. although persons who violate the Act's prohibitions or takings of 
endangered and threatened species are subject to civil penalties and criminal punishment. See 
supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text. 
Judge Stephen Williams, in a statement joined in by Judge Sentelle in support of denial of 
appellees' petition for rehearing of Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 
1994), see infra notes 345-56 and accompanying text, states that: 
Michael Bean, Senior Counsel for the Environmental Def~nse Fund, recOgnized 
the virtual identity between what the Senate deleted from § 9 and what it retained 
in § 7 when he wrote, not long after the Act passed, "if "taking' [sic] comprehends 
habitat destruction, then it is at least doubtful whether section 7 of the Act is even 
necessary." MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 397 
(1977). But see MICHAEL}. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAw 342 
(Revised &t Expanded Edition 1983). 
Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 192 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (statement by Williams, J.), 
cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995)(No. 94-859). This analysis by Judge Williams ignores 
the differences between sections 9 and 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act discussed in this 
section of the article. See supra notes 114-27 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 345-56 
and accompanying text. 
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significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, but 
are not limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering.l28 
179 
When the Fish and Wildlife Service adopted this definition of 
"harass" on September 26, 1975, it did not explain the definition's 
basis.l29 The House Report on the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
may give some insight into the basis for the definition of "harass": 
[Take] includes harassment, whether intentional or not. This 
would allow, for example, the Secretary to regulate or prohibit the 
activities of birdwatchers where the effect of those activities might 
disturb the birds and make it difficult for them to hatch or raise 
their young.13O 
The Fish and Wildlife Service's final definition of "harass" differs 
from its proposed definition of "harass," which was: 
[A]n act which either actually or potentially harms wildlife by 
killing or injuring it, or by annoying it to such an extent as to cause 
serious disruption in essential behavior patterns, such as feeding, 
breeding or sheltering; significant environmental modification or 
degradation which has such effects is included within the meaning 
of Iharass."131 
This proposed definition of "harass" was the basis for a final 
definition of "harm," which the Fish and Wildlife Service defined as 
follows on September 26, 1975: 
"Harm" in the definition of "take" in the Act means an act or 
omission which actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts 
which annoy it to such an extent as to Significantly disrupt essential 
behavioral patterns, which include, but are not limited to, breeding, 
feeding or sheltering; significant environmental modification or 
degradation which has such effects is included within the meaning 
of "harm" .... 132 
The definition of "harm" adopted in 1975 differed from the pro-
posed definition of "harass" by including the words: "or omission II 
128. so C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993). Fish and Wildlife Service regulations define "wildlife" to mean 
the same as "fish or wildlife." Id. at § 10.12. "Fish or wildlife" in tum is defined to mean "any 
wild animal, whether alive or dead, including without limitation any wild mammal, bird, 
reptile, amphibian, fish, mollusk, crustacean, arthropod, coelenterate, or other invertebrate, 
whether or not bred, hatched, or born in captivity, and including any part, product, egg, or off-
spring thereof." Id. Fish and Wildlife Service regulations at 50 C.F.R. § 10.11 (1993) provide 
that words in singular form shall include plural, and words in plural form shall include 
singular. 
129. See 40 Fed. Reg. 44,412-16 (Sept. 26, 1975) (codified at SO C.F.R. § 17.3). 
130. H.R. REP. NO. 412, 93d Cong., IstSess. 11 (1973). 
131. 40 Fed. Reg. 28,714 ijuly 8,1975). 
132 SO C.F.R. § 17.3 (1975). This 1975 definition of "harm" was amended in 1981. See infra 
notes 149-62 and accompanying text. 
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after "act" and by substituting the words: "which actually injures or 
kills wildlife, including acts which annoy it to such an extent as to 
significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns, which include, but 
are not limited to, breeding, feeding or .sheltering" for the words: 
"which either actually or potentially hanns wildlife by killing or 
injuring it, or by annoying it to such an extent as to cause serious dis-
ruption in essential behavioral patterns, such as feeding, breeding or 
sheltering. "133 
In adopting these final definitions of "harass" and "harm" in 1975, 
the Fish and Wildlife Service explained: 
The definition of "harass" has been retained in a modified form 
in this final rulemaking, to make it applicable to actions or omis-
sions with the potential for injury. The concept of environmental 
damage being considered a "taking" has been retained, but is now 
found in a new definition, of the word "harm." "Harm" covers ac-
tions or omissions which actually (as opposed to potentially), cause 
injury. In addition, the definition of "harass" has been modified by 
restricting its application to acts or omissions which are done inten-
tionally or negligently. In the proposal, "harass" would have ap-
plied to any action, regardless of intent or negligence .... 
By moving the concept of environmental degradation to the 
definition of "harm," potential restrictions on environmental modi-
fications are expressly limited to those actions causing actual death 
or injury to a protected species of fish of wildlife .... 
**** 
It should be noted that this definition of "harm" which includes 
significant environmental modification, does not permanently limit 
the environmental modifications that are permissible for the habitat 
of a listed species of fish or wildlife. . .. [T]he species could recover 
completely and be delisted altogether. Finally, the species in ques-
tion could abandon its use of the area. In all of these situations, the 
limited restrictions on environmental modification under the defini-
tion of "harm" would be removed.134 
The Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harass" conse-
quently should be interpreted to exclude destruction or modification 
of wildlife habitat because the Service's final definition of "harass" 
was intended to exclude "significant environmental [habitat] modifi-
cation or degradation."135 The Service intended that such habitat 
133. Compare 40 Fed. Reg. 28,714 Ouly 8, 1975) with 40 Fed. Reg. 44,416-17 (Sept. 26, 1975) 
(codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3). 
134. Id. at 44,413. 
135. 40 Fed. Reg. 28,714 Guly 8,1975). 
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destruction or modification be included only in its definition of 
IIharm.lIl36 
B. Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources 
(PaliZa 1) 
The Fish and Wildlife Service's 1975 definition of "harm" was 
interpreted in 1979 in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural 
ResouTces137 (PaliZa 1). The district court in Palila I held that acts and 
136. There have not been any judicial interpretations of the Service's definition of "harass" 
in any specific factual situation. although Chief Judge Mikva of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia has observed that the prohibition against "harassment" 
"can limit a private landowner's use of his land in a rather broad manner." Sweet Home 
Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 10 (D.c. Cir. 1993) (Mikva, C. J., concurring in section II(A)(l) of 
the opinion), modified on reh'g, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 
1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (Jan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). 
The Service's definition of "harass· is drafted in such a manner that "harass" includes an 
intentional act or omission that creates the requisite likelihood of injury to wildlife, even if the 
person had no intent to injure or kill wildlife, and even if the person had no knowledge, or 
reason to know, that their act or omission created the requisite injury to wildlife. Chief Judge 
Mikva has stated that "the prohibition against harassment can be used to suppress activities 
that are in no way intended to injure an endangered species." Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 
1 F.3d at 10 (Mikva, C. J., concurring in section II(A)(l) of the opinion). The Service's definition 
of "harass: however, does not define "intentional." "Intentional" act or omission might be in-
terpreted the same as "voluntary act or omission" is defined in crirninallaw, meaning an act or 
omission that 1s the product of free and conscious will or of a situation where the person had 
the choice and opportunity to act differently. See WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSllN W. SCOTT, JR., 
CRIMINAL LAw, § 3.2(c), at 197-200 (3d ed. 1986); Kilbride v. Lake, N.Z.L. Rev. 590 (1961), cited 
in JOSEPH G. COOK & PAUL MARCUS, CRIMINAL LAw 128-33 (2d ed. 1988). Under such an inter-
pretation. an act or omission would not be intentional if the act or omission occurred while the 
person was asleep or unconscious. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra, at § 3.2(c). Such an inter-
pretation of an "intentional act or omission" would essentially be the same as the definition of 
what constitutes a "knowing" violation of the Endangered Species Act's takings prohibitions 
for purposes of imposition of civil penalties and criminal punishment under the Act. See supra 
notes 96-98 and accompanying text. Almost any act or omission engaged in by a person would 
be "intentional" under this interpretation if the person was not asleep or unconscious when the 
act or omission occurred; therefore there would be no need to determine if the act or omission 
was "negligent." 
The Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harass" does not define "negligent." In order 
for a person's act or omission to be "negligent" within the meaning of "harass," the person 
probably would have to have breached a duty to an endangered or threatened species of wild-
life, proximately causing injury by creating "the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it 
to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 
(1993). Under traditional tort principles, a person would have such a duty if the person's act or 
omission created a foreseeable risk of such injury to wildlife. See FOWLER W. HARPER, FLEMING 
JAMES, JR., & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAw OF TORTS § 18.2, at 654-55 (2d ed. 1986). A person 
would breach such a duty if he or she fails to exercise reasonable care, exposing protected 
species of wildlife to an unreasonable risk of injury. See id. § 16.9, at 466-67. The degree of care 
required in a particular situation traditionally is determined by consideration of the gravity of 
the harm threatened by the person's conduct and the likelihood that the person's conduct will 
cause that harm, weighed against the costs that would be incurred if the person acted to avoid 
that risk. ld. at 467~. 
137. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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omissions of Hawaiian officials, in maintaining populations of feral 
sheep and goats on state-owned land which was a critical habitat of 
the endangered palila bird species, constituted a taking in violation 
of section 9138 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, under the Fish 
and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" in the Act's definition of 
"take."139 The district court in Palila I granted the plaintiffs' motion 
for summary judgment in a citizen suit under the Endangered 
Species Act and ordered that all of the feral sheep and goats be 
removed from the palila's critical habitat, on the grounds that the 
palila required all of its critical habitat to survive.14O 
The district court based this judgment upon its findings that the 
feral sheep and goats within the palila's critical habitat ate seedlings 
and shoots of the mamane trees and leaves of the naio trees,141 which 
provided food, shelter and nest sites for the palila in its critical 
habitat142 and prevented regeneration of the mamane-naio forest, 
causing a "relentless decline II of the palila's designated critical 
habitat.143 The district court concluded IIthat the feral sheep and 
goats maintained by defendants ... [were] the major cause of that 
habitat's degradation,"l44 and that the acts and omissions of the 
defendants were "clearly withinll the Fish and Wildlife Service's 
definition of IIharmll as IIsignificant environmental modification or 
degradation" which actually injures or kills wildlife.145 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's 
judgment in Palila I, holding that lI[t]he defendants' actioit in main-
taining feral sheep and goats in the critical habitat ... [was] a viola-
tion of the Act since it was shown that the Palila was endangered by 
the activityll146 and that lI[t]he district court's conclusion ... [was] 
consistent with the Act's legislative history showing. that Congress 
was informed that the greatest threat to endangered species is the 
destruction of their natural habitat.1I147 Palila I is the only major 
138. 16 U.S.c. § 1538 (1976). 
139. The district court also held that enforcement of the Endangered Species Act's takings 
prohibition against the state, state agencies and state employees does not violate either the 
Tenth or Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. 471 F. Supp. at 992-99. 
140. Id. at 991. 
141. Id. at 990. 
142. Id. at 989. 
143. Id. at 990. 
144. Id. at 991. 
145. Id. at 995. 
146. 639 F.2d at 497. 
147. Id. at 498 (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978». 
In 1986, Chief Judge Samuel King explained that in his 1979 decision in Palila 1 "[he] did 
not find that habitat modification alone caused harm to Palila . . .. On the contrary, the evi-
dence considered at the summary judgment hearing overwhelmingly showed that the feral 
animals had a drastic negative impact on the mamane forest which in tum injured the Palila by 
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judicial decision interpreting the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1975 
definition of "harm."l48 Subsequently, the Fish and Wildlife Service 
modified its definition of "harm" in 1981. 
v. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE'S 1981 REDEFINmON OF "HARM" 
A. History of the Regulation 
In 1981, the Fish and Wildlife Service proposed a regulation that 
would have redefined "harm" as "an act ••• which injures or kills 
wildlife,"149 on the grounds that its original 1975 definition of "harm" 
could be interpreted to include "significant environmental [habitat] 
modification or degradation" as a prohibited taking "without further 
proof of actual injury or death to a listed species."lSO The Fish and 
Wildlife Service noted that under such an interpretation, a showing 
of significant habitat modification or degradation alone would be 
sufficient to invoke the criminal penalties of section 9, 16 U.S.c. § 
significantly disrupting its essential behavioral habits." Palila v. Hawaii Oep't of Land & 
Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 n.21 (D. Haw. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 
1988) (Palila 11). Chief Judge King added in Palila 11 that: 
Continued destruction of the forest would have driven the bird into extinction ... 
[and) [a)t the time ... , the continued presence of feral sheep had a severe negative 
impact on the Palila by indirectly suppressing the population figures to a level 
which threatened extinction and by preventing the expansion or recovery of the 
population. These {actors supported my decision to order removal of the feral 
sheeps and goats in Palr1a 1. 
649 F. Supp. at 1078. Chief Judge King added that in Palila I he did not interpret the Fish and 
Wildlife Service's 1975 definition of "harm" "to require an actual decline in population of an en-
dangered species." Id. at 1076 n.21. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in 1988 in its 
Palila II decision that "[i)n Palila I, the district court construed harm to include habitat des-
truction that could result in the extinction of the Palila." 852 F.2d at 1108. 
148. In Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), the United States Supreme 
Court, although primarily addressing the issue of whether operation of the Tellico Dam would 
violate section 7, 16 U.S.c. § 1536, of the Endangered Species Act, by jeopardizing the con-
tinued existence of the endangered snail darter fish, indicated that the operation of the dam 
might "harm" the snail darter within the meaning of the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1975 
definition of "harm" and violate section 9, 16 U.S.c. § 1538, of the Act. The Supreme Court 
noted that the district court had found that the reservoir that would be created by the dam 
would have a low oxygen content, while the snail darter needed a clear, flowing river with a 
high oxygen content, that the low oxygen and high silt levels in the water in the reservoir 
would not be suitable for snail darter spawning. and that the snail darter's primary source of 
food would probably not survive in a reservoir environment. 437 U.s. at 165-66 n.16 (citing 
419 F. Supp. at 756). Emphasizing that the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1975 definition of "harm" 
included "significant environmental modification or degradation" which "actually kills or 
injures wildlife" by "significantly disrupting essential behavioral patterns," the Supreme Court 
stated: "[w)e do not understand how TVA intends to operate Tellico without 'harming' the 
snail darter." 437 U.s. at 184-85 n.3O. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 
649 F. Supp. 1070, 1077-78 n.22 (D. Haw. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). 
149. 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490 (1981) (proposed June 2, 1981). 
150. Id. 
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1538, of the Endangered Species Act, "regardless of whether an 
actual killing or injuring of a listed species of wildlife is demon-
strated."151 
The Fish and Wildlife Service did not adopt this proposed re-
definition of "harm," instead adopting on November 4, 1981, a regu-
lation that redefined "harm" (in the Act's definition of "take") to mean 
"an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include 
significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills 
or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral pat-
terns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering,"152 The Fish and 
Wildlife Service stated that "harm" was being redefined: 
to mean any action, including habitat modification, which actually 
kills or injures wildlife, rather than the present interpretation which 
might be read to include habitat modification or degradation alone 
without further proof of death or injury. Habitat modification as 
injury would only be covered by the new definition if it significant-
ly impaired essential behavioral patterns of a listed species.153 
The Service added that its revised definition of "harm" was not 
limited to: 
direct physical injury to an individual member of the wildlife 
species, ... The purpose of the redefinition was to preclude claims 
of a section 9 taking for habitat modification alone without any 
attendant death or injury of the protected wildlife. Death or injury, 
however, may be caused by impairment of essential behavioral 
patterns which can have significant and permanent effects on a 
listed species.l54 
The Fish and Wildlife Service also stated, in the preamble to its regu-
lation redefining "harm," that Palila [155 can "be read to incorrectly 
imply that under the Services [sic] definition of 'harm' a taking may 
occur from habitat modification alone."I56 The Fish and Wildlife 
. Service stressed that under its redefinition of "harm": 
[H]abitat modification or degradation, standing alone, is not a 
taking pursuant to section 9. To be subject to section 9, the 
151. Id. 
152. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993). 
153. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3). 
154. Id. 
155. See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text. 
156. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,749 (1981) (emphasis added) (codified at 50 c.F.R. § 17.3). 
Responding to this statement by the Fish and Wildlife Service, Chief Judge Samuel King, the 
author of the district court opinion in Palila I, asserted in 1986 of his 1979 decision in Palila I "I 
did not find that habitat modification alone caused harm to the Palila." Palila v. Hawaii Dep't 
of Land & Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 n.21 (D. Haw. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 1106 
(9th Cir. 1988). See supra note 147. 
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modification or degradation must be significant, must significantly 
impair essential behavioral patterns, and must result in actual injury 
to a protected wildlife species. The word "impair" was substituted 
for "disrupt" to limit harm to situations where a behavioral pattern 
was adversely affected and not simply disturbed on a temporary 
basis with no consequent injury to the protected species.157 
185 
Habitat modification does not constitute "harm" under this new 
1981 definition unless the habitat modification causes death or injury 
to members of a protected species.l58 Under this new definition of 
"harm," however, modification of the habitat of a listed wildlife spe-
cies constitutes "harm" when the habitat modification "causes ascer-
tainable physical injury or death to an individual member of a listed 
species."159 The new definition of "harm" does not "require an actual 
decline in population of an endangered species"16O and "does not 
indicate that threatened extinction is necessary for a finding of 
harm. "161 Scientific evidence demonstrating that habitat modifica-
tion is impairing a species' essential behavioral patterns, however, is 
not a sufficient basis to infer, for purposes of this new definition of 
"harm," that death or injury is necessarily occurring.162 
B. Questions Raised by the Regulation and Suggested Interpretations 
The Service's definition of "harm" does not define when habitat 
modification or degradation is "Significant." Habitat modification or 
degradation that "actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly im-
pairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or 
sheltering,"l63 should be "significant." The determination of whether 
habitat modification constitutes "harm" under the new definition, 
however, generally "requires an evaluation of the species involved, 
157. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,750 (1981) (emphasis added) (codified at 50 U.S.c. § 17.3). 
158. Palila, 649 F. Supp. at 1077, affd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988); Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. 
Supp. 424, 430 (S.D. Ala. 1992). See American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(stating that a showing of actual injury to a listed species is required in order for there to be 
"harm" and a "taking" in violation of section 9 of the Endangered Species Act; a "one in a 
million risk of harm is [not] sufficient"); see also Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States 
Dept. of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1990). 
159. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1,5 (D.c. Cir. 1993), modified on other grounds, 
17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 
714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). 
160. Palila, 649 F. Supp. at 1076 n.21. 
161. Swan View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 938 (D. Mont. 1992). 
162. Cd. at 939. 
163. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,750 (codified at.50 C.F.R. § 17.3). 
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the biological needs of that species, and the degree of habitat modifi-
cation. "164 
One question not answered by either the Endangered Species 
Act's definition of "take" or the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition 
of "harm" is whether an action of federal, state or local government, 
permitting or authorizing another person to engage in conduct that 
kills or injures endangered or threatened wildlife, is a prohibited tak-
ing in violation of the Endangered Species Act. The Fish and Wild-
life Service, at least in California, has taken the position in letters to 
municipal and county officials that such officials can violate ~he Act's 
takings prohibition if they approve, through zoning actions, pro-
posed development of land that serves as habitat for a listed pro-
tected species.165 
When such governmental authorization is a legal prerequisite to 
private action that modifies the habitat of endangered or threatened 
species and causes the death or injury of members of that species, 
that governmental authorization is a cause-in-fact of such death or 
injury166 and should be found, along with such private action, to 
have "harmed" and "taken" protected species in violation of the En-
dangered Species Act. Thus, the Fish and Wildlife Service's redefini-
tion of "harm" should be interpreted to mean that "harm" includes 
federal, state or local government action that authorizes or permits a 
person to engage in conduct that kills or injures protected species of 
wildlife, when such governmental authorization or permission is a 
legal prerequisite for that other person's action.167 
164. Sweet Home Chapter v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279, 286 (D.D.C. 1992), aJfd sub nom. 
Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.c. Cir. 1993), affd in part and rev'd in part on other 
grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 
S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6,1995) (No. 94-859). 
165. See Thornton, Takings, supra note 56, at 50-51. 
The Fish and Wildlife Service also reportedly has advised county officials in California that 
the County could be responsible for a "take" in violation of the Act if it recommended that 
private landowners clear flammable brush in the endangered Stephens' Kangaroo rat habitat 
in order to create a preemptive firebreak. See Rep. Al McCandless, Letter to the Editor - Homes 
Burned So Rats Nests Could Survive, WASH. PosT, Sept. 6, 1994, at A 16. 
166. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text (including "but for" and substantial 
factor causation). 
167. One court, without explicitly discussing the issue of whether a governmental body 
"takes" wildlife when it authorizes or permits action by another person that kills or injures 
wildlife, held that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) registration of pesticides con-
taining strychnine, causing the death of endangered species that ate strychnine-laced rodent 
bait (or rodents that had been poisoned by such bait), constituted a prohibited taking of an 
endangered species in violation of the Endangered Species Act. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 
882 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1989). The Eighth Circuit reasoned in this case that: (1) "a taking 
occurs when the challenged activity has 'some prohibited impact on an endangered species'," 
id. at 1300-m (quoting Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495, 497 
(9th Cir. 1981»; and (2) that the EPA's strychnine registrations had a prohibited impact on 
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A more troublesome issue under the takings prohibitions of the 
Endangered Species Act is whether a granting of funds by federal, 
state or local government to a person, who utilizes such funds to 
undertake an action, constitutes a prohibited taking when that per-
son's action kills or injures a protected species of wildlife. Govern-
ment funds granted to a person should be held to "harm" and "take" 
a protected species if there is a finding that the person's action that 
killed or injured wildlife would not have occurred "but for" the 
granting of government funds, or that the government's grant was a 
substantial factor in the person's action that killed or injured a pro-
tected species.l68 The Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" 
should also be interpreted to mean that a governmental granting of 
funds constitutes "harm" in such a situation. 
Another issue not explicitly addressed by either the Endangered 
Species Act's definition of "take" or the Fish and Wildlife Service's 
definition of "harm," is whether an omission, such as the failure of a 
governmental official or agency to perform a mandatory duty, or 
exercise discretionary powers, to prevent another person from killing 
or injuring an endangered or threatened species of wildlife, can con-
stitute a prohibited taking. The Fish and Wildlife Service's definition 
of "harass"169 applies to either an "act" or "omission," as did the Fish 
and Wildlife Service's 1975 definition of "harm";170 but the Service's 
1981 redefinition of "harm" only refers to an "act which actually kills 
or injures wildlife."l71 
endangered species because endangered species had died after eating strychnine bait and be-
cause "strychnine can be distributed only if it is registered. Consequently, the EPA's decision 
to register pesticides containing strychnine or to continue these registrations was critical to the 
resulting poisoning of endangered species." 882 F.2d at 1301. Because the Eighth Circuit 
found that "[tJhe relationship between the registration decision and the deaths of endangered 
species ... [was) dear," the EPA's registration of strychnine was held to constitute the taking of 
endangered species. ld. The court's reasoning suggests that it was applying a "but for" causa-
tion test-that "but for" EPA's registration of strychnine, endangered species would not eat 
strychnine bait and be killed. 
Another court, without supporting reasoning, held that the federal government's authori-
zation of the use of lead shot by hunters, when such lead shot causes the death of wild bald 
eagles through lead poisoning when eagles consume other birds that have consumed lead shot 
or been wounded or killed by lead shot, constituted a taking in violation of section 9 of the En-
dangered Species Act. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1089 (E.D. Cal. 
1985). See also Sierra Oub v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part and vacated in 
part sub nom. Sierra Oub v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that Forest Service's 
management practices and policies, allowing private timber companies to cut timber in na-
tional forests within endangered species habitats, "harm" the species by causing a severe 
decline in the species population). See infra notes 183-206 and accompanying text. 
168. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. 
169. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993). 
170. 40 Fed. Reg. 44,415 to 44,416 (Sept. 26, 1975) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1975» 
(current version at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993». 
171. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993). 
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The 1981 redefinition of "harm" might be interpreted as only ap-
plying to affirmative acts that kill or injure wildlife. However, when 
it adopted its redefinition of "harm" in 1981, the Service stated that it 
deleted the phrase "or omission" from its definition of "harm" since 
the term "'act' ..• [was] inclusive of either commissions or omissions 
which would be prohibited by section 9."172 The Fish and Wildlife 
Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" therefore should be interpreted 
to mean that "harm" occurs when a governmental agency or official 
fails to perform a mandatory duty, prescribed by statute, regulation, 
court order, etc., or fails to exercise discretionary powers conferred 
by statute or regulation, to prevent another person from killing or 
injuring an endangered or threatened species of wildlife. 
In the case of federal departments and agencies such an interpre-
tation of "harm" is consistent with "the policy of Congress [under the 
Endangered Species Act] that all Federal departments and agencies . 
. . shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of [the 
Act]."l73 This interpretation of "harm" also would be consistent with 
tort standards of causation-in-fact because it would apply the defini-
tion of "harm" to omissions by federal, state and local government 
agencies and officials that are "but for" causes of, or a substantial fac-
tor in, the death or injury of protected species of wildlife.174 
172. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,750 (Nov. 4, 1981) (codified at.50 C.F.R. § 17.3). 
In 1994, however, the United States contended, in a petition for rehearing of Sweet Home 
Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), see infra notes 345-56 and accompanying text, 
that the Service's 1981 redefinition of harm required that "habitat modification involve 
'affirmative action which creates death or disturbance to essential behavioral patterns with 
significant and permanent, injurious effects.'" Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 192 
(D.c. Cir. 1994) (statement of Williams, J.) (quoting Petition for Rehearing), cert. granted, 115 S. 
Ct. 714 ijan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). Judge Stephen Wi11iams, in his statement joined in by Judge 
Sentelle, explaining his vote in favor of the court's per curiam denial of the appellee's petition 
for rehearing, asserted that the regulation "in fact requires no 'affirmative action.'" rd. After 
quoting the Service's 1981 statement, Judge Williams accused the federal government of 
misrepresenting the regulation. rd. Judge Williams argued that "the Department [of Interior) 
inserted the word 'actually' before 'kills or injures' in its redefinition of harm merely to under-
score the need for a causal link-a showing that the 'significant and permanent effects' on the 
species have been 'due to a party's actions.'" rd. (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 to 54,749 (Nov. 4, 
1981». 
173. 16 U.S.c. § 1531(c)(1) (1988). 
174. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. 
Without explicitly addressing the issue of whether "harm" can occur through an omission. 
one court held that the failure or refusal of the Secretary of the Interior and the Fish and 
Wildlife Service to perform its non-discretionary duty under section 4(f), 16 U.S.c. § 1533(f) 
(1988), to develop and implement a recovery plan for an endangered species of fish, consti-
tuted a taking of the endangered species in violation of section 9 of the Act because members 
of the endangered species were being killed, damaged, or destroyed. Sierra Oub v. Lujan. 36 
Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1533 (W.O. Tex. 1993). 
Sierra Oub v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 438-39 (5th Cir. 1991), supports an interpretation of 
"harm" as including a failure of a government agency to comply with requirements the agency 
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Also troublesome is whether a private, non-governmental person 
can "harm" and "take" a protected species of wildlife through an 
omission or failure to protect a listed endangered or threatened 
species of wildlife from death or injury. A non-governmental person 
should only be liable under the Endangered Species Act, through an 
omission, when the person has killed or injured an endangered or 
threatened species by breaching a legal duty, imposed by statute, 
regulation, judicial order, or common law, to protect the wildlife 
from such harm.175 If a private person's liability for a "taking" under 
the Act through an omission is not limited to when he or she 
breaches a legal duty to a protected species, a private landowner 
might have to "spend money to affirmatively manipulate their lands 
to improve habitat conditions for listed species"176 anytime listed 
wildlife was threatened with death or physical injury from hunters, 
animal predators, disease, other action by third parties, or other 
natural causes. 
Yet another issue not addressed by the Fish and Wildlife 
Service's redefinition of "harm" is the type of evidentiary showing 
required to show that habitat modification has killed or injured en-
dangered or threatened species. When modification of wildlife 
habitat involves the cutting down of a tree inhabited by wildlife and 
the tree falls upon an animal and kills it, or otherwise directly kills a 
protected wildlife species, the person who cut the tree down has 
violated section-9's taking provision. Similarly, a person would kill 
wildlife (and commit a prohibited taking through habitat modifica-
tion) if he or she struck and killed an endangered or threatened wild-
life species, while operating earthmoving equipment (such as a bull-
dozer or grader) to clear and develop land. 
In each of these two examples, a person's modification of wildlife 
habitat constitutes a prohibited "take" in violation of section 9 of the 
Endangered Species Act because the person's actions would directly 
has adopted to protect an endangered species. See infra note 200-01 and accompanying text. 
See also Quarles et aI., supra note 29, at 12. 
175. Such an approach to a private person's liability for "harm:' through an omission, 
would be similar to the criminal law principles governing a person's liability for criminal 
homicide (murder or manslaughter) for an omission. In order to be guilty of either murder or 
manslaughter, a person must unlawfully kill another human being. See LAP A VE & ScaTI, supra 
note 136, § 7.1 at 605 & § 7.9 at 652. American courts hold that a person can "kill" another 
human being through an omission and be guilty of murder or manslaughter as a result of the 
omission, only if the person had a legal duty (which is recognized only in limited circum-
stances under the criminal law) to the alleged victim of the criminal homicide and if the per-
son's failure to perform that duty proximately caused the victim's death. See id. § 3.3 at 202-12. 
A similar approach to criminal liability under the Endangered Species Act for "killing" an 
endangered or threatened species through an omission is appropriate in view of the Act's pur-
pose of insuring the survival and recovery of protected species. 
176. See Quarles et aI., supra note 29, at 12. 
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kill a protected wildlife species. There would be no need to deter-
mine if the habitat modification constituted IIharm ll under the Fish 
and Wildlife Service's regulation. However, when there is no evi-
dence that habitat modification has directly killed an endangered or 
threatened species of wildlife, questions arise as to when habitat 
modification constitutes IIharmll under the Fish and Wildlife Service's 
regulation. 
The Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of IIharmll does not state 
whether a showing that a particular animal was killed must exist for 
a court to find a II harm, II II kill, II or IItake ll of a protected wildlife 
species, nor does it stat~ whether a showing that a person's actions or 
habitat modification, causing a decrease in the population of a 
protected species of wildlife, is sufficient to support a finding of a 
Ilharm,1I IItake,1I or Ilkill.1I Several courts, however, have held that a 
showing of IIharmll does not require proof of the death of individual 
members of an endangered or threatened species of wildlife.l77 
If the death of an individual wild animal is relied upon to show 
IIharmll or a II kill II in violation of the Endangered Species Act, a num-
ber of issues may arise regarding when modification of a species' 
habitat is alleged to have actually killed those specific animals. 
When the body of a dead animal is found on modified or altered 
land that is part of the animal's habitat, the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice's definition of IIharmll does not state what type of evidence or 
showing is required in order for a court to find that the habitat modi-
fication actually killed that specific animal. The Service's definition 
of IIharmll does not state whether, or when, modification or alteration 
of a species' habitat can be found to be a IIharm" to, or a "kill" of, a 
dead animal, if the direct cause of the animal's death appears to be 
shooting by a hunter, the act of an animal predator, disease, malnu-
trition, starvation, or unknown (natural) causes. 
The Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of IIharm" should be 
interpreted to mean that the modification or degradation of wildlife 
habitat will be found to have actually killed an individual member of 
the species, if there is a finding that "but for" the habitat modification 
or degradation the specific dead animal would not have been killed, 
or that the habitat modification was a substantial factor in the killing 
of the animal. Such an approach would follow the IIbut for" and sub-
stantial factor tests used by courts in civil torts cases to determine 
whether a defendant's tortious conduct was the cause-in-fact of the 
177. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (0. Haw. 
1986), afJ'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, 1270 (E.D. Tex. 
1988), afJ'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 
429 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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plaintiff's injury,178 and would further Congress' intent to give "take" 
a broad, protective definition179 and to protect and conserve the 
habitat of endangered and threatened species of wildlife. ISO Under 
such an interpretation, habitat modification could be considered to 
have actually killed an animal that was shot by a hunter or killed by 
an animal predator if there is a finding that the animal would not 
have died when it did but for the habitat modification, or that the 
habitat modification was a substantial factor in causing the animal's 
death. Such a finding might be made when the habitat modification 
destroyed an animal's food supply, shelter or protective vegetative 
cover, causing the animal to migrate to a new habitat where it was 
vulnerable to the hunter or animal predator that killed it. 
Similarly, if a specific animal died as a result of starvation or 
malnutrition, habitat modification that destroyed or reduced the 
animal's food supply should be found to have actually killed the 
animal if there is a finding that the animal would not have died but 
for the damage to its food supply, or that the damage to its food 
supply was a substantial factor in causing the animal's death. If a 
specific protected animal was found dead on land that was not part 
of modified or degraded wildlife habitat, there would be a finding 
that the modification of the wildlife habitat was a "taking" if the dead 
animal had used the altered or modified habitat prior to its death181 
and if, using the "but for" or substantial factor test, the habitat modi-
fication was the cause-in-fact of the animal's death by forcing the 
animal to migrate to new habitat where it died or was killed. 
178. See Bert Black & David H. Hollander, Jr., Unravelling Causation: Back to the Basics, 3 U. 
BALT. J. ENVTL. L 1 (1993). In civil torts cases, a plaintiff is required to show that the defen-
dant's tortious conduct was both the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury and the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff's injury. See id. at 1-2. Traditionally, proof of causation-in-fact requires 
the plaintiff to show that his or her injury would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's 
conduct. Id. at 4. However, many courts today hold that a defendant's conduct can be held to 
be the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury if the defendant's conduct was a "substantial factor" 
in causing the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 5-6. See United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District, 
788 F. Supp. 1126, 1133-34 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
179. See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text. 
ISO. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
181. Proving that a particular dead animal had used the modified habitat may be difficult 
when the animal is found dead on land outside the modified habitat, unless the dead animal 
had peculiar identifying characteristics and had been observed within the modified habitat 
prior to its death. Because such evidence usually will not be present, a court in such a case 
might presume that the dead animal spent at least part of its life on the modified habitat if: (1) 
the modified habitat, prior to its modification. had characteristics that made it suitable habitat 
for the dead animal's species; and (2) the place where the dead animal's body was found was 
close enough to the modified habitat to be within the range of members of the species. See 
Robert J. Taylor, Biological Uncertainty in the Endangered Species Act, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, 
Summer 1993, at 6 (discussing the range and migratory habits of certain species protected 
under the Endangered Species Act). 
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Alternatively, it could be found that the habitat modification was the 
cause-in-fact of the animal's death even if the animal had never been 
on the altered or degraded habitat.t82 
Some courts hold that modification of wildlife habitat can con-
stitute "harm" when it causes a decrease in the population of the pro-
tected species. In Sierra Club v. Lyng, the court held that the manage-
ment practices of the National Forest Service in eastern Texas' 
national forests significantly modified the old growth pine tree 
habitat of the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker.183 The court 
held that the resulting decline in the species' population within the 
national forests' modified habitat was "harm" within the meaning of 
the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition.l84 The district court 
in Lyng found that the case involved "not merely a situation where 
the recovery of the species ... [was] impaired by the agency's 
practices, ... but rather the agency's practices themselves ... caused 
and accelerated the decline in the species. "185 
Specifically, the Lyng court determined the Forest Service's man-
agement practices implicated all four factors of the Fish and Wildlife 
Service's definition of "harm."l86 First, the district court found that 
"essential behavioral patterns of the woodpeckers ... [were] im-
paired by isolation of woodpecker colonies from one another," 
because the Forest Service's management practices altered "the cus-
tomary habits of the birds to survive and produce young" by making 
"woodpecker colonies particularly susceptible to outbreaks of 
southern pine beetles" and by contributing "to woodpecker abandon-
ment of cavity trees" used by the woodpeckers for their nests.187 
Second, the district court found that the "isolation of particular 
colonies interfere [ d] with breeding practices," contributing to popu-
lation decline because "males ... [could not] find females [with 
182 This latter type of situation might occur if habitat modification caused hunters or 
animal predators to move their hunting from the modified habitat to another area used by the 
specific dead animal for its habitat, resulting in the animal being killed by the relocated 
predator or hunter. 
183. 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds sub 
nom. Sierra Oub v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991). 
184. 694 F. Supp. at 1271-72. The Forest Service's "even-aged management" practices at 
issue in Lyng involved c1ear<utting, shelterwood cutting, and seed-tree cutting. See id. at 1263 
n.2. 
The district court in Lyng also held that the defendants' actions violated section 7(a)(2) of 
the Endangered Species Act. 694 F. Supp. at 1272-73 (interpreting U.s.c. § 1536(a)(2»; see supra 
notes 114-27 and accompanying text. However, the defendants' actions did not violate the 
Wilderness Act. 694 F. Supp. at 1273-75 (interpreting 16 U.S.c. §§ 1131-36). 
185. Id. at 1271 (emphasis added). 
186. Id. (listing essential behavioral patterns, breeding, feeding and sheltering, as the four 
factors constituting "harm"). 
187. Id. 
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whom] to breed."I88 Third, the district court found that the Forest 
Service's management practices reduced the woodpecker's food 
supply and foraging areas. Fourth, the court found that the manage-
ment practices reduced the number of cavity trees used as nests.189 
The district court concluded in Lyng that the practices and poli-
cies of the Forest Service, "when taken as a whole, detrimentally im-
pact[ed] upon the woodpecker and ... [were] largely responsible for 
the rapid decline of the remaining birds in Texas."19O In short, the 
court held that the Forest Service's management practices caused 
"harm" to the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker because the 
practices significantly modified or degraded the woodpecker's 
habitat, by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns-
including breeding, feeding and sheltering - and actually killed 
endangered woodpeckers, causing a decline in the woodpecker's 
population within the national forests.191 
However, the district court in Lyng did not explain how it found 
that woodpecker deaths, or the significant modification of the wood-
peckers' habitat resulting from the Forest Service's management 
practices, caused the decline in the woodpecker population. The 
finding that the population decline was due to deaths of wood-
peckers apparently was based upon the fact that "[t]he last remaining 
populations of these birds ... [were] concentrated in the national 
forests, primarily because the old growth pines on private lands ... 
[had] largely been eliminated."192 The district court in Lyng impli-
citly found that the woodpeckers had not migrated to private lands 
when their habitat in the eastern Texas national forests was signifi-
cantly modified. In the absence of evidence that woodpeckers had 
migrated to other habitat, the decline in woodpecker population 
could only be due, as found by the district court, to "large percent-
ages of the few remaining birds hav[ing] died."I93 Since there was no 
allegation or showing that the deaths and population decline of the 
species were caused by something independent of the modification 
of the species' habitat, the district court apparently found that the 
deaths and declining population of red-cockaded woodpeckers 
188. Id. at 1271-72. The court added that "[iJsolation also causes the gene pool to be re-
duced with fewer birds in a given area, causing genetic problems and abnonnalities in the 
subsequent generations." Id. at 1272. 
189. ld. 
190. Id. 
191. The district court in Lyng found that the "severe decline in the population of wood-
peckers ... in the past ten years: id. at 1270, was due to "large percentages of the few re-
maining birds" dying. id. at 1271. 
192. Id. at1265. 
193. Id. at 1271. 
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within national forests were caused by the significant habitat'modi-
fication resulting from the Forest Service's management practices.194 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals implicitly recog-
nized the possibility that the deaths and decline of the red-cockaded 
woodpecker might have been caused by some other act independent 
of the Forest Service's management practices, by stating that lithe 
[red-cockaded woodpecker] population hard] not fallen as a result of 
permits granted under section 1539(a)(1).11195 
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court in Lyng IIdid 
not err in finding that the government violated ESA section 9,"196 but 
vacated the district court's orders so far as they mandated the 
specific features of a Forest Service timber management plan for 
national forests in Texas.l97 The Fifth Circuit noted that the district 
court in Lyng determined that the Forest Service's management prac-
tices IIresulted in significant habitat modificationll and IIcaused and 
accelerated the decline in the [red-cockaded woodpecker] species.1I198 
In addition, the Fifth Circuit noted that the Forest Service had not 
completely implemented its wildlife management handbook, which 
specified silvicultural practices that should be followed in order to 
protect red-cockaded woodpeckers, by permitting clearcutting with-
in 200 feet of woodpecker cavity trees and by not removing midstory 
hardwood. This lack of implementation led to the woodpeckers' 
abandonment of cavity trees.t99 The Fifth Circuit stated that the 
Forest Service's: 
course of conduct certainly impair[ed] the [red-cockaded wood-
pecker'S] lIessential behavioral patterns, including ... sheltering, II 50 
c.P.R. § 17.3, and thus result[ed1 in a violation of section 9 .... 
Because the dictates of the USPS's handbook were intended to 
preserve the dwindling [red-cockaded woodpecker1 population, it 
... [was] not unreasonable to conclude that failure to observe the 
handbook would result in a lltakingll of the [red-cockaded wood-
pecker].200 
194. rd. at 1263. 
195. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 438 (5th Cir. 1991). 
196. rd. at 439. 
197. rd. at 440. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court had not erred in determining 
that the defendants' actions violated section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.c. § 1536), 
926 F.2d at 439, but held that the district court "exceeded its authority to enjoin violations of 
the [Endangered Species Act)" because "[t)he court's injunction eviscerated the [section 7) 
consultation process by effectively dictating the result of that process." Id. at 440. 
198. rd. at 438 (quoting 694 F. Supp. at 1260). 
199. rd. 
200. rd. at 438-39 (footnote omitted). 
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The Fifth Circuit then concluded "that the district court did not err in 
finding that the government violated ESA section 9."201 Therefore, 
Sierra Club v. Lyng, as affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
stands for the proposition that "harm" to an endangered or protected 
species occurs when that species' population declines after there is 
significant modification of that species' habitat which significantly 
impairs the species' breeding, feeding or sheltering, in the absence of 
a showing that the decline in the species' population is due either to 
the death of members of the species by independent causes or to mi-
gration of members of the species to new habitat, without resulting 
injury to the migrating animals. 
Since the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" requires 
actually killing or injuring wildlife, there must be a finding either: (1) 
that the decline in population was due to the death of species caused 
by the habitat modification, or (2) that the decline in population was 
due to members of the species migrating to new habitat because of 
the modification of their habitat and that the habitat modification 
caused "injury" (either to the migrating members of the species or to 
members of the species that remain within the modified habitat, or 
bOth).202 Proof of the death of individual members of a protected 
species, by producing evidence of dead bodies of animals, should 
not be required in order to prove a "kill" or "harm" of a protected 
species. Furthermore, an affirmative showing that members of the 
species have died, or migrated to new habitat with resultant "injury" 
to the species, is not required, in order to find harm within the mean-
ing of Fish and Wildlife Service regulations. 
The Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" should be 
interpreted to mean that "harm" includes significant modification or 
degradation of a protected species' habitat, which significantly im-
pairs essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or 
sheltering, when there is a decline in the population of the species 
within a particular habitat after, or during, modification or degrada-
tion of part or all of that habitat.203 The burden should be on the 
201. Id. at 439 (citation and footnote omitted). The reasoning of the Fifth Circuit implies 
that the term "act" in the Fish and Wildlife Service's redefinition of "harm" can be interpreted to 
include an omission or failure to act, at least when a federal government agency fails to com-
ply with policies it adopted to protect an endangered or listed species. See supra notes 169-74 
and accompanying text. 
202. See infra notes 207-29 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of "injury" 
within the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm"). 
203. In order to invoke this presumption, a court would first have to geographically define 
the habitat of a species. The species' habitat for purposes of this presumption may be a greater 
area than the area that has been modified or altered, as determined by the characteristics that 
make an area suitable habitat for a particular species and by the range and migratory habits of 
that species. See Taylor, supra note 181. A court also would have to determine the species' 
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person who allegedly engaged in or caused the habitat modification 
or degradation, to show that either: (1) the decline in the species' 
population was due to death of members of the species caused by 
something independent of the habitat modification or degrada-
tion,204 or (2) the decline in the species' population was due to the 
migration of members of the species to a new habitat and that such 
migration did not cause "injury" to members of the species. Under 
this approach, a court will presume that the population decrease was 
caused by the significant habitat modification, if evidence exists that 
the population, within a particular protected species' habitat, has 
decreased after or during significant habitat modification. This 
presumption is consistent with the policy of the Endangered Species 
Act to protect the habitat of endangered and threatened species of 
wildlife, and it is rational because wildlife usually is killed or injured 
when modification of their habitat significantly impairs their breed-
ing, feeding or shelter.2os The presumption that the death of animals 
population both before and after the habitat modification, in order to determine if the species' 
population had declined after or during the habitat modification. See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 
F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Sierra Oub v. Yeutter, 
926 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 1991). 
204. Even if the death of a specific animal was directly caused by a hunter shooting a 
predatory animal, or by starvation, malnutrition, or disease, modification of that animal's habi-
tat may still be the cause-in-fact of that animal's death and considered a "harm" to that animal 
if it is found that the animal would not have died or been killed at that time "but for" the 
modification of its habitat, or that the habitat modification was a substantial factor in causing 
the animal's death. See supra notes 177-$2 and accompanying text. 
20S. See Sierra Oub v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1991), affd in part and vacated in 
part sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991). 
Such a presumption is also arguably rational because the population of endangered and 
threatened species should increase as a result of recovery plans developed and implemented 
by the Secretary of the Interior under section 4(f), 16 U.S.c. § 1S33(f), of the Act. The goal of 
such recovery plans is "the conservation and survival of the species" so "that the species (can] 
be removed from the list" of endangered or threatened species. ld. at § 1S33(f)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). 
Under the Endangered Species Act, however, "(o]nly two domestic species have been delisted 
due to recovery from endangerment," and only "a minority of listed species boasts recovery 
plans, and few of the 34S approved recovery plans have been implemented." Desiderio, supra 
note 28, at 41, SO. 
(O]f the hundreds of species listed as endangered or threatened by [the Fish and 
Wildlife Service] since 1973, most remain poised today on the brink of extinction. 
Less than a handful of species have recovered in numbers sufficient to warrant a 
change in their condition. Importantly, more species have become extinct than 
those that have been recovered. 
ld. at 41. In light of these facts, a broad interpretation of "harm," to include an unexplained de-
cline in a species' population when its habitat has been significantly modified, would further 
the purposes of the Endangered Species Act to protect endangered and threatened species of 
wildlife and their habitat. 
The birth of new members of a species, of course, may affect the extent to which the popu-
lation of a particular species in a specific area will decline when modification of the species' 
habitat causes the death of members of that species. In some cases, population of a species in a 
particular area may not decline during a particular period of time even though modification of 
1995] ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 197 
and a decline in wildlife species population results from significant 
modification of that species' habitat could be overcome by evidence 
that the decline in population is due to the death of members of the 
species caused by some other act independent of the habitat modifi-
cation, or by non-injurious migration of members of the species to a 
new habitat.206 
The Fish and Wildlife Service's redefinition of "harm" does not 
define what types of harm "injure" wildlife. The Service's definition 
of "harm" indicates, however, that "harm" includes, but is not limited 
to, "significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including 
breeding, feeding or sheltering" by significant habitat modification or 
degradation.207 The Service's definition of "harm," however, does 
not require proof of physical injury (serious or otherwise) to an indi-
vidual animal in order for an act to "injure" wildlife. 
The Service's definition of "harm" should be interpreted to mean 
that "harm" occurs either if an act or omission causes physical injury, 
the species' habitat causes the death of some members of that species, when the number of 
new members of the species that are born during a particular period of time equals or exceeds 
the number of members of the species that die during that period. In the absence of evidence 
that modification of a species' habitat has caused a decline in the species' population, some 
other evidence that modification of a species' habitat has killed or injured members of the spe-
cies would be reqUired to establish that the habitat modification was a taking prohibited by 
section 9 of the Endangered Species Act. 
206. Such a rebuttable presumption, which shifts the burden of proof to the person 
accused of a "taking" to show that the decline of a species' population was not caused by that 
person's modification of the species' habitat, is arguably similar to the approach followed by 
Judge Jenkins in Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 
816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). Allen involved an action 
brought against the United States under the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.c. §§ 1291, 1346, 
2671-80 (1988), by approximately 1200 individuals, alleging that nearly 500 deaths and cancer 
were caused by radioactive fallout from atmospheric detonation of atomic bombs in Nevada in 
the 1950's and early 1960's. Since Judge Jenkins found that the cancers suffered by the plain-
tiffs could be caused by natural, unknown, or "spontaneous" causes as well as by radiation and 
that science could not distinguish between cancers caused by radiation and cancers caused by 
other sources, he adopted the following test for determining if the federal government's atomic 
bomb tests were the cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs cancer: 
Where a defendant who negligently creates a radiological hazard which puts an 
identifiable population group at increased risk, a member of that group at risk 
develops a biological condition which is consistent with having been caused by 
the hazard to which he has been negligently subjected, such consistency having 
been demonstrated by substantial, appropriate, persuasive, and connecting fac-
tors, a fact finder may reasonably conclude that the hazard caused the condition 
absent persuasive proof to the contrary offered by the defendant. 
588 F. Supp. at 415. Similarly, when the population of a species within its habitat has declined 
after its habitat has been modified, it is possible that the population decline is the result of 
deaths of animals from some other act independent of the habitat modification or migration of 
animals to new habitat, rather than the habitat modification. As in Allen, considerations of 
fairness support a shifting of the burden of proof to the person who modified a species' habitat 
to prove that the modification of habitat did not kill or injure members of the species. 
207. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993). 
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whether serious or otherwise, to an individual animal, or signifi-
cantly impairs essential behavioral patterns of a wildlife species, 
including breeding, feeding or sheltering, through significant habitat 
modification or otherwise. Such an interpretation would include 
within II injury II both direct physical injury to specific, individual 
animals, and "injury" to a large number of animals and even an entire 
species resulting from adverse impacts on feeding, breeding, 
sheltering, or other essential behavioral patterns of one or more 
members of a species of wildlife. Such an interpretation of "harm" 
recognizes the importance of a species I habitat in providing food, 
shelter, protection, breeding and reproduction sites, and nesting sites 
for the rearing of young,208 and recognizes the Endangered Species 
Act's policy of protecting the habitat of listed species.209 Such an 
interpretation is consistent with the 1986 district court decision in 
Palila v. Hawaii Department o/Land & Natural Resources (Palila 11).210 
C. Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources 
(Palila II) 
In Palila II, the district court held that the conduct of state offi-
cials, in permitting mouflon sheep in the endangered palila bird' 
species I designated critical habitat, constituted a prohibited "take" 
under the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of Iharm."211 
The district court in Palila II found that this conduct constituted 
"harm" within the meaning of the Service's definition of "harm" 
because: 
(1) the eating habits of the sheep destroyed the mamane woodland 
and thus caused habitat degradation that could result in extinction; 
[and] (2) were the mouflon to continue eating the mamane [trees], 
the woodland would not regenerate and the Palila population 
would not recover to a point where [the Palila] could be removed 
from the Endangered Species list."212 
The district court reasoned in Palila II that "harm" under the Service's 
1981 redefinition, "would include activities that significantly impair 
essential behavioral patterns to the extent that there is an actual 
negative impact or injury to the endangered species, threatening its 
continued existence or recovery, II and "[u]nder both the original 
208. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. 
209. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
210. 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), af!d, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th eir. 1988). 
211. 649 F. Supp. at 1080. 
212. 852 F.2d at 1107. 
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definition and the definition as amended in 1981, 'harm' may include 
significant habitat destruction that injures protected wildlife."213 
The district court also stated in Palila II that: 
[a] finding of "harm" does not require death to individual members 
of the species; nor does it require a finding that habitat degradation 
is presently driving the species further toward extinction. Habitat 
destruction that prevents the recovery of the species by affecting 
essential behavioral patterns causes actual injury to the species and 
effects a taking under section 9 of the Act.214 
Although the court stated that Congress intended under the En-
dangered Species Act lito prohibit habitat destruction that harms an 
endangered species,1I215 the court added that: 
since the purpose of the Endangered Species Act is to protect en-
dangered wildlife, there can be no finding of a taking unless habitat 
modification or degradation has an adverse impact on the protected 
species .... [H]owever, this injury to the species does not necessitate 
a finding of death to individual species members ... [and] a show-
ing of "harm" similarly does not require a decline in population 
numbers ... , Until [a listed species] has reached a sufficiently 
viable population to be delisted, it should not be necessary for it to 
dip closer to extinction before the prohibitions of section 9 come 
into force. The key to the Secretary's definition is harm to the spe-
cies as a whole through habitat destruction or modification. If the 
habitat modification prevents the population from recovering, then 
this causes injury to the species and should be actionable under 
section 9.216 
Finding that the IImouflon sheep are having the same destructive 
impact on the mamane as the feral sheep [in Palila I 217]"218 and that 
lithe Palila population may be as large as it can be now, given the 
condition of the mamanell219 in the Palila's designated critical habitat, 
the district court, per Judge King, found that: 
213. 649 F. Supp. at 1075. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 1076. 
216. Id. at 1077 (footnote omitted). An example of no adverse impact on a species result-
ing from a habitat modification or degradation is "if the State were to mow the lawn within the 
Palila's critical habitat, this modification would not in and of itself result in a taking under 
section 9. There would have to be a showing of concomitant injury to Palila, such as a signifi-
cant impairment of Palila breeding or feeding habits." Id. at 1077 n.24. 
217. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land &: Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), 
affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text. 
218. 649 F. Supp. at 1079. 
219. Id. at 1079-80. 
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Continued grazing by mouflon will continue to suppress mamane 
growth and regeneration. This in tum will harm the Palila in one of 
two ways. Either the mouflon sheep will further degrade the ma-
mane ecosystem, thus decreasing the remaining Palila habitat and 
further depressing the Palila population. Or, at best, the mouflon 
will merely slow or prevent the recovery of the mamane forest, 
suppressing the available food supply and nesting sites for Palila, 
and thus preventing the Palila population from expanding toward 
recovery.220 
This finding led Judge King to conclude in Palila II that: 
[T)he mouflon sheep are harming the Palila within the definition of 
50 c.P.R. § 17.3. The mouflon are having a significant negative im-
pact on the mamane forest, on which the Palila is wholly dependent 
for breeding, feeding and sheltering. This significant habitat de-
gradation is actually presently injuring the Palila by decreasing food 
and nesting sites, so that the Palila population is suppressed to its 
current critically endangered levels. If the mouflon continue eating 
the mamane, the forest will not regenerate and the Palila popula-
tion will not recover to a point where it can be removed from the 
Endangered Species List. Thus, the presence of mouflon sheep on 
Mauna Kea threatens the continued existence and the recovery of 
the Palila species. If the Palila is to have any hope of survival, the 
mouflon must be removed to give the mamane forest a chance to 
recover and expand.221 
Judge King rejected the state's argument that multiple use of the 
palila's critical habitat on Mauna Kea by mouflon sheep and the 
palila should be allowed, on the grounds that once the plaintiffs have 
shown the "significant negative impact" of mouflon sheep "'harming' 
the Palila population within the meaning of 50 C.F.R. § 17.3, ... the 
[Endangered Species] Act leaves no room for mixed use or other 
management strategies or policies. "222 
Judge King concluded in Palila II that: 
[T)he presence of the mouflon sheep in numbers sufficient for sport-
hunting purposes is harming the Palila. They degrade the mamane 
ecosystem to the extent that there is an actual present negative 
impact on the Palila population that threatens the continued exist-
ence and recovery of the species. Once this determination has been 
made, the Endangered Species Act leaves no room for balancing 
policy considerations, but rather requires me to order the removal 
of the mouflon sheep from Mauna Kea. . .. [T]he mouflon sheep 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 1080 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
222. Id. at 1081. 
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are to be removed from the critical habitat of the Palila on Mauna 
Kea.223 
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Unlike the court in Sierra Club v. Lyng,224 which held that there 
was "harm" to an endangered species when the habitat modification 
caused the population of the species within the habitat to decline, 
Judge King in Palila II held that significant habitat modification of an 
endangered species' habitat was "injury" and "harm" to that species 
either when the habitat modification suppresses the species' popula-
tion level at current levels, threatening the continued existence of the 
species, or when the habitat modification prevents the species' popu-
lation from recovering and increasing to an extent that species could 
be removed from the Endangered Species List. Judge King explicitly 
stated that an "injury" to a protected species did not require proof of 
either the death of individual members of a species or a decline in 
the species' population; he implicitly held that a finding of II injury II to 
a listed species does not require proof of physical injury, serious or 
otherwise, to individual members of a species. Judge King in Palila II 
interprets "injury" as including II injury II to the entire species caused 
by habitat modification that adversely affects a species' breeding, 
feeding, or sheltering and prevents an increase of the species' popu-
lation, when that species thereby is either threatened with extinction 
or prevented from recovering. 
In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed225 Judge King's order in Palila II, on the grounds that 
habitat destruction that could result in a species' extinction causes 
Iharm."226 The Ninth Circuit in Palila II upheld, as not clearly erron-
eous, Judge King's findings that the state's action, permitting mou-
flon sheep in the Palila's designated critical habitat, constituted a 
"taking" of the Palila's habitat.227 The Ninth Circuit held that lithe 
district court's (and the Secretary's) interpretation of harm as includ-
ing habitat destruction that could result in extinction, and findings to 
that effect are enough to sustain an order for the removal of the 
mouflon sheep."228 The Ninth Circuit did "not reach the issue of 
whether the district court properly found that harm included habitat 
degradation that prevents recovery of an endangered species."229 
223. rd. at 1082-83. 
224. 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Sierra Club 
v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991). See supra notes 183-206 and accompanying text. 
225. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land &: Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th CiT. 1988). 
226. rd. at 1110. 
227. rd. 
228. ld. (footnote omitted). 
229. rd. at 1110-11. In 1994, the Ninth Circuit stated that its PaliZa II decision "held that the 
definition of 'harm' in the [Endangered Species Act) includes habitat degradation that could 
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In Palila II, the Ninth Circuit also held that the Fish and Wildlife 
Service's 1981 regulation redefining "harm" "serves the overall pur-
pose of the [Endangered Species Act] ... [and] is also consistent with 
the policy of Congress evidenced by the legislative history."230 The 
Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm," however, was not directly chal-
lenged as invalid in Palila II. The Ninth Circuit in Palila II implicitly 
noted this fact when it stated - in addressing the state's argument 
that the district court incorrectly interpreted the Act's definition of 
"harm" to include habitat destruction which could drive the palila to 
extinction-that "[w]e inquire whether the district court's interpre-
tation is consistent with the Secretary's construction of the statute 
since he is charged with enforcing the Act, and entitled to deference 
if his regulation is reasonable and not in conflict with the intent of 
Congress. "231 
The Ninth Circuit in Palila II did not cite or discuss the Supreme 
Court's approach in Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense 
Council232 to judicial review regarding the validity of an agency's 
statutory construction. The Ninth Circuit in Palila II, however, cited 
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,233 for the proposition 
that "the Secretary's construction of the statute [is] ... entitled to 
deference if '. . . reasonable and not in conflict with the intent of 
Congress."234 Riverside Bayview Homes235 cites Chevron U.S.A. for the 
proposition that "[a]n agency's construction of a statute it is charged 
with enforcing is entitled to deference If it is reasonable and not in 
conflict with the expressed intent of Congress. "236 
The Ninth Circuit in Palila II stated that the Fish and Wildlife 
Service's definition of "harm" "is entitled to deference if ... [the 
regulation] is reasonable and not in conflict with the intent of 
result in extinction," but had "specifically declined to 'reach the issue of whether harm includes 
habitat degradation that merely retards recovery."' National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. 
R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Palila II, 852 F.2d at 1110-11). In Burlington, the 
Ninth Circuit further stated that "in order to reach a similar finding of harm using our Palililll 
analysis," the plaintiff "would have to show significant impairment of the species' breeding or 
feeding habitats and prove that the habitat degradation prevents, or possibly retards, recovery 
of the species." 23 F.3d at 1511. This recent statement by the Ninth Circuit indicates that the 
Ninth Circuit today might affirm Judge King's holding in Palila II that "harm" to a species 
occurs when the species' habitat is modified to an extent that it prevents recovery and delisting 
of the species. 
230. 852 F.2d at 1108. 
231. Id. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985». 
232 467 U.s. 837 (1984). 
233. 474 U.s. 121 (1985). 
234. 852 F.2d at 1108. 
235. 474 U.S. at 131. 
236. Id. at 131 (citing Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 837). 
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Congress."237 This analysis is essentially identical to Chevron U.S.A.' s 
requirements that a court and administrative agency are required to 
follow the "clear" and "unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress."238 Chevron U.S.A. also states that a court is required to follow 
an agency's resolution of a specific statutory question and not sub-
stitute the court's own construction of a statutory provision when the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific question 
and the agency's interpretation of the statute is a "permissible con-
struction"239 or a "reasonable interpretation"240 of the statute. 
237. 852 F.2d at 1108. 
238. 467 U.s. at 84243. "The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory con-
struction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congres-
sional intent." ld. at 843 n.9. The Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. indicated that a court is 
permitted to use "traditional tools of statutory construction" to determine if there is "clear" and 
"unambiguous" intent by Congress; "[i]f a court, employing traditional tools of statutory 
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that 
intention is the law and must be given effect." 467 U.S. at 843 n.9; see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
480 U.s. 421, 446-50 (1987); Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 
1285,1292-93 (D.c. Cir.), affd per curiam I7y equally divided court, 493 U.S. 38 (1989); Sweet Home 
Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 193 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (statement by Williams, J.), cert. granted, 
115 S. Ct. 714 (Jan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859); see infra notes 379, 387-99, 435-61 and accompanying 
text. 
239. 467 U.S. at 843. 
240. ld. at 844, 845. See infra note 393-94 and accompanying text. Chevron U.S.A. also 
states, however, that "[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill" by "explicit" 
"legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question," id. at 843-44, "there is an express 
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." ld. (citations omitted). This arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review under Chevron U.S.A. does not apply to the Fish and Wildlife 
Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm," because this regulation was not promulgated under "an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation." ld. (emphasis added). Rather, the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of 
"harm" was promulgated under section n(£), 16 U.S.c. § 1540(f) (1988), of the Endangered 
Species Act, which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior "to promulgate such regulations as 
may be appropriate to enforce this chapter," which is "implicit" "legislative delegation" to the 
Fish and Wildlife Service on the "particular question" of how "harm" should be defined, see 467 
U.s. at 844, thus requiring a court under Chevron U.S.A. to defer to, and uphold, the Service's 
1981 redefinition of "harm" if it is a "reasonable interpretation" of the Endangered Species Act. 
ld. 
Judge Silberman's dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Judge Mikva and Judge Wald, in 
Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994), cut. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (Jan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859), raised the issue of whether 
Chevron U.S.A. was inapplicable to judicial review of the Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" 
because "we are dealing with a criminal statute." See infra notes 321-461 and accompanying 
text; if. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2110 & nn.9-10 (1992) 
(plurality opinion). "That is to say, the Chevron U.S.A. presumption-that Congress has 
delegated primary authority to the administrative agency to reconcile ambiguities in statutory 
language-may not apply when the statute contemplates criminal enforcement. Cf Kelley v. 
EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1107 (D.c. Cir. 1994). The petitioner does not raise that concern, but it 
surely is not a separate claim that the petitioner has affirmatively waived." Sweet Home 
Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 194 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (Silberman, J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en bane), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (Jan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). The issue of whether 
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In PaUla II, the Ninth Circuit, in addressing the state's argument 
that the district court erred in interpreting the definition of "harm" 
under the Endangered Species Act to include habitat destruction that 
could drive an endangered species to extinction, emphasized that the 
Secretary of the Interior, when promulgating the redefinition of 
"harm" in 1981, "noted that harm include[d] not only direct physical 
injury, but also injury caused by impairment of essential behavior 
patterns via habitat modification that can have significant and per-
manent effects on a listed species."241 The Ninth Circuit also stated 
that the Secretary of the Interior, in the 1981 notice promulgating the 
redefinition of "harm," "let stand the district court's construction of 
harm in PaliZa I ... [that] include[d] habitat destruction that could 
result in the extinction of the Palila-exactly the same type of injury 
at issue here. "242 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that "the district court's inclusion 
within the definition of harm of habitat destruction that could drive 
the Palila to extinction falls within the Secretary's interpretation."243 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit implicitly found that the district court de-
ferred to the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" and had 
Chevron U.S.A. applies when a statute contemplates criminal enforcement also was not ad-
dressed in Palila II. This issue arguably is present in Sweet Home I, Sweet Home 11 and in PaliZa 11 
because the Endangered Species Act's prohibition of taking endangered and threatened species 
is subject to enforcement through criminal penalties, as well as through civil penalties and 
injunctive relief. See supra notes 86-113 and accompanying text. 
No statement by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. indicates that the Chevron standard 
of judicial review regarding an agency's interpretation of a statute is inapplicable when the 
statute is subject to criminal enforcement or when the agency's statutory interpretation is at 
issue in a criminal prosecution. The plurality opinion in Thompson/Center Anns Co. cited by 
Judge Silberman addresses the issue of the applicability in a civil setting of the rule of lenity in 
construing a criminal statute, not the issue of the application of the Chevron U.S.A. standard in 
a civil case to a statute that can be enforced through a criminal prosecution. The opinion in 
Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d at 1107, which was cited by Judge Silberman also failed to address the 
issue of the applicability of Chevron U.S.A. to a statute subject to criminal enforcement. 
Denying a petition for rehearing of Kelley v. EPA in Michigan v. EPA, 38 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
2068 (D.C. Cir. 1994), Judge Silberman indicated that the issue presented in Kelley was whether 
Chevron U.S.A. should apply "[w]hen Congress treats an agency only as a prosecutor without 
specific authority to issue regulations bearing on the questions prosecuted." Michigan, 38 Env't 
Rep. Cas. at 2072. Under the Endangered Species Act, however, Congress has given the Fish 
and Wildlife Service authority "to promulgate such regulations as may be appropriate to 
enforce" the Act. 16 U.S.c. § 1533(d) (1988). Because the judges deciding Sweet Home I, Sweet 
Home 11 and Palila 11 applied the Chevron U.S.A. standard to determine the validity of the Fish 
and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm," this article will not further address the issue 
of whether a standard other than the Chevron U.S.A. standard should be applied by a court to 
determine the validity of the Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm.· 
241. 852 F.2d at 1108 (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,750 (1981) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3». 
242. Id. (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 54,749-50 (1981) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3) and Palila I, 471 F. 
Supp. at 985). 
243. Id. 
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"not substitute[d] its own construction of a statutory provision," as 
required by Chevron U.S.A.244 
The Ninth Circuit in Palila II then found that the Secretary's 
inclusion of habitat destruction that could result in extinction within 
the definition of "harm" "follow[ed] the plain language of the statute, 
. . . which is 'to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon 
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be 
conserved .... ' 16 U.S.c. § 1531(b). The definition serves the overall 
purpose of the Act since it conserves the Palila's threatened eco-
system."245 The Ninth Circuit also added: 
The Secretary's construction of harm is also consistent with the poli-
cy of Congress evidenced by the legislative history. For example, in 
the Senate Report on the Act: '"Take' is defined in ... the broadest 
possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a 
person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife." ... The 
House Report said that the "harassment" form of taking would 
"allow, for example, the Secretary to regulate or prohibit the activi-
ties of birdwatchers where the effect of those activities might 
disturb the birds and make it difficult for them to hatch or raise 
their young." ... If the "harassment" form of taking includes activi-
ties so remote from actual injury to the bird as birdwatching, then 
the "harm" form of taking should include more direct activities, 
such as the mouflon sheep preventing any mamane from growing 
to maturity.246 
Although the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly find a clear, unambig-
uous congressional intent on the issue of whether "harm" included 
significant habitat modification within the meaning of the Chevron 
U.S.A. doctrine, the Ninth Circuit, in analyzing the "plain language" 
and legislative history of the Endangered Species Act, held that the 
Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" was a "reason-
able interpretation" and a "permissible construction" of the Act 
within the meaning of Chevron U.S.A. 
D. Validity of the Fish and Wildlife Service's Definition of Harm 
The Palila II holding should be followed and upheld by other 
courts because the Ninth Circuit's deference to the Service's redefini-
tion of "harm" is consistent with the Supreme Court's application of 
Chevron U.S.A. in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 1nc.247 In 
Riverside Bayview, the Supreme Court stated that under Chevron 
244. 467 U.S. at 844. 
245. 852 F.2d at 1108. 
246. Id. at 1108-09 (citations omitted). 
247. 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
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U.S.A., judicial review of an agency's inte~pretation of a statute was 
lllimited to the question whether ... [the agency's exercise of juris-
diction was] reasonable, in light of the language, policies and legisla-
tive history of the Act. 11248 The Supreme Court in Riverside Bayview 
upheld, under this Chevron U.S.A. standard, Corps of Engineers' 
regulations broadly defining IIwaters of the United Statesll under the 
Clean Water Act249 to include certain wetlands. This decision was 
based on the grounds that the Clean Water Ads legislative history 
indicated that Congress intended the term IIwaters of the United 
States" to have a broad, expansive definition.250 In Palila II, the Ninth 
Circuit similarly found, after examining the language and the legis-
lative history of the Endangered Species Act, that Congress intended 
lltakell to be construed broadly and to protect the habitat of listed 
species. This interpretation requires a court to uphold, under the 
principles of Chevron U.S.A. and Riverside Bayview, the Service's def-
inition of IIharmll as including Significant habitat modification. 
In upholding the Service's definition of IIharm,1I the Ninth Cir-
cuit's approach in Palila II is also similar to the Supreme Court's 
approach in Chevron U.S.A., where the EPA's interpretation of a pro-
vision251 of the Clean Air Act, with respect to a situation when the 
statutory language and legislative history did not address the 
specific issue in question, was upheld by the Supreme Court as lIa 
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests. . . . 
[Because] the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency 
considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the de-
cision involve[d] reconciling conflicting policies. II252 The Endan-
gered Species Act's IIregulatory scheme, II with respect to takings, 
similarly can be characterized as IItechnical and complexll; the Fish 
and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" reconciled "con-
flicting policies II in lIa detailed and reasoned fashion."253 
The Ninth Circuit in Palila II also stated, in a footnote that might 
be interpreted as an alternate ground for holding the Service's defini-
tion of "harmll to be valid, that: 
In addition, the Secretary's interpretation is consistent with the 
presumption that Congress is "aware of an administrative or 
248. ld. at 131. 
249. 33 U.s.c. § 1362(7) (1982). 
250. See 474 U.S. at 133-34. 
251. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982). 
252. 467 U.S. at 865 (footnotes omitted). 
253. ld. 
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judicial interpretation of a statute and [adopts) that interpretation 
when it reenacts a statute without change."254 
207 
Apparently relying on this presumption, the Ninth Circuit in Palila 
II, after tracing the evolution of the Service's redefinition of "harm," 
stated: "Congress presumably was aware of the current interpreta-
tion of harm when it amended the Act in 1982. But Congress did not 
modify the taking prohibition in any matter. Thus Congress' failure 
to act indicates satisfaction with the current definition of harm and 
its interpretation by the Secretary and the judiciary."255 
However, the Ninth Circuit's reliance in Palila II, upon a principle 
that applies when Congress "reenacts a statute without change," was 
incorrect because the Endangered Species Act's definition of "take" 
under section 3(19)256 was not reenacted by Congress in 1982.257 
Consequently, this apparent alternative ground in Palila II for 
254. 852 F.2d at 1109 n.6 (citing Undahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 
782 n.15 (1985) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.s. 575, 580-81 (1978»). The Pons case actually 
dealt with Congress' enactment of a new law that incorporated sections of an earlier law. The 
Supreme Court in Pons also stated that Congress normally can be presumed to have had 
knowledge of the judicial interpretation given to the earlier law incorporated into the new law, 
at least insofar as it affects the new statute. 434 U.S. at 581. In Pons, the Supreme Court, 
following the statement quoted in Lindahl and PaliZa II, cited Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 
422 US. 405, 414 n.8 (1975), NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 US. 361, 366 (1951), and National 
Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 147 (1920). The Albermarle Paper Co. and Gullett Gin Co. 
cases held that Congress, in reenacting a statutory provision,. approved of prior judicial or 
administrative interpretations of the provision, when those judicial or administrative interpre-
tations of the reenacted provision had been cited approvingly in Senate, House or Conference 
Committee reports on the bill that reenacted the provision at issue. The National Lead Co. case 
upheld an executive department's interpretation of a statutory provision which had been 
reenacted by Congress, by simply stating that Congress, in reenacting a statutory provision,. "is 
presumed to have legislated with knowledge of such an established usage of an executive 
department of the Government." 252 U.S. at 147. In National Lead Co., however, unlike 
Albermarle Paper Co. and Gullet Gin Co., the Supreme Court did not refer to citation or discus-
sion of the department's interpretation of the statute in any committee reports on the bill that 
reenacted the prOvision at issue. 
255. 852 F.2d at 1109 n.6. 
256. 16 U.s.c. § 1532(19) (1982). 
257. See 852 F.2d at 1106, 1109 n.6; Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1472 
(D.C. Cit. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cit. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 aan. 6, 
1995) (No. 94-859). The only amendment in the 1982 Endangered Species Act relating to the 
Act's takings prohibitions was the enactment of section 10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.c. § 1539(a)(1)(8) 
(1988), which authorized the Fish and Wildlife Service to issue incidental takings permits. See 
supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 357-63, 428-34 and accompanying 
text. Furthermore, although a House subcommittee conducting hearings on the 1982 amend-
ments to the Endangered Species Act had notice of the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 
redefinition of "harm," 50 C.F.R § 17.3 (1981), and the Ninth Circuit's decision in PaliZa 1, 639 
F.2d 495 (9th Cit. 1981), neither the Service's redefinition nor PaliZa 1 were cited approvingly in 
Senate or House reports on the 1982 amendments or in floor debates on the 1982 amendments, 
see Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d at 1469, unlike the situation in Albermarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.s. 405, 414 n.8 (1975); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 366 (1951). 
See supra note 254. 
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upholding the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" 
is not a valid legal argument.258 However, the Ninth Circuit's reli-
ance upon the Chevron U.S.A. doctrine to uphold the Service's 1981 
redefinition of "harm" is a sufficient and independent ground for up-
holding the regulation as valid under the Endangered Species Act. 
In 1994, as a result of Judge Stephen F. Williams' change of posi-
tion, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia invalidated the Fish and Wildlife Service's 
inclusion of habitat modification within its definition of "harm" and 
.alter~d a previous opinion,259 issued in 1993, that upheld the Fish 
and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm."260 A disagree-
ment now exists between the Ninth Circuit and District of Columbia 
Courts of Appeals as to whether the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 
regulation redefining "harm" is valid. 
E. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt (Sweet Home I) 
In 1993, the majority of this panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia (per Chief Judge Abner Mikva), 
rejected, in Sweet Home Clulpter v. Babbitt261 (Sweet Home 1), a facially-
void-for-vagueness challenge to the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 
redefinition of "harm"~62 and held, "per curiam, that the 'harm' regula-
tion does not violate the ESA by including actions that modify habi-
tat among prohibited 'takings."'263 Writing in Sweet Home I for a 
258. See infra notes 364-78 and accompanying text. 
259. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C Cir. 1993), modified on reh'g, 17 F.3d 
1463 (D.C Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 
6,1995) (No. 94-859). 
260. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Later· in 1994, this 
divided panel, per curiam, denied the appellees' petition for rehearing (with Chief Judge Abner 
Mikva stating ,that he would grant the petition for rehearing). Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 
30 F.3d 190 (D.C Cir. 1994), eert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). The en bane 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia denied the appellees' suggestion 
for rehearing en bane (with four judges, including Chief Judge Mikva, dissenting from the 
denial of rehearing en bane). rd. 
261. 1 F.3d 1 (D.C Cir. 1993). 
262. 1d. at 3-5. 
263. ld. at 3. This suit, which was brought by "various organizations, businesses and 
individuals, who depend directly or indirectly on the timber industry in the Pacific Northwest 
and in the Southeast for their livelihood," Sweet Home Chapter v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279,281 
(D.D.C 1992), affd sub. nom. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C Cir. 1994), affd in 
part and rev'd in part, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C Cir. 1994), eert. 
granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859), challenged the validity of the Fish and 
Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm," 50 CF.R. § 17.3 (1988), as well as the Service's 
regulation, id. at § 17.31(a), extending to threatened species the Service's regulations 
prohibiting takings of endangered species. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text. The 
district court rejected the plaintiff's challenges to these two regulations, granted the 
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majority of the panel, Chief Judge Mikva stated that the Fish and 
Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" would be held facially 
void for vagueness in such a pre-enforcement challenge264 only if the 
regulation was impermissibly vague in all of its applications.265 
This holding by Chief Judge Mikva was a correct decision. As 
noted by Chief Judge Mikva in Sweet Home I,266 the Supreme Court 
has indicated261 that when a statute or regulation does not affect First 
Amendment expressive freedoms,268 the statute or regulation will be 
defendants' motion for summary judgment, and denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment 806 F. Supp. at'1Jj7. 
264. The plaintiffs in Sweet Home I, who were "not currently the subject of an enforcement 
action under 50 C.F.R § 17.3," 1 F.3d at 4, brought a civil suit directly challenging 50 C.F.R § 
17.3 as facially void for vagueness. 
265. 1 F.3d at 4. 
266. Id. 
261. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.s. 489, 495, 498 (1982); Smith v. 
Goguen. 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1914). The Goguen case was cited and discussed by Chief Judge 
Mikva in Sweet Home I, 1 F.3d at 4. 
268. Chief Judge Mikva did not explicitly hold in Sweet Home [ that the plaintiff's actions 
regulated by 50 C.F.R § 17.3 were not protected First Amendment expressive freedoms, but he 
did hold that, "the conduct implicated by this case is economic activity." "which modem 
vagueness cases have invariably afforded less protection" than to First Amendment expressive 
freedoms. 1 F.3d at 4. Chief Judge Mikva explained that the plaintiffs contended that 50 C.F.R. 
§ 11.3 would "inhibit their ability to develop their land, especially by harvesting timber:' but 
that "[t]o the degree that [plaintiffs] contend that the regulation results in a 'taking' of their 
property in the Fifth Amendment sense, their remedy would be compensation, not a VOiding 
of the regulation." 1 F.3d at 4. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), states that a statute 
can be challenged as facially void for vagueness (even when it is not impermissibly vague in 
all possible applications) when it "reaches, 'a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct,'" id. at 358 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982». 
KDlender made clear, however, that such facial vagueness challenges are permitted only ·where 
free speech or free association are affected" by the statute or regulation," 461 U.S. at 358 n.8, 
because of the Supreme Court's "concern ... 'upon the potential for arbitrarily suppressing 
First Amendment liberties.'· [d. at 358 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 
87, 90 (1965». Chief Judge Mikva in Sweet Home I similarly concluded that the reference to an 
enactment implicating "constitutionally protected conduct" in Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982), was "referring primariIy to the First Amendment expressive 
freedoms, which have long received special protection in vagueness cases." 1 F.3d at 4 (citing 
Smith v. Goguen. 415 U.s. 566,573 (1914». 
Even if a facial taking challenge was permitted under KDlender when a statute or regulation 
constituted a taking of property, in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, and reached a "substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct" within 
the meaning of KDlender, 461 U.s. at 358, the plaintiffs in Sweet Home I neither alleged nor 
established that the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" constituted, in a 
substantial amount of situations, a Fifth Amendment taking of property without just compen-
sation. The plaintiffs in Sweet Home I also did not allege or establish that 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 
reached a substantial amount of conduct that was free speech or free association protected 
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Chief Judge Mikva therefore 
ruled correctly in Sweet Home I that the plaintiffs could not succeed in their facial void for 
vagueness challenge "unless the regulation is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." 1 
F.3d at 4. 
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held to be facially void for vagueness "only if the enactment is imper-
missibly vague in all of its applications. "269 
Chief Judge Mikva also noted in Sweet Home I that the void for 
vagueness doctrine requires "regulations with criminal sanctions [to] 
'define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary 
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner 
that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment."'270 He stated that "[t]his principle, however, does not lead to 
the conclusion that any person can have a regulation wiped off the 
books, or prompt a limiting judicial construction of the regulation, 
merely by showing that it will be impermissibly vague in the context 
of some hypothetical application."271 
Chief Judge Mikva found in Sweet Home I that the provision in 
the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" requiring an act 
that "actually kills or injures wildlife," and the requirement that the 
government must prove that a party knowingly violated the statute 
or regulation in order to establish a -civil or criminal violation272 of 
the Endangered Species Act's "take" provision, were "features that 
prevent [the regulation] from being invariably vague as applied. "273 
Although the plaintiffs in Sweet Home I argued that the Service's 
definition of "harm" was impermissibly vague in referring to, but not 
defining, "significant" habitat modification, "significantly" impairing, 
and "essential" behavioral patterns, 274. Chief Judge Mikva found that 
"there are obviously types of activity, including habitat modification, 
that 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 clearly propibits without a hint of vagueness."275 
He cited, as examples of conduct "obviously" forbidden by the 
269. Sweet Home 1,1 F.3d at 4 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 
495 (1982». 
270. Id. (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.s. 352, 357 (1983». Although not stated by 
Chief Judge Mikva in Sweet Home I, "the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine 'is 
not actual notice, but the other prindpal element of the doctrine-the requirement that a 
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. ... Kolender,461 U.S. at 357 
(quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974». Another basic prindple of the vagueness 
doctrine also not discussed by Chief Judge Mikva in Sweet Home I is that a statute or regulation 
"is not unconstitutional merely because it throws upon (persons] the risk of rightly estimating 
a matter of degree." International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 223 (1914). 
Consequently, words or phrases in a statute or regulation can be held to be certain enough for 
vagueness doctrine purposes "notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to 
which estimates might differ." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
271. 1 F.3d at 4. 
272. 16 US.c. §§ 1540(a)-(b) (1988). 
273. 1 F.3d at 4. Chief Judge Mikva added, "The Supreme Court has recognized that 'a 
scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy 
of notice to the complainant that his conduct is prOscribed.'" Id. (quoting Village of Hoffman 
Estates v. F1ipside, 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982». 
274. 1 F.3d at 4. 
275. Id. at 4-5. 
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regulation, "habitat modification that causes ascertainable physical 
injury or death to an individual member of a listed species" and 
"major acts of habitat degradation that destroy a species' ability to 
breed, feed, or shelter. For instance, a person aware of the regulation 
would undoubtedly be held accountable for clear-cutting an entire 
forested area known to be populated by spotted owls."276 
Because he correctly concluded that the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice's definition of "harm" was "not vague in all of its applications, II 
Chief Judge Mikva held in Sweet Home I that the court "may not 
declare it void on its face."277 He noted, however, that "[s]pecific 
vagueness concerns about the regulation can be addressed when and 
if they are properly raised in the framework of a concrete challenge 
to a particular application of the regulation."278 As stated by the 
district court in Sweet Home I, when a statute or regulation is not im-
permissibly vague in all of its possible applications, '"[v]agueness 
challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment free-
doms must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand.'''279 
A majority of the panel also held in Sweet Home I, "per curiam, that 
the 'harm' regulation does not violate the [Endangered Species Act] 
by including actions that modify habitat among prohibited 'tak-
ings.'''280 In his opinion for the court, Judge Mikva noted that the 
plaintiffs argued that Congress did not intend to include habitat 
modification within "harm" in the Act's definition of "take" and "that 
the meaning of harm should therefore be limited to direct physical 
injury to an identifiable member of a listed wildlife species."281 Judge 
Mikva also noted, in a separate opinion concurring in this per curiam 
holding, that the plaintiffs in Sweet Home I also argued that Congress, 
although intending under the Endangered Species Act to halt injuri-
ous habitat modification, "did not mean to combat habitat degrada-
tion on private lands through the prohibition against takings in 16 
U.S.c. § 1538 ... [and] that Congress intended to combat the prob-
lem solely through § 1534's provision for federal land acquisition."282 
276. ld. at 5. 
277. ld. 
278. ld. 
279. Sweet Home Chapter v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279, 286 (D.D.C. 1992) (quoting United 
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.s. 544, 550 (1975», affd sub nom. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 
F.3d 1 (D.c. Cir. 1993), affd in part and ,ev'd in part on other grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 
1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-
859). 
280. 1 F.3d at 3. 
281. ld. 
282 ld. at 8-9 (Mikva. C.}., concurring). 16 U.s.c. § 1534(a) (1988) (authorizing the 
Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture-in the case of National Forest System lands-to 
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Chief Judge Mikva, in his separate concurring opinion, joined the 
holding that the IIharmll definition does not violate the Endangered 
Species Act on the grounds that lithe 'harm' regulation conflicts with 
neither the [Endangered Species Act] itself nor its ambiguous legisla-
tive history and is unquestionably a permissible and reasonable con-
struction of the statute"283 which a court must uphold under the 
Chevron U.S.A.2M standard. 
He noted in this concurring opinion that the plaintiffs' argument, 
that the Act's "takingll provision was not intended to include habitat 
modification, in part was based on the fact that the Endangered 
Species Bill reported to the Senate by the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee in 1973 did not refer to habitat modification in its definition of 
"take," although the definition of "take" in S. 1983-the first endan-
gered species bill referred to the committee in 1973-included within 
the definition of "takell the IIdestruction, modification, or curtailment 
of [an endangered species'] habitat or range II in the definition of 
II take. "285 The plaintiffs argued that the Committee's deletion of 
references to habitat modification in the reported bill's definition of 
"take" "evince[d] Congress' intent not to include habitat modification 
within the scope of prohibited 'takings.'''286 Chief Judge Mikva, 
however, found the Act's IIlegislative history to be most ambiguous 
regarding whether Congress intended to include habitat modi-
fication within the meaning of 'take,''' noting that there was no indi-
cation of why the Senate Commerce Committee excluded habitat 
modification from the definition of IItake.1I287 He asserted that the 
Committee may have acted in this manner because the original bill 
(5. 1983) would have made habitat modification a per se taking under 
the Act. However, he stated that the Committee may not have in-
tended to preclude the Fish and Wildlife Service from adopting, as it 
did, a regulation providing that habitat modification constitutes a 
taking when it causes actual injury or death to a protected species.288 
acquire land as part of "a program to conserve fish, wildlife, and plants, including those which 
are listed as endangered or threatened species"). 
283. 1 F.3d at 8 (Mikva, c.J., concurring). 
284. Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See 
infra notes 387-99, 434-61 and accompanying text. 
285. 1d. at 9 (citing S. 1983, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(6) (1973». See Sweet Home Chapter v. 
Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-
859); see infra notes 343-44 and accompanying text. 
286. 1 F.3d at 9 (Mikva, C.]., concurring). 
287. 1d. 
288. 1d. The district court in Sweet Home 1, whose judgment initially was affirmed by the 
court of appeals, noted that: 
S. 1983 was only one of two endangered species bills under consideration by the 
Senate Committee on Commerce at that time. The other bill, S. 1592, defines 'take' 
\ 
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Thus, Chief Judge Mikva found no clear Congressional intent to ex-
clude habitat modification from the Act's definition of "take," noting 
that the Senate Committee Report on its Endangered Species Bill 
states that "'[t]ake' is defined ... in the broadest possible manner to 
include every conceivable way in which a person can 'take' or at-
tempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife. "289 
The plaintiffs in Sweet Home I, in support of their argument that 
the service's definition of "harm" was invalid, also referred to floor 
statements290 by some members of Congress that allegedly suggested 
that some members of Congress might have desired land acquisition 
under section 5(a)291 of the Endangered Species Act to be the sole 
method under the Act of dealing with habitat modification.292 The 
plaintiffs further argued that "Congress must have intended land 
acquisition to be the exclusive mechanism for preventing such habi-
tat modification. . .. Otherwise ... agency officials would always 
choose the free alternative of prohibiting a damaging land use under 
the 'take' provision, rather than paying to acquire the affected 
land. "293 
Chief Judge Mikva, however, found that "[n]othing in the lan-
guage of 16 U.S.c. § 1534 or in the legislative history establishes that 
Congress meant land acquisition to be the only mechanism for habi-
tat protection on private lands."294 He asserted that the floor state-
ments by individual members of Congress cited by the plaintiffs "'are 
not a safe guide •.. in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the 
exactly as it now appears in the statute. From this legislative history, the Court 
can conclude no more than that the Senate chose to adopt the definition in one bill 
over that in another. There is absolutely nothing in the legislative history of the 
[Endangered 5pecies Act) to indicate that the Senate rejected the definition in S. 
1983 specifically because it wanted to exclude habitat modification from the 
definition of take. In fact, the Senate Report indicates just the opposite, that "take" 
was being defined "in the broadest possible manner." 
It may be, as defendants suggest, that the Senate rejected the definition of "take" 
in S. 1983 because it did not want habitat modification per se to constitute a taking, 
or it may be that the Senate chose to leave the decision of whether to define 
takings to include habitat modification in the hands of the Secretary. However, 
the Court will not rely upon such speculation to deduce legislative intent. 
Sweet Home Chapter v. Lujan. 806 F. 5upp. 279, 283 (D.D.C. 1992) (emphasis added), aff'd sub 
nom. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.c. Cir. 1993), affd in part and rev'd in part, 17 
F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 
aan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). 
289. 1 F.3d at 9 (Mikva, c.J., concurring) (quoting 5. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 
(1973». 
290. Id. (citing 119 CONGo REC. 525,669 (daily ed. July 24, 1973) (including statement of Sen. 
Tunney) and 119 CONGo REc. 525,691 (1973) (including statement of Sen. Nelson». 
291. 16 U.s.c. § 1534(a) (1988). 
292. See 1 F.3d at 9 (Mikva, C.J., concurring). 
293. Id. (emphasis added). 
294. Id. 
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law-making body,"'295 and that the statements cited "do not establish 
that even the speakers themselves intended land acquisition to be the 
exclusive protective mechanism for habitats on private lands."296 He 
also argued that extending the Act's taking prohibition to habitat 
modification on private land would not make land acquisition under 
section 5297 of the Act a nullity. The Act would be valid because 
federal wildlife managers might wish to acquire private lands, rather 
than simply forbidding damaging activity on private lands under the 
Act's taking prohibition, because they could engage in more 
protective conservation programs on "preserves," "owned and 
controlled" by the federal government.298 
Chief Judge Mikva then rejected, in Sweet Home I, the plaintiffs' 
argument that under the noscitur a sociis principle of statutory con-
struction299 the Fish and Wildlife Service must narrowly interpret 
"harm" to exclude habitat modification. The plaintiffs asserted that 
the other words used in the Act's definition of "take" do not apply to 
land use that only indirectly injures wildlife.3OO Chief Judge Mikva 
rejected the plaintiffs' argument on the grounds that other terms 
used in the Act's definition of "take," such as "harass," "can limit a 
private landowner's use of his land in a rather broad manner ... to 
suppress activities that are in no way intended to injure an endan-
gered species. "301 
Finally, Chief Judge Mikva concluded in his concurring opinion 
in Sweet Home I that the enactment by Congress in 1982 of section 
10(a)(1)(B)302 of the Act "strongly suggests that Congress did in fact 
intend to include habitat modification within the meaning of 
'take.'"303 Section 10(a)(1)(B) of the Act authorizes the Fish and Wild-
life Service to issue a permit authorizing any "taking otherwise pro-
hibited by [16 U.S.c. § 1538 (a)(l)(B)] if such taking is incidental to, 
and not [sic] the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful 
295. ld. at 10 (quoting Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,474 (1921». 
296. ld. (Mikva, c.J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
297. 16 U.S.c. § 1534 (1988). 
298. 1 F.3d at 10 (Mikva, c.J., concurring). See Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 
1463,1466 (D.c. Cir. 1994); see infra notes 341-42 and accompanying text. 
299. "[U]nder the principle of statutory construction known as noscitur a sociis, a general 
term in a list should be interpreted narrowly 'to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the 
Acts of C;ongress.'" 1 F.3d at 10 (Mikva, c.J., concurring) (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 
367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961» (emphasis added). 
300. ld. (Mikva, c.J., concurring). 
301. 1d.; see infra notes 311, 316, 326-39, 400-10 and accompanying text. 
302. 16 U.S.c. § 1539(a)(I)(B) (1988). 
303. 1 F.3d at 10 (Mikva, C.}., concurring). 
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activity."304 Chief Judge Mikva found that Congress' enactment of 
section 10(a)(1)(B), which authorizes the issuance of a permit for 
"incidental takings," "implicitly confirmed" that incidental takings, 
which he interprets as including habitat modification,30s "were other-
wise forbidden by the Act. "306 
Chief Judge Mikva concluded his concurring opinion in Sweet 
Home I by stating that "[o]verall, there is nothing in the [Endangered 
Species Act] or in its legislative history that unambiguously demon-
strates that the term 'take' does not encompass habitat modifica-
tion"307 and that "Chevron commands that unless it is absolutely clear 
that an agency's interpretation of a statute, entrusted to it to adminis-
ter, is contrary to the will of Congress, courts must defer to that 
interpretation so long as it is reasonable."308 
Judge Stephen Williams also wrote a separate opinion in Sweet 
Home I concurring in section Il(A)(1) of the majority's opinion, in 
which he stated that he agreed that the Service's definition of "harm" 
"complies with the Endangered Species Act-but only because of the 
1982 amendments to the [Act]."309 Judge Williams added that the 
enactment in 1982 of section 10(a)(1)(B), authorizing permits for 
incidental takings, "support[s] the inference that the [Endangered 
Species Act] otherwise forbids some such incidental takings, includ-
ing some habitat modification. "310 He concluded his concurring 
opinion, however, by stating that "but for the 1982 amendments, I 
would find Judge Sentelle's analysis highly persuasive-including 
his discussion of the noscitur a sociis canon. "311 
Judge Sentelle dissented in Sweet Home I, arguing that while the 
Chevron U.S.A. doctrine requires a court to defer to an agency's 
304. Under section 10(a)(1)(B), a person "whose activities might incidentally 'take' 
members of an endangered species can get advance protection from legal liability, but only if 
they convince the Secretary that [their habitat conservation] plan uses the maximum devices 
possible to mitigate and minimize species loss, and that the rE;Sulting losses will not unduly 
hann the species." Sweet Home Otapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(emphasis added). See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
305. See 1 F.3d at 11 (Mikva, C.]., concurring) ("[I]t is hard to imagine what 'incidental 
takings' might be other than habitat modification. "). 
306. Id.; see infra notes 309-11 and accompanying text; see also Sweet Home Otapter v. 
Babbitt 17 F.3d 1463, 1467-69 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 11S S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-
859); id. at 1477-78 (Mikva, C.]., dissenting); see also infra notes 357-66, 428-34 and accom-
panyingtext. 
307. 1 F.3d at 11. 
308. Id. (quoting Otevron U.s.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.s. 837, 844 
(1984». 
309. Id. at 11 (Williams, ]., concurring). 
310. Id. 
311. Id. (citing RLEA v. NMB, 988 F.2d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Williams, ]., dissenting) 
(characterizing the canon as a "powerful linguistic norm"». 
216 ]. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. [Vol. 10:2 
reasonable and consistent interpretation of a statute, which is silent 
or ambiguous with respect to the issue,312 he could "see no reason-
able way that the term 'take' can be defined to include 'significant 
habitat modification or degradation' as it is defined in 50 C.F.R. § 
17.3. "313 He analogized the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of 
"harm" to a hypothetical agency regulation, prohibiting "chewing 
and spitting of tobacco," purportedly promulgated under a federal 
statute authorizing the posting of "No Smoking" signs, under which 
"smoking" was defined to include "lighting, burning, puffing, inhal-
ing, and otherwise employing the noxious nicotine-bearing tobacco 
products."314 He argued that in both the case of the Fish and Wildlife 
Service's definition of "harm" and his hypothetical regulation, the 
agency engaged in an "unreasonable expansion of terms."31S 
Judge Sentelle also invoked the noscitur a sociis principle of 
statutory construction. He argued that all the terms other than 
"harm" that are used in the definition of "take" under the Endangered 
Species Act: 
relate to an act which a specifically acting human does to a specific 
individual representative of a wildlife species. In fact, they are the 
sorts of things an individual ... commonly does when he intends to 
"take" an animal. Otherwise put, if I were intent on taking a rabbit, 
a squirrel, or a deer, as the term "take" is used in common English 
parlance, I would go forth with my dogs or my guns or my snares 
and proceed to "harass, ... pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect" one of the target species. 16 U.S.c. § 1532(19). If 
I succeeded in that endeavor, I would certainly have "taken" the 
beast. If I failed, I would at least have "attempt[ed] to engage in ... 
such conduct."316 
According to Judge Sentelle, the unreasonableness of the Fish and 
Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" was not alleviated by the state-
ment in the Senate Commerce Committee's report that "'take' is 
defined ... in the broadest possible manner,"317 because that legisla-
tive history did not convince him that Congress "intended to deprive 
the definition of any bounds whatsoever and tum the word into a 
312. 1d. (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
313. 1d. at 12 (interpreting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993». Judge Sentelle asserted that the second 
prong of the Chevron U.S.A. doctrine places limits on the judiciary'S power to question admin-
istrative actions. Id. (citing Nuclear Info. Resources Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 986 
F.2d 1169, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc)). 
314. ld. at 11-12. 
315. 1d. at 12. 
316. 1d. at 12 &: n.1 ("The only word replaced by ellipses is "harm," the word under exam-
ination."); see also infra notes 328-39, 400-08 and accompanying text. 
317. Id. at 12 (quoting S. REP. NO. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973». 
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free form concept inclusive of anything an agency might wish it to 
cover. "318 
Finally, Judge Sentelle asserted that the Service's definition of 
"harm" violated "the presumption against surplusage" principle of 
statutory construction.319 The Service's definition of "harm" made 
every other term in the Act's definition "superfluous" since "[e]very 
single one of those acts .•. falls within the definition of 'harm' as 
understood by the agency."320 
F. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt (Sweet Home II) 
On petition for rehearing, Judge Sentelle's position in Sweet 
Home I prevailed, with Judge Williams changing his earlier position, 
without additional oral arguments or additional briefing.321 Judge 
William's majority opinion in Sweet Home II held "invalid the Fish & 
Wildlife Service regulation defining 'harm' to embrace habitat modi-
fications."322 In Sweet Home 11,323 Judge Williams held that the Ser-
vice's regulation defining "harm" was invalid because the definition 
"was neither clearly authorized by Congress nor a 'reasonable inter-
pretation' of the statute, see OJevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, ... [and1 no later action of Congress supplied the 
missing authority. "324 
318. Id. at 13 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
319. Id. 
320. Id. 
321. See Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1473 (D.c. Cir.1994) (Sweet Home 11) 
(Mikva, q., dissenting), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 
Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). 
322. Id. at 1472. Later in 1994, this divided panel, per curiam, denied the appellees' petition 
for rehearing. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), eert. granted, 115 S. 
Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). Judge Williams issued a statement, which was joined by 
Judge Sentelle, in support of his vote to deny the petition for rehearing; this statement 
defended and interpreted his decision in Sweet Home 11. ld. at 191-93. Chief Judge Mikva 
stated that he would grant the petition for rehearing. Id. at 191. At the same time that the 
panel denied the appellees' petition for rehearing, the en bane United States Court of Appeals of 
the District of Columbia denied the appellees' suggestion for rehearing en bane. Id. at 191. 
Four judges, including Chief Judge Mikva, dissented from the denial of rehearing en bane. Id. 
at 194. 
On January 6, 1995, the United States Supreme Court granted the federal government's 
petition for certiorari in this case to address the validity on its face of the Fish and Wildlife 
Service's regulation that makes significant habitat modification a prohibited taking under the 
Endangered Species Act. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-
859). Oral arguments in this case are scheduled for April 17, 1995. 
323. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (Sweet Home Il), reh'g 
denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). 
324. Id. at 1464 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 
837,842-44 (1984». Chief Judge Mikva, who wrote the opinion for the court in Sweet Home 1, 1 
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993), dissented in Sweet Home II" 17 F.3d at 1473-78 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting). 
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Although Judge Williams referred to the Chevron U.S.A. doctrine 
in the court's Sweet Home II holding, his decision invalidating the 
Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" violated the Chevron 
U.S.A. doctrine. The court violated Chevron U.S.A. because it erron-
eously imposed its own construction of the statute's definition of 
"harm" instead of deferring to the Service's reasonable interpretation 
of "harm."325 In reversing his earlier position, Judge Williams first 
relied on the noscitur a sociis maxim of statutory construction.326 
After concluding that the word "harm" could be broadly and vari-
ously construed "[als a matter of pure linguistic possibility,"327 
Judge Williams found that all of the words except "harm" in the 
Endangered Species Act's definition of "take" "contemplate the per-
petrator's direct application of force against the animal taken,"328 
although in some cases "the application of force may not be instan-
taneous or immediate, and the force may not involve a bullet or 
blade."329 
Judge Williams then approvingly discussed United States v. 
Hayashi,330 where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the 
term "harass" in the definition of "take" under the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act.331 The court in Hayashi held that the defendant's 
firing of a rifle into water behind porpoises did not "harass" the por-
poises in violation of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, because 
the defendant's acts were not "direct and significant intrusions upon 
the mammal's ordinary activities."332 The Ninth Circuit in Hayashi 
reasoned that: 
325. See Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 844. 
326. 17 F.3d at 1465; see supra notes 299-301, 311, 316 and accompanying text; see also infra 
notes 400-14 and accompanying text. 
Id. 
327. 17 F.3d at 1464. 
328. Id. at 1465. 
329. Id. Judge Williams added: 
In the case of "pursue", the perpetrator does not necessarily catch or destroy the 
animal, but pursuit would always or almost always be a step toward deliberate 
capture or destruction, and so would be picked up by § 1532(19)'s reference to 
"attempt[s)". While one may "trap" an animal without being physicany present, 
the perpetrator wiJI have previously arranged for release of energy that directly 
captures the animal. And one may under some circumstances "harass" an animal 
by aiming sound or light in its direction, but the waves and particles are them-
selves physical forces launched by the perpetrator. 
330. 5 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 1993). 
331. 17 F.3d at 1465 (citing Hayashi, 5 F.3d at 1282). Under the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act, which makes it unlawful for any person to take a marine mammal, 16 U.S.c. 1372(a)(2)(A) 
(1988), "take" is defined as activity which may "harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to 
harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal." 16 U.S.c. § 1362(13) (1988). 
332 5 F.3d at 1282. 
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The [Marine Mammal Protection Act] (MMPA) groups "harass" 
with "hunt," "capture," and "kill" as forms of prohibited "taking." 
The latter three each involve direct, sustained, and significant intru-
sions upon the normal, life-sustaining activities of a marine mam-
mal; killing is a direct and permanent intrusion, while hunting and 
capturing cause significant disruptions of a marine mammal's 
natural state. Consistent with these other terms, "harassment," to 
constitute a taking under the MMP A, must entail a similar level of 
direct and sustained intrusion.333 
Judge Williams asserted in Sweet Home II that: 
[T]he nine verbs accompanying "harm" [in the Endangered Species 
Act's definition of "take"] all involve a substantially direct applica-
tion of force, which the Service's concept of forbidden habitat modi-
fication altogether lacks.334 
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In effect, Judge Williams in Sweet Home II held that to "take" a 
protected species in violation of the Endangered Species Act, a per-
son must exert direct force (although not necessarily instantaneous 
or immediate force) against a protected animaI.335 Under this reason-
ing, killing or injuring an animal indirectly through habitat modifica-
tion can never be held to be a "take" of a protected species under the 
Endangered Species Act, as "harm," "harass," or any of the other 
terms used in the Act to define "take."336 
Judge Williams, in further support of this interpretation of "take" 
under the Act, asserted in Sweet Home II that "[t]he implications of 
the Service's definition suggest its improbable relation to congres-
sional intent."337 After noting the large amount of land that may be 
needed for the survival of the grizzly bear and the criminal penalties 
for knowing violations of the Endangered Species Act's takings 
333.Id. 
334. 17 F.3d at 1465. "Of course, each of the terms in the 'take' definition itself implies 
some degree of habitat modification. Setting a trap for an animal certainly modifies its habitat, 
as in a slightly different sense, does firing bullets at it. This obviously does not imply that 
habitat modifications as the Service uses the term are also encompassed." Id. at 1465 n.1. 
335. Id at 1465. 
336. Although not cited by Judge Williams in his opinion in Sweet Home 11, California v. 
Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (CD. Cal. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 683 F.2d 
1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Secretary of Interior v. California, 464 
U.S. 312 (1984), adds support to his claim that the Endangered Species Act requires direct 
application of force against a protected animal. In California v. Watt, the court held that the 
proposed leasing of tracts on the Outer Continental Shelf, for oil and gas exploration, did not 
constitute a "take" under the Endangered Species Act, either as "harm," "attempted harm," or 
"harass," under the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1975 definitions of those terms, see supra notes 
128-48 and accompanying text, even assuming that the leasing constituted a threat to the 
continued survival of a species protected under the Endangered Species Act, because the Act 
requires a more immediate injury. 520 F. Supp. at 1387. 
337. 17 F.3d at 1465. 
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prohibitions, Judge Williams stated that lithe gulf between the 
Service's habitat modification concept of 'harm' and the other words 
of the statutory definition, and the implications in terms of the 
resulting extinction of private rights, counsel application of the max-
im noscitur a sociis."338 Judge Williams asserted that lithe Service's 
interpretation appears to yield precisely the 'unintended breadth' 
that use of the maxim properly prevents."339 
An additional reason given by Judge Williams in support of his 
holding in Sweet Home II was that "[t]he [Endangered Species] Act 
addresses habitat preservation in two ways - the federal land acqui-
sition program and the directive to federal agencies to avoid adverse 
impacts."340 Judge Williams found that the legislative history with 
respect to the Endangered Species Act's federal land acquisition pro-
gram "confirms the intention to assign the primary task of habitat 
preservation to the govemment."341 "[T]he floor managers [of the 
338. Id. Judge Williams later explained in his statement Goined by Judge Sentelle) in 
denying the appellees' petition for rehearing of Sweet Home II, that this 
grizzly example ... "makes quite clear that the panel understood that the regula-
tion addressed habitat modifications that would be fatal to members of the spe-
cies. It refers to a contention that "as many as 35 million to 42 million acres of land 
are necessary to the survival of grizzlies." If that habitat is "necessary to [the 
grizzlies') survivaL" then any material curtailment must involve de!lth for mem-
bers of the species. 
Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (statement of Williams, J.) 
(citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Sweet Home II, 17 F.3d at 1465), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 
714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). 
339. 17 F.3d at 1465 (noting that the Supreme Court stated in Janecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 
367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961), that this maxim is usually applied to avoid giving an unintended 
. breadth to Congress' Acts when a word is ambiguous); see supra notes 299-301, 311, 316 and 
accompanying text; see also infra notes 400-08 and accompanying text. Judge Williams in Sweet 
Home II referred to the statement in Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990), ~at "words 
grouped in a list should be given related meaning." 17 F.3d at 1466. 
340. 17 F.3d at 1466. The federal land acquisition program to which Judge Williams 
referred is pursuant to section 5 of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.c. § 1534 (1988). The 
directive to federal agencies to avoid adverse impacts to which Judge Williams referred is in 
section 7 of the Act, id. § 1536. See supra notes 114-27 and accompanying text. 
341. 17 F.3d at 1466. Judge Williams referred to floor statements by Representative 
Sullivan, the floor manager of the House version of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 in 
which Representative Sullivan stated that H.R 37 (the house version of the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973): 
will meet this problem [of adverse impacts on wildlife from destruction of their 
habitat) by providing funds for acquisition of critical habitat through the use of 
the land and water conservation fund. It will also enable the Department of 
Agriculture to cooperate with willing landowners who desire to assist in the 
protection of endangered species, but who are understandably unwilling to do so 
at excessive cost to themselves. 
Id. (quoting 119 Congo Rec. H30,162 (daily ed' Sept. 18, 1973) (statement of Rep. Sullivan». 
According to Judge Williams, "Representative Sullivan saw the Act as providing duties for the 
government [for habitat modification), with private persons acting only in the form of 'willing 
landowners' assisted by the Department of Agriculture.· Id. Judge Williams also quoted the 
following statement by Senator Tunney, the floor manager of the Senate version of the 
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House and Senate versions of the Endangered Species Act of 1973] 
differentiated loss of habitat from the hazard that was the target of 
the 'taking' ban and the other prohibitions of § 9."342 He then stated 
that "Congress's deliberate deletion of habitat modification from the 
definition of 'take' strengthens ... [the] conclusion,"343 and that "in 
rejecting the Service's understanding of 'take' to encompass habitat 
modification, 'we are mindful that Congress had before it, but failed 
to pass, just such a scheme. "'344 
Judge Williams, in his subsequent statement Goined in by Judge 
Sentelle) in denying the appellees' petition for rehearing of Sweet 
Home II, noted that: 
The government argues that the panel misstated the legislative 
history when it suggested a parallel between the ban on habitat 
modification retained in the Act as applied to federal government 
actors, 17 F.3d at 1466, and the "habitat modification" explicitly 
deleted [in § 9] from the draft provision governing private actors, 
id. at 1467. See Petition at 8. The panel made the point both in 
noting the apparent structure of the Act (contrasting the imposition 
of "very broad burdens" on a narrow segment of society, the federal 
government, and relatively narrow burdens on all others), and in 
suggesting the significance of the Senate Committee's deletion of 
Endangered Species Act of 1973: "Through these land acquisition provisions, we will be able to 
conserve habitats necessary to protect fish and wildlife from further destruction." ld. (quoting 
119 Congo Rec. 525,669 (daily ed. July 24,1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney»; see supra notes 290-
98 and accompanying text. 
342 17 F.3d at 1466. In support of this latter statement, Judge Williams once again quotes: 
Another hazard to endangered species arises from those who would capture or kill 
them for pleasure or profit. There is no way that the Congress can make it less 
pleasurable for a person to take an animal, but we can certainly make it less 
profitable for them to do so. 
ld. (quoting 119 CONGo REC. H30,162 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1973) (statement of Rep. Sullivan) 
(emphasis added by Judge Williams». Judge Williams then quoted the following floor state-
ment by Senator Tunney: 
Although most endangered species are threatened primarily by the destruction 
of their natural habitats, a significant portion of those animals are subject to preda-
tion by man for commercial, sport, consumption, or other purposes. The provisions in S. 
1983 would prohibit the commerce in or the importation, exportation, or taking of 
endangered species except where permitted by the Secretary. 
17 F.3d at 1466-67 (quoting 119 CONGo REC. 525,669 (daily ed. July 24, 1973) (emphasis added 
by Judge Williams». 
343. 17 F.3d at 1467. Judge Williams then discussed the fact that S. 1983, as introduced to 
the Senate Commerce Committee in 1973, defined "take" to include "the destruction, modifi-
cation, or curtailment of [a species'] habitat or range," id., but that the definition of "take" in the 
version of the Endangered Species Bill reported out of the Committee to the Senate deleted the 
language in the original version of S. 1983 referring to habitat modification. ld. (citing 119 
CONGo REC.S25,663 (daily ed. July 24, 1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney»; see supra notes 285-89 
and accompanying text. 
344. 17 F.3d at 1467 (quoting John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. CO. V. Harris Trust & Sav. 
Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517, 526 (1993». 
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the bill's reference to "habitat modification" as one of the ways in 
which a person might "take" members of an endangered species. 
The suggested parallelism is false, says the government, because the 
statutory ban on habitat modifications by federal agencies is far 
broader, reaching such modifications "whether destruction of the 
habitat would actually kill or injure the species. "345 
Judge Williams responded in this statement by asserting that "the 
government misrepresents,"346 and first concluded that section 
7(a)(2)'s prohibition of "destruction or adverse modification of 
habitat ... which is determined ... to be critical,"347 "seems to be 
simply another way of referring to habitat modifications so signifi-
cant to the species that they might lead to death, or at least some 
very serious injury, for members of the species."348 Judge Williams 
also stated an inability "to discern any substantive, operational dif-
ference" between the Service's regulations [50 C.F.R. § 17.94 (1993)] 
governing "modifications of 'critical' habitat," and the Service's regu-
lations defining "harm" under section 9 to include habitat modifica-
tion.349 Judge Williams in this statement also referred to "the virtual 
identity between what the Senate deleted from § 9 and what it 
retained in § 7."350 He said this was recognized by Michael Bean, 
Senior Counsel for the Environmental Defense Fund, when Bean 
wrote that "'if 'taking' comprehends habitat destruction, then it is at 
least doubtful whether Section 7 of the Act is even necessary.'''351 
Section 7, however, imposes procedures upon federal agencies 
that are designed to protect endangered and threatened species.352 
These procedures are not imposed upon persons under section 9 of 
the Endangered Species Act. Consequently, section 9 does not simp-
ly duplicate section 7(a)(2) if section 9 is interpreted to prohibit 
habitat modifications proscribed by the Fish and Wildlife Service's 
1981 redefinition of "harm." 
Judge Williams' analysis in denying the appellees' petition for re-
hearing in Sweet Home II also ignores the differences in habitat pro-
tection under sections 7 and 9 discussed previously in this article.353 
In particular, Judge Williams fails to discuss section 7(a)(2)'s 
345. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 192 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (statement of 
Williams, J.) (citation omitted), eerl. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). 
346. Id. 
347. 16 U.S.c. § 1S36(a)(2) (1988). 
348. 30 F.3d at 192. 
349. Id.; see supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. 
350. 30 F.3d at 192. 
351. Id. (quoting MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL WILDLIFE LAw 397 (1977). 
352 See supra note 117. 
353. See supra notes 114-27 and accompanying text. 
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alternative prohibition of conduct that may "jeopardize the con-
tinued existence of any endangered or threatened species,"354 and he 
also fails to consider the significance of the fact that section 7 of the 
Endangered Species Act only applies to actions "authorized, funded 
or carried out" by a federal agency, whereas section 9 applies to any 
person, including private individuals, corporations, and state and 
local governments and their agents and employees.355 Even if in 
some situations habitat modification might be prohibited by both 
sections 9 and 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act, Congress is not 
prohibited from subjecting the same act to regulation and/ or 
354. See supra notes 116-17, 121-24 and accompanying text. 
355. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text. 
Judge Williams also argued, in his subsequent statement in support of denial of the 
appellees' petition for rehearing of Sweet Home II, that "[t]o the extent that there may be some 
theoretical difference between habitat modification under § 7 and under the Department's 
regulations purporting to implement § 9, practical realties limit ... [§ 9's] role to pure theory," 
Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 192 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (statement of Williams, J.), 
art. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859), because modification that would 
constitute a prohibited taking under the Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" may only 
proceed pursuant to an "incidental taking" permit under section 10(a), 16 U.S.c. § 1539(a) 
(1988), of the Endangered Species Act, see supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text, and 
because "the Department [of Interior] explicitly recognizes the restrictions that it imposes 
under § 10(a) as 'equivalent' to those it imposes under § 7 to protect 'critical habitat. "' 30 F.3d 
at 192-93 (citing Special Rule Concerning Take of the Threatened Coastal California 
Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,088-90 (Dec. 10, 1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (taking 
permitted under a § 10(a) plan for California gnatcatcher '''will not appreciably reduce the 
likelihood of survival and recovery of the gnatcatcher in the wild; this criteria is equivalent to 
the regulatory definition of 'jeopardy' under section 7(a)(2) of the Act'"). 
Judge Williams' assertion. that habitat conservation plans under section 10(a) incidental 
taking permits are equivalent to restrictions imposed under section 7 to protect "critical 
habitat" is not supported by the citation to the gnatcatcher special rule, however, because the 
quotation from the special gnatcatcher rule refers to the jeopardy clause of section 7(a)(2), a 
clause which is separate and distinct from section 7(a)(2)'s prohibition of the destruction or 
alteration of des~gnated critical habitat. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. Even if this 
assertion by Judge Williams is correct, section 7(a)(2) would not prohibit modification of a 
species' habitat that is not designated critical habitat unless the habitat modification would 
violate section 7(a)(2)'s prohibition against action that may jeopardize the continued existence 
of a species (by threatening the species with extinction). See supra notes 121-24 and accom-
panyingtext. 
Judge Williams' assertion in this statement also fails to recognize, as does Judge Williams' 
earlier opinion in Sweet Home II, see infra notes 360-63 and accompanying text, that if section 9 
does not apply to habitat modification. habitat conservation plans under section 10(a) 
incidental take permits would not regulate habitat modification. Also, section 7(a)(2) would 
regulate the modification of habitat only if the modification was caused by "action authorized, 
funded, or carried out" by a federal agency and the habitat modification either may threaten 
the continued existence of the species or would destroy or adversely modify designated critical 
habitat. Section 7(a)(2) does not regulate modification of habitat that has not been designated 
as critical habitat and which would not threaten the species with extinction. See supra notes 
114-27 and accompanying text. 
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punishment (even criminal) under two different statutory pro-
visions.356 
Judge Williams I opinion in Sweet Home II, also examined the 
significance of the 1982 amendments to the Endangered Species Act. 
He noted that lithe only legislative act [in 1982) from which the 
government claims support II was the enactment in 1982 of sections 10 
(a)(l)(B) & (a)(2)357 of the Endangered Species Act, which authorize 
the Fish and Wildlife Service to issue incidental take permits.358 He 
concluded that these 1982 amendments had neither sufficiently 
lIaltered the context of the definition of ltakel as to render the 
Services1s [sic] interpretation reasonable, or even, conceivably, to 
reflect express congressional adoption of that view,1I nor, by bringing 
lithe Service1s regulation and a judicial interpretation to the attention 
of a ... subcommittee, [did they] constitute[ ] a ratification of the 
regulation. 11359 
Judge Williams held in Sweet Home II that the incidental taking 
permits authorized by section 10 (a) (1) (B) of the Endangered Species 
Act do not include the habitat modifications included within the Fish 
and Wildlife Service1s definition of IIharm.1I360 He found that lithe 
problem of incidental takings II are posed by lI[h]arms involving the 
direct applications of force that characterize the nine other verbs of § 
1532 (19),11 such as when lI[t]he trapping of a nonendangered animal 
... may incidentally trap an endangered species;1361 He stated that 
lithe key example of the sort of problem to be corrected by § 
10(a)(1)(B) involved the immediate destruction of animals that would 
be trapped by a human enterprise, II where eggs of a protected species 
would be immediately destroyed by being crushed or captured lias a 
direct result of a human enterprise, II when entrained or impinged by 
a nuclear power plant water intake structure.362 Judge Williams 
concluded his analysis of this issue by finding that the enactment of 
356. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989) (stating that Congress is not 
prohibited by Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion from subjecting a person to criminal punishment under one statute, and remedial civil 
sanctions under another statutory proviSion for the same act). 
357. 16 U.S.c. §§ 1539 (a)(1)(8) & (a)(2) (1988). 
358. See supra notes 54-56, 302-06, 310-11 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 428-34 
and accompanying text. 
359. 17 F.3d at 1467 (emphasis added). In addition. Senator Gam in 1982 withdrew a 
proposed bill that would have been "a wholesale 'rewrite,'" of the Endangered Species Act and 
would have excluded "effects from normal forestry, farming, ranching, or water management 
practices: from the Act's definition of "take." Id. at 1469 & n.3. Judge Williams concluded in 
Sweet Horne II that "[t)he record reveals nothing to suggest any relation between Senator Gam's 
decision and congressional sentiment on the habitat modification issue." Id. at 1469. 
360. Id. at 1467-68. 
361. Id. at 1467. 
362. Id. (emphasis added). 
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the section 10(a)(1)(B) incidental taking permit provision "involved 
no assumptions supporting the Service's position on habitat modi-
fication. So far as the creation of the permit plan is concerned, the 
implicit assumptions simply do not embrace the idea that 'take' in-
cluded any significant habitat modification injurious to wildlife."363 
Regarding the federal government's alternative theory that Con-
gress in 1982 ratified the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of 
"harm" in the process of amending the Endangered Species Act, 
Judge Williams in Sweet Home II interpreted references in the 1982 
Conference Report364 regarding the 1982 amendments to "habitat 
conservation" under seCtion 10 (a) of the Act, as referring to the fact 
"that relief under the § 10 (a) permit scheme would include habitat 
conservation [and] does not imply an assumption that takings encom-
pass habitat modification."365 Judge Williams added that "although § 
10(a) relief contemplates advancing 'the interest of endangered spe-
cies', it does not follow that every act detrimental to an endangered 
species constitutes a forbidden taking."366 
Judge Williams also held that awareness by a congressional sub-
committee of the Service's redefinition of "harm" and of the Ninth 
Circuit's Palila I decision,367 upholding the application of the En-
dangered Species Act to habitat modification, would not be inter-
preted as ratification by Congress of the Service's 1981 redefinition of 
"harm, "368 when there was no showing that "congressional awareness 
of the Service's regulation or of Palila [1] reached the floor of either 
House."369 He based this holding on analysis370 of decisions by the 
United States Supreme Court371 and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia,372 which he concluded "may 
363. Id. at 1468. 
364. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
US.C.C.A.N.2871-72). 
365. 17 F.3d at 1468 (emphasis added). 
366. Id. at 1469. Judge Williams, later in his opinion in Sweet Home II, added that Congress' 
"creation of the permit scheme is fully consistent with the meaning of 'take' as enacted in 1973." 
Id. at 1472. 
367. Palila v: Hawaii Dep't of Land of & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). 
See supra notes 137-48 and accompanying text. 
368. 17 F.3d at 1472. 
369. Id. at 1469. 
370. Id.at1469L72. 
371. Id. (citing Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); Mackey v. Lanier Collection 
Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 US. 825 (1988); Shearson/ American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 
US. 220 (1987); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); United 
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 US. 121 (1985); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 
461 U.S. 574 (1983); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); United States v. Board 
of Comm'rs, 435 US. 110 (1978». 
372. 17 F.3d at 1471 (citing Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.c. Cir. 1989». 
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ultimately not be fully reconcilable.1I373 These decisions address the 
issue of when Congress' action or inaction constitutes ratification of 
an earlier judicial or administrative agency interpretation of a 
statute. 
Judge Williams concluded that lI[a]lthough the precedents are 
hardly in perfect harmony, the Supreme Court has generally refused 
to infer ratification from mere amendment of adjacent clauses in 
these circumstances.1I374 He also added that lI[a]s [Congressional] in-
action is inadequate to repeal a law, it should be inadequate to modify 
a law. Yet modification is required to sustain an interpretation that 
is invalid as against the original legislation. 11375 He asserted: 
373. 17 F.3d at 14n. 
Judge Williams, however, did not refer to the apparent alternative holding in Palila v. 
Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988), that "Congress' 
failure" to "modify the taking prohibition in any matter ... indicates satisfaction with the cur-
rent definition of harm and its interpretation by the Secretary and the judiciary" and that "the 
Secretary's interpretation is consistent with the presumption that Congress is 'aware of an 
administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and [adopts) that interpretation when it re-
enacts a statute without change.'" ld. at 1109 & n.6 (quoting Lindahl v. Office of Personnel 
Management, 470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15 (1985»; see supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text. 
Judge Williams also failed to cite or analyze Lindahl in his opinion for the court in Sweet Home 
11. 
In his analysis of decisions dealing with whether congressional action or inaction con-
stitutes ratification of an earlier judicial or administrative interpretation of a statute, Judge 
Williams in Sweet Home 11 stated: 
"Although we are chary of attributing significance to Congress' failure to act, a 
refusal by Congress to overrule an agency's construction of legislation is at least 
some evidence of the reasonableness of that construction, particularly where the 
administrative construction has been brought to Congress' attention through legis-
lation specifically designed to supplant it." 
17 F.3d at 1471 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, lnc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985». 
Judge Williams, however, did not explicitly apply this principle to the facts of the case in Sweet 
Home 11. He failed to consider that Congress' failure to amend the Act's definition of "take" in 
1982,. when members of a congressional subcommittee had knowledge of the Service's 1981 
redefinition of "harm" and the Palila 1 decision, was at least some evidence of the reasonable-
ness of the Service's interpretation of the Act. See id. at 1469. 
The support provided by Congress' failure in 1982 to amend the Endangered Species Act's 
definition of "take" is weaker, however, than the situation in Riverside Bayview. In Riverside 
Bayview, Congress had considered, but did not enact, bills that would have changed the Corps 
of Engineers' regulations providing that certain wetlands were with.io the definition of "waters 
of the United States: under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.c. § 1362(7) (1982), and there was 
discussion of the Corps' interpretation both in Committee reports and on the floors of both 
houses of Congress. See 474 U.S. at 135-39. 
However, when Congress amended the Endangered Species Act in 1982, a bill was 
introduced that would have amended the Act's definition of "take" to exclude some types of 
habitat modification but it was later withdrawn. 17 F.3d at 1467-69. Neither that withdrawn 
bill nor the Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" was cited or discussed in Committee reports 
or floor debates. See id. 
374. 17 F.3d at 1469. Congress in 1982 did not reenact or amend section 3(19),16 U.S.c. § 
1532(19) (1976), of the Endangered Species Act:- See Palila v. Hawaii Oep't of Land & Natural 
Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1109 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988); 17 F.3d at 1472. 
375. 17 F.3d at 1471 (emphasis added). 
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that the cases drawing inferences from [Congress'] inaction typi-
cally fail to address the serious jurisprudential problems of doing 
so-especially those captured in Judge Wald's observation that 
there are plenty of statutes "on the books for which no congres-
sional majority could presently be generated either to reenact or to 
repeal." It hardly seems consistent to enforce such statutes yet to 
accept non-amendment of an interpretation as the equivalent of 
congressional endorsement. 376 
227 
Judge Williams then concluded his analysis regarding whether 
Congress in 1982 had ratified the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 
regulation redefining "harm" as follows: 
If the 1982 Congress had reentlcted the pertinent sections of the 
... [Endangered Species Act] and "voice[d] its approval" of the ... 
[Fish and Wildlife Service's] interpretation, it might be appropriate 
to treat the reenactment as an adoption of that interpretation. Here, 
however, Congress neither reenacted the section having to do with 
"take," nor "voiced its approval" of the harm regulation .... [I]ts 
creation of the [§ 10 (a)(1)(B)] permit scheme is fully consistent with 
the meaning of "take" as enacted in 1973; the other developments 
show no more than awareness of the Service's view, its survival in 
Palila [IJ, and the absence of any action to endorse or repudiate 
those developments.377 
Accordingly, Judge Williams invalidated the Fish and Wildlife 
Service's regulation defining "harm" to include habitat modification 
and reversed the judgment of the district court "to that extent," but 
otherwise left the judgment of the court in Sweet Home I "un-
altered. "378 
Subsequently, in his statement Goined in by Judge Sentelle) sup-
porting the denial of appellees' petition for rehearing of Sweet Home 
II, Judge Williams noted that: 
The government faults the panel [in Sweet Home II) for failing to 
specify whether the regulation'S excess of statutory authOrity failed 
under the first or second "step" of the analysiS set forth in Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), Petition at 9-10, and in a 
more general way for failing to give the agency the deference that is 
its due under Chevron. Because the court in determining whether 
Congress "unambiguously expressed" its intent on the issue, see 467 
U.S. at 843, is to employ all the "traditional tools of statutory 
construction," INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987), the 
376. Id. at 1472 (citation omitted) (quoting Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 
458). 
377. rd. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
378. Id. 
228 J. LAND USE & ENVfL. L. (Vol. 10:2 
factors involved in the first "step" are also pertinent to whether an 
agency's interpretation is "reasonable". Thus the exact point where 
an agency interpretation falls down may be unclear. Indeed, the 
Chevron Court itself never specified which step it was applying at 
any point in its analysis, see 467 U.S. at 859-66. 
Nonetheless, we conclude that the statute, fairly read in the 
light of the "traditional tools of statutory interpretation", manifests a 
clear determination by Congress that the prohibitions of § 9 should 
not reach habitat modifications as defined by the Department, 
where there is no direct action by the defendant against any 
member of the species. Extending the word "harm" to reach habitat 
modification as so conceived carries § 9's prohibition far beyond the 
reach effected by all the other terms used in the definition; it applies 
to every citizen duties the Act expressly imposed only on federal 
government agencies; and it ignores the plausible inferences from 
the Senate's deletion of the phrase "habitat modification" from the 
draft bill. The extension vests the Department with authority to 
supervise the use of privately owned land in vast tracts of the 
United States, even to the point of forbidding modest clearing 
efforts conducted in the interest of fire protection in popUlated 
areas. Congress clearly did not hang so massive an expansion of 
government power on so slight a nail as § 9's provision that no one 
should "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, cap-
ture, or collect" an endangered sp'ecies.379 
Judge Williams in Sweet Home II changed his pOSition from his 
concurrence in Sweet Home I, in which he had agreed that the Fish 
and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" "complies with the 
Endangered Species Act-but only because ... the 1982 amendments 
to the ... [Act, enacting the section 10(a)(l)(B)380 incidental take 
permit provision] support the inference that the ... [Act] otherwise 
forbids some such incidental takings, including some habitat 
modification. "381 In Sweet Home II, Judge Williams changed his 
position with respect to section 10(a)(l)(B) and held that section 
lO(a)(l)(B) only applied to a "take" involving the direct application of 
force and did not "include the habitat modifications embraced by the 
Service's definition of 'harm."'382 Having changed his interpretation 
of section 10(a)(l)(B), which had been the only basis of his concur-
rence in Sweet Home I, Judge Williams joined Judge Sentelle in Sweet 
379. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 193 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (statement of 
Williams, J.) (citations omitted), em. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). 
380. 16 U.S.c. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1988). 
381. 1 F.3d at 11 (Williams, J., concurring) (emphasiS added). 
382. 17 F.3d at 1467. 
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Home II to hold invalid the Fish and Wildlife Service's regulation 
defining "harm" to include habitat modification. 
In Sweet Home II, Judge Sentelle concurred with Judge Williams' 
decision to reverse the district court judgment in part and stated that 
he remained of the view expressed in his Sweet Home ]383 dissent that 
the Service's definition of "harm" "cannot reasonably be defined to 
include the broadly prohibited habitat modification encompassed in 
the challenged regulation."384 Judge Sentelle stated that he found 
"the words and structure of the Act sufficiently clear as to require no 
resort to legislative history."38S He therefore concurred with "those 
portions of Judge Williams' opinion that ... [relied] on the structure 
of the Act and on the maxim of noscitur a sociis," and noted, as in his 
dissent in Sweet Home I, "that to define 'harm' as broadly as does the 
Secretary is to render all other words in the statutory definition of 
'taking' superfluous in violation of the presumption against sur-
plusage."386 
Chief Judge Mikva dissented in Sweet Home II,387 arguing388 that 
Judge Williams' majority decision on rehearing violated the Chevron 
U.S.A.389 doctrine.39O Chief Judge Mikva noted391 that Judge 
Williams only cited Chevron U.S.A. once in Sweet Home II, after he 
stated that the Fish and Wildlife "Service's definition of 'harm' was 
neither clearly authorized by Congress nor a 'reasonable interpreta-
tion' of the statute."392 Chief Judge Mikva quoted393 the following 
paragraph from Chevron U.S.A.: 
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute 
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, 
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is 
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, how-
ever, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of 
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or 
383. 1 F.3d at 11 (Sentelle, T., dissenting). See supra notes 312-20 and accompanying text. 
384. 17 F.3d at 1472 (Sentelle, J., concurring). 
385. [d. 
386. [d. 
387. [d. at 1473 (Mikva, CT., dissenting). 
388. Id. at 1473-78. 
389. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
390. See supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text. 
391. 17 F.3d at 1473 (Mikva, CT., dissenting). 
392. 17 F.3d at 1464. 
393. Id. at 1473 (Mikva, Cr, dissenting). 
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ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the 
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute.394 
Chief Judge Mikva then stated that: 
Plainly, Chevron does not place the burden on the responsible 
agency to show that its interpretation is clearly authorized or rea-
sonable. On the contrary, the burden is on the party seeking to 
overturn such an interpretation to show that Congress has clearly 
spoken to the contrary, or that the agency's interpretation is unrea-
sonable. The whole point of Chevron deference is that when Con-
gress has not given a clear command, we presume that it has 
accorded discretion to the agency to clarify any ambiguities in the 
statute it administers. In requiring the agency to justify its regula-
tion by reference to such a clear command, the majority confounds 
its role. Ties are supposed to go to the dealer under Chevron.395 
Chief Judge Mikva's dissent also criticized Judge Williams' ma-
jority opinion for failing to clarify whether the court was invalidating 
the Service's regulation defining "harm" under step one of Chevron 
U.S.A. because Congress clearly and unambiguously addressed the 
issue of whether "harm" includes "significant habitat modification 
[that] actually kills or injures wildlife," or under step two of Chevron 
U.S.A. because the Service's definition was not a permissible or 
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.396 Chief Judge 
Mikva argued that the Endangered Species Act, regarding step one 
of Chevron U.S.A., "surely ... is silent, or at best ambiguous on this 
question,"397 so that the only question under step two of the Chevron 
U.S.A. doctrine is: 
whether the ... [Service's] interpretation of the word "harm" con-
stitutes a "permissible" reading of the ambiguous language. The 
question is not . .. whether we think it constitutes the best reading. 
Under ... [Chevron U.S.A.], "[t]he court need not conclude that the 
agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have 
adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court 
would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judidal 
proceeding. "398 
Chief Judge Mikva asserted in his dissent in Sweet Home II that 
the majority violated the Chevron U.S.A. standard by substituting "its 
394. rd. (quoting 467 US. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted». 
395. rd. (Mikva, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
396. Id. at 1473-74. 
397. Id. 
398. Id. at 1474 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. 837, 843 & n.ll) (alteration in original) 
(emphasis added». 
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own favorite reading of the Endangered Species Act for that of the 
agency," when "the only question is the reasonableness of the agen-
cy's interpretation. A fair reading allows for no other conclusion 
than that the agency's interpretation is reasonable."399 
Chief Judge Mikva's dissent then criticized the majority for rely-
ing on the "seldom-invoked" noscitur a sociis principle of statutory 
construction.400 He argued that this principle was incorrectly ap-
plied by the majority,401 because the principle is applicable "when a 
potentially broad word appears in a definition . . . with a list of 
narrow words, II while the Act's definition of "take" includes several 
words, including "harass," "wound" and "kill," which "might be read 
as broadly, or nearly as broadly, as 'harm.'''402 
In his analysis of the noscitur a sociis maxim, Chief Judge Mikva 
distinguished the holding of United States v. Hayashi,403 upon which 
Judge Williams relied in his ,majority opinion,404 on the grounds that 
the Marine Mammal Protection Act's definition of "take"405 only in-
cludes the terms "harass," "hunt," "capture," and "kill," but not the 
"more expansive" terms "harm," "wound," and "pursue," found in the 
Endangered Species Act's definition of "take."406 Chief Judge Mikva 
also noted that Hayashi was decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which held in Palila II407 that the Service's "interpretation of 
'harm' to include significant habitat modification is consistent with 
the language, purpose, and legislative history" of the Endangered 
Species Act.408 
In his Sweet Home II dissent, Chief Judge Mikva also asserted that 
Judge Sentelle's use of the presumption against surplusage409 was 
"[e]quaUy [as] inappropriate" as his use of the noscitur a sociis 
399. rd.; see infra note 453. 
400. 17 F.3d at 1774. Chief Judge Mikva also concluded in Sweet Home I, 1 F.3d at 10 
(Mikva, c.J., concurring), that the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" was not 
impermissible under the noscitur a sociis maxim. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying 
text. 
401. 17 F.3d at 1475. , 
402. rd. at 1474. Chief Judge Mikva commented that the Fish and Wildlife Service "has 
defined ... 'harass' nearly as broadly as the term 'harm.'" and that the definition of "harass" 
had not been challenged. rd. at 1474-75. 
403. 5 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 1993). 
404. See supra notes 330-36 and accompanying text. 
405. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1988). See supra note 331. 
406. 17 F.3d at 1475 (Mikva, C,J., dissenting). 
407. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1107-09 (9th Cir. 
1988). 
408. 17 F.3d at 1475 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting). See supra notes 230-53 and accompanying 
text. Judge Mikva contended that "today's contrary decision thus creates a foolish circuit 
conflict." 17 F.3d at 1475 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). 
409. See id. at 1472 (Sentelle, J., concurring); Sweet Home v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 13 (D.c. Cir. 
1993) (Sentelle, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 319-20, 386 and accompanying text. 
232 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. [Vol. 10:2 
principle of statutory construction.410 Although conceding that 
"[t]here is no reasonable definition of the word 'harm' (or, for that 
matter, the word 'harass') that would not render superfluous some of 
the other defined terms," and that "one cannot 'kill' or 'wound' an 
animal without also 'harming' it, even under the narrowest conceiv-
able interpretation of 'harm',"411 Chief Judge Mikva argued that the 
majority's holding "read[s] 'harm' out of the statute altogether."412 
This result contradicts "Congress's [sic] intent ... to define takings 'in 
the broadest possible manner to include any conceivable way in 
which a person can "take" or attempt to "take" any fish or wild-
life.'''413 He added that: 
[d]efining "harm" to include "significant habitat modification" rend-
ers no more terms superfluous than would a definition that did not 
include habitat modification but did include "direct" forms of kil-
ling and wounding. And indeed, the majority's holding that "harm" 
cannot include indirect means of injuring wildlife may render 
"harm" itself superfluous, or nearly so, as "direct" means of injury 
are well covered by the other terms.414 
Chief Judge Mikva also contended that the legislative history re-
lating to the Endangered Species Act's taking provision,415 was "most 
ambiguous regarding whether Congress intended to include habitat 
modification within the meaning of 'take,"'416 contrary to the ma-
jority's conclusion that this legislative history of the "take" provision 
establishes that Congress "deliberate[ly] delet[ed] ... habitat modifi-
cation from the definition of 'take.'''417 Chief Judge Mikva pointed 
out in his Sweet Home II dissent, as well as his Sweet Home I concur-
rence,418 that there is nothing in the legislative history of the Act 
indicating why the Senate Commerce Committee adopted the 
definition of "take" in S. 1592 rather than S. 1983's definition of "take," 
which included habitat "destruction, modification, or curtailment."419 
He also noted that the term "harm" was added to the Act's definition 
of "take" on the floor of the Senate without a committee vote on the 
issue.42o Arguing that the floor addition of "harm" to the Act's 
410. 17 F.3d at 1475 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting). 
411. Id. 
412. Id. 
413. 1d. (quoting S. REp. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973». 
414. 17 F.3d at 1475 (Mikva. c.J., dissenting). 
415. See supra notes 285-89, 340-44 and accompanying text. 
416. 17 F.3d at 1476 (Mikva, C.]., dissenting). 
417. Id. at 1467. See supra notes 343-44 and accompanying text. 
418. 1 F.3d at 9 (Mikva. C.J., concurring). See supra notes 285-89 and accompanying text. 
419. 17 F.3d at 1474-76 (Mikva, C.]., dissenting). 
420. Id. at 1476. 
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definition of "take" "can only have broadened the definition from the 
bill reported out of Committee-'clarifying' that 'take' should be 
defined 'in the broadest possible manner,"'421 Chief Judge Mikva 
asserted that for purposes of the Chevron doctrine: 
fI1here is nothing to suggest that Congress chose the definition 
it did in order to exclude habitat modification. The Committee may 
have rejected the S. 1983 defmition only because it apparently 
would have made habitat modification a per se violation of the 
[Endangered Species Act], as opposed to leaving such determina-
tions to the discretion of the responsible agency. . . . Surely there is 
nothing to indicate that the Committee intended to foreclose an 
administrative regulation prohibiting habitat modification-
particularly a prohibition ... requiring that there be actual injury or 
death to wildlife.422 
As in his Sweet Home 1423 concurring opinion, Chief Judge Mikva 
argued in his Sweet Home II dissent that n[n]othing in the language of 
16 U.S.c. § 1534 or in the legislative history" establishes "that 
Congress intended land acquisition to be the exclusive instrument 
for curbing habitat modification on private lands. "424 He noted that 
Judge Williams referred only to floor statements by members of 
Congress425 to support his "totally speculative" "contention that 
Congress intended land acquisition [under 16 U.S.c. § 1534] to be the 
exclusive instrument for curbing habitat modification on private 
lands." Chief Judge Mikva argued "that 'debates in Congress expres-
sive of the views and motives of individual members are not a safe 
guide ... in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the law-mak-
ing body."'426 He added that "[i]n any case, these statements do not 
establish that even the speakers themselves intended land acquisi-
tion to be the exclusive protective mechanism for habitats on private 
lands. "427 
In his Sweet Home II dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Mikva 
found, as he had in his concurring opinion in Sweet Home I,428 that 
the Service's definition of "harm" was supported by Congress' 
421. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 3fJ7, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973». 
422. 17 F.3d at 1476 (Mikva, C.]., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
423. 1 F.3d at 9-10 (Mikva, C.]., concurring). See supra notes 294-98 and accompanying 
text. 
424. 17 F.3d at 1476. 
425. See supra notes 341-42 and accompanying text. 
426. 17 F.3d at 1476 (quoting Duplex Printing Press. Co. v. Deering, 2S4 U.s. 443, 474 
(1921». 
427. Id. (Mikva, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
428. 1 F.3d at 10-11 (Mikva, C.]., concurring). See supra notes 302-06 and accompanying 
text. 
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enactment in 1982 of section 10(a)(1)(B)'s incidental take permit pro-
vision.429 He interpreted the term "incidental takings" in section 
10(a)(1)(B) as meaning habitat modification, which would be pro-
hibited under the Act without a permit.43O Although he implied that 
the enactment in 1982 of this incidental take permit provision alone 
does not support a decision to uphold the Service's definition of 
"harm,"431 he asserted that the 1982 amendments to the Endangered 
Species Act "indicate that Congress in 1982 probably believed that 
habitat modification was properly covered by the prohibition on tak-
ings."432 He conceded that "the 1982 amendments prove little about 
Congress's [sic] intent in 1973," but he noted that Congress in 1973 
"was silent on the question" of whether "take" includes habitat modi-
fication.433 He argued that "[c]onsequently, the 1982 amendments 
.. , lend some weight to the reasonableness of the agency's 
definition-if Congress in 1982 believed the definition was reason-
able, and the agency believed it was reasonable, then Chevron [sic] 
demands that we uphold the regulation unless we find solid evi-
dence to the contrary. No such evidence exists."434 
Based on his analysis of "the language, structure, purpose, [and] 
legislative history"435 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and of 
the 1982 amendments to the Act and its legislative history, Chief 
Judge Mikva concluded in his Sweet Home II dissent that Congress 
had not "unambiguously command [ed]" that "harm" does not 
include habitat modification.436 He stated that "the statute ... [was] 
silent, or at best ambiguous,"437 on the question of whether "harm" 
includes "significant habitat modification [that] actually kills or 
injures wildlife."438 Thus, a court could not, under Chevron U.S.A., 
invalidate the Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" 
on the grounds that it is contrary to the clear or unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.439 
This conclusion by Chief Judge Mikva is clearly a correct applica-
tion of Chevron U.S.A. There is no clear language in the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973, the 1982 amendments to the Act, or legislative 
429. 17 F.3d at 1477-78 (Mikva, C.]., dissenting). 
430. [d. at 1477. 
431. Id. ("Uudge Williams in Sweet Home 1] was wrong to rely solely on the 1982 amend-
ments for his decision; I agree that they do not alone support its weight."). 
432. Id. 
433. Id. at 1477-78. 
434. Id. at 1478. 
435. 1d. at 1476. 
436. Id. at 1478. 
437. Id. at 1473-74. 
438. ld. 
439. ld. at 1476, 1478. 
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history of either, that expressed an unambiguous intent by Congress 
regarding whether "harm" includes "significant habitat modification 
[that] actually kills or injures wildlife."44O Furthermore, the noscitur a 
sociis and presumption against surplusage maxims do not demon-
strate an "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress"441 on this 
question within the meaning of the Chevron U.S.A. doctrine. Conse-
quently, because Congress has not unambiguously spoken to pro-
vide its clear intent on whether "harm" includes habitat modification, 
Chevron U.S.A. prohibits a court from imposing its own construction 
of the silent or ambiguous statute,442 and requires the court to 
uphold the Fish and Wildlife Service's definition of "harm" if it is a 
permissible or reasonable interpretation of the Act.443 
Judge Williams in his majority opinion in Sweet Home II incor-
rectly placed the burden on the Fish and Wildlife Service to show 
that Congress clearly authorized the Service's definition of "harm. "444 
As Chief Judge Mikva noted in his dissenting opinion in Sweet Home 
II, Chevron U.S.A. "does not place the burden on the responsible 
agency to show that its interpretation is clearly authorized or reason-
able. On the contrary, the burden is on the party seeking to overturn 
such an interpretation to show that Congress has clearly spoken to 
the contrary, or that the agency's interpretation is unreasonable."445 
Applying this interpretation of Chevron U.S.A., Chief Judge 
Mikva concluded in his Sweet Home II dissent that the Service's 
definition of "harm" "is a permissible exercise of its discretion as 
delegated by Congress," and therefore should be upheld under the 
Chevron U.S.A. doctrine.446 Chief Judge Mikva argued that the 
Service's definition was supported by legislative history of the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 "which suggest[s] that Congress en-
visioned a broad interpretation of 'take,' even before the crucial word 
'harm' was added to the definition of that term,"447 as well as by the 
440. rd. at 1473-74. 
441. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
442 ld. at 843-44. 
443. rd. at 843-45. 
444. 17 F.3d at 1464 ("We find that the Service's definition of 'harm' was neither clearly 
authorized by Congress nor a 'reasonable interpretation' of the statute."). This statement by 
Judge Williams, however, does not explicitly place the burden on the federal government to 
show that the Service's 1981 redefinition of "harm" is a reasonable interpretation of the Act, as 
Chief Judge Mikva contended. See supra note 395 and accompanying text. 
445. rd. at 1473 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see supra notes 395-96 and 
accompanying text. 
446. 17 F.3d at 1476 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting). 
447. ld. at 1477 (citing S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973) ('''Take' is defined ... in 
the broadest possible manner."»; H.R. REP. NO. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973) ("[The Act) 
includes, in the broadest possible terms, restrictions on the taking, importation and exporta-
tion, and transportation of [endangered) species, as well as other specified acts."); Sweet Home I, 
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1982 enactment of the section 10(a)(1)(B) incidental take permit pro-
vision.448 As Chief Judge Mikva stressed in his Sweet Home II dis-
sent, the majority in Sweet Home II made: 
no effort . . . to determine whether the agency could reasonably 
have relied on such [1982] amendments as persuasive evidence sup-
porting its interpretation. Instead, the agency ... [was] asked to 
prove that the best interpretation of "harm" encompasses habitat 
modification. Beginning from a wrong premise, applying a wrong 
standard, it is not surprising that the wrong result ... [was] 
achieved.449 
He added that the majority's decision created a split among the 
circuit court of appeals because "[t]he Ninth Circuit determined, in 
Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, . . . that the 
[Fish and Wildlife Service's] 'harm' definition was a permissible 
interpretation of the statute.114SO 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Judge Williams' majority opinion in Sweet Home II should be 
reversed by the United States Supreme Court. The Fish and Wildlife 
Service's definition of "harm" should be upheld by the Supreme 
Court under the Chevron U.S.A. doctrine as a reasonable and per-
missible interpretation of the Endangered Species Act, for the rea-
sons set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Palila II,451 and by Chief Judge 
Mikva in his concurring opinion in Sweet Home 1452 and in his 
dissenting opinion in Sweet Home II.453 The reasons for upholding 
1 F.3d at 11 (stating that "'[h]arass' includes activities of bird watchers 'where the effect of those 
activities might disturb the birds and make it difficult for them to hatch or raise their young'") 
(quoting 5. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973». Chief Judge Mikva also referred "to the 
floor amendment that added the word 'harm,' purportedly to 'clarify' language that was 
'omitted' from the draft that emerged from Committee." 17 F.3d at 1477 (quoting 119 CONGo 
REc. 525,683 Ouly 24, 1973) (statement by Sen. Tunney». 
448. 17 F 3d at 1477-78 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting). See supra notes 429-39 and accompanying 
text. 
449. 17 F.3d at 1478 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). 
450. Id. (citing 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988». See supra notes 229-55 and accompanying 
text. 
451. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1108.{)9 (9th Cir. 
1988). See supra notes 230-53 and accompanying text 
452. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1,8 (D.c. Cir. 1993) (Mikva, C.]., concurring), 
modified on other grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.c. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.c. Cir. 1994), 
art. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-859). See supra notes 283-308 and accom-
panying text. 
453. Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1473 (D.c. Cir. 1994) (Mikva, q., 
dissenting), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Oan. 6, 1995) 
(No. 94-859). Judge Silberman, in a dissenting opinion. joined by Chief Judge Mikva and Judge 
Wald, argued that: 
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the Service's definition of "harm," as a reasonable and permissible 
interpretation of the Endangered Species Act, include: (1) that the 
Service's definition furthers both the Act's purpose of conserving 
wildlife habitat and Congress' intent to define "take" as broadly as 
possible to protect wildlife;454 and (2) Congress' enactment in 1982 of 
the section 10(a)(1)(B) incidental taking permit provision provides 
reasonable support for the Service's interpretation of "harm" to 
include habitat modification.455 The Fish and Wildlife Service's 
definition of "harm" should not be found to be unreasonable or im-
permissible under a Chevron U.S.A. analysis, either because habitat 
modification was deleted from the original version of S. 1983,456 
because of the legislative history with respect to the federal land 
acquisition program under section 4 of the Act,457 or because of the 
Assuming the challenge to the regulation is ripe and that Chevron [sic] controls 
our review, I think the Chief Judge [Mikva] has the better of the argument. . .. I 
do not think ... that the majority has submitted to the diSCipline of the Chevron 
[sic] framework and given the Department of Interior its due deference. It was 
certainly not apparent whether the majority's initial opinion rested on Chevron 
[sic] Step I or Step II. In its response to the government's petition for rehearing, 
the panel majority appears to shift perceptibly to a Step I "clear determination by 
Congress, n against which no deference to the agency's interpretation is appro-
priate. I do not find in either the statutory language or the legislative history any 
such fixed view. And at the second step (which is where I would analyze the 
case), maxims of statutory construction like noscitur a sociis, although not totally 
irrelevant, certainly have less force. See Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. 
Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1292-93 (D.C Cir.), affd per curiam by an equally divided 
cqurl, 493 U.s. 38 (1989). I quite agree with the panel that "the factors involved in 
the first 'step' are also pertinent to whether an agency's interpretation is 'reason-
able;'· ... but when thinking of the statute at that second step, one must assume 
that the statute has more than one plaUSible construction as it applies to the case 
before you. If the agency offers one-it prevails. 
Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Silberman J., dissenting from 
the denial of rehearing en bane) (some citations omitted), eert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 Gan. 6, 
1995) (No. 94-859). Judge Silbennan's opinion in Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. 
Thornburgh, 868 F.2d at 1292, states that: 
Id. 
Chevron implicitly precludes courts picking and choosing among various canons 
of statutory construction to reject reasonable agency interpretations of amqiguous 
statutes. If a statute is ambiguous, a reviewing court cannot reverse an agency 
decision merely because it failed to rely on anyone of a number of canons of con-
struction that might have shaded the interpretation a few degrees in one direction 
or another. 
454. See Palila II, 852 F.2d at 1108-09; Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d at 8-9 (Mikva, 
CJ., concurring); Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d at 1476-77 (Mikva, CJ., dissenting). 
See supra notes 24.5-46 and accompanying text. 
455. See Sweet Home Chapter v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d at 1477-78 (Mikva, CJ., dissenting). See 
supra notes 428-39 and accompanying text. 
456. See 17 F.3d at 1467. See supra notes 343-44 and accompanying text. 
457. See 17 F.3d at 1466. See supra notes 340-42 and accompanying text. 
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statutory construction maxims of noscitur a sociis458 or surplusage.459 
Chief Judge Mikva in his Sweet Home 1460 concurrence and in his 
Sweet Home II461 dissent presented reasonable rebuttals to each of 
these arguments. The Fish and Wildlife Service's 1981 regulation re-
defining "harm" is a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous provi-
sions of the Endangered Species Act and should be upheld under the 
Chevron U.S.A. doctrine. 
Furthermore, courts should liberally construe the Service's 1981 
redefinition of "harm." This liberal construction should prohibit acts, 
including habitat modification, that kill or physically injure indi-
vidual wild animals and acts, including habitat modification, that 
adversely impact entire species' - or a large number of animals'-
breeding, feeding, or sheltering, causing a decline in the species' 
population and threatening the species with extinction or preventing 
the species from recovering. 
The Service's definition of "harm" also should be interpreted to 
prohibit local, state, or federal governmental officials or agencies 
from permitting, licensing, or funding another person's act that 
would "take" an endangered or threatened species, when such au-
thorization or funding is a prerequisite to that other person's act. In 
addition, the failure of a person or agency to perform a duty should 
be a "harm" that is prohibited by the Service's regulations and the 
Act when that omission causes death or injury to a protected species. 
As noted by Chief Judge Mikva in his dissent in Sweet Home II, 
"[t]he purpose of the Endangered Species Act, lest we forget, is to 
protect endangered species. In [Sweet Home II's] abandonment of 
[the panel's] decision of less than a year ago, [the] court ... [took] a 
large step backward from that purpose. The majority [in Sweet Home 
II] may believe it ... [made] good policy-but that is not [a court's] 
job."462 
458. See 1 F.3d at 12-13 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). See supra notes 316-18 and accompanying 
text. 
459. See 1 F.3d at 13 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). See supra notes 319-20 and accompanying 
text. 
460. 1 F.3d at 8-11 (Mikva, c.J., concurring). See supra notes 283-308 and accompanying 
text. 
461. 17 F.3d at 1473-78 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting). See supra notes 387-450 and accom-
panyingtext. 
462. 17 F.3d at 1478 (Mikva, c.J., dissenting); see Federico Cheever, An Introduction to the 
Prohibition Against Takings in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live With 
a PlJWerfuI Species Preseroation Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 109 (1991). 
